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A B S T R A C T  
This research examines how legal practitioners discursively construct corruption from 
their experience as users of the services of a public institution. In the legal field, 
corruption is a word rarely used in connection with practitioners, it is substituted with a 
less felonious alternative, ‘misconduct’. As a result, this research focuses on how legal 
practitioners talk about their interaction with the public institution, especially their 
construction of corrupt transactions. This qualitative study is located within the 
interpretive paradigm of social constructionism, and the primary source of data is from 
semi-structured interviews. Due to the focus on talk, the study adopts the philosophies of 
discourse analysis for collected data.  
Contrary to the popular assumptions that participants in corrupt transactions are unwilling 
to talk about their involvement, the findings revealed that participants are willing to talk 
about their involvement in corrupt practice, but mainly through the use of euphemisms. 
The empirical contribution of this study suggests on one hand that the extensive use of 
euphemisms in the construction of the self, processes of corrupt interaction and actions, 
illustrates the significance of language use in the study of corruption. On the other hand, 
it emphasises the extent of ‘ethical fading’ and moral disengagement amongst 
professional service users which is due in part to their popular typecasting as victims, and 
the inherently contradictory principles of practice within the legal field.      
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C H A P T E R  1   
R E S E A R C H  O V E R V I E W  
At the start of this research journey, my perception of the Nigerian bureaucracy mirrored 
the ‘fantastically corrupt’ view expressed by the English Prime Minister, David Cameron 
(BBC, May 2016). This perspective of the bureaucracy was heavily influenced by my 
professional interaction with the Lands Bureau of Lagos state. In my capacity as a legal 
practitioner, I have had frequent interactions with this key parastatal of the Lagos state 
government and as such I am familiar with the informal notoriety of the Bureau as a den 
of corruption (Ajayi, 2016). Consequently, the first set of meetings with my supervisors 
in 2012 was dominated by my argument that the Lands Bureau singularly had a problem 
of bad leadership, which I was ready to investigate. The research was entered into in order 
to understand why some departments functioned better than others in this Nigerian public 
institution. The strategic importance of the Lands Bureau to a society (Hudson, 2016) 
also made it the ideal institution for this study.   
After the first year of critically reviewing the literature on the Nigerian bureaucracy and 
corruption in general, I found one key stakeholder that was always typecasted and ignored 
at the same time, the public service user. Once her status as a ‘victim’ has been established 
no further thought is given to her, rather the discussion turns to an extensive analysis of 
the public official, his role in corrupt transactions and its various impact on services, 
organisations and even societies. But no similar in-depth understanding is shown with 
regards to service users, almost as if she has been ruled a passive participant and her role 
is deemed inconsequential. This led me to reflect on how my behaviour, action or inaction 
as a service user has impacted on the Lands Bureau. As a result, I came to the realisation 
that perhaps I eagerly adopted the popular understanding of bureaucratic corruption 
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because it pushes the responsibility for such transactions to others and leaves me guilt 
free to go about making these types of informal transactions as a ‘victim’. This view 
influenced the later progression of the research, from the research question to the 
participants I approach for data.     
The remainder of this chapter introduces the context of the study by highlighting the 
underlying necessity of the research. It states the research question, the aims and 
objectives of the study and provides justification for the nature of the research. It further 
discusses the expected contributions to be made to the research area and provides a 
pictorial synopsis of the thesis.       
1 . 1 .  C o r r u p t i o n :  A  N o n - W e s t e r n  P r o b l e m ?  
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon from which no nation is completely immune. In 
the West, the famous Lockheed scandal of the 20th century comes to mind as it saw the 
payment of millions of dollars by the American aviation giant in bribe money to 
encourage the international sale of their products (Legan, 2013). The significance of this 
case lies in the fact that it had a far-reaching international impact that not only led to the 
probing and indictment of officials and individuals in Japan, the United States, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Indonesia amongst others (Leigh & Evans, 2007; Carr & Outhwaite, 
2008). It put the spotlight on the popular act of bribe payment among American 
companies to overseas government officials (Pae, 2008) and informed the promulgation 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in America.  
Heralding the 21st century was a succession of corporate scandals which pointed to the 
lingering height of corruption in corporate America, starting from the class leading Enron 
scandal, to the WorldCom and Tyco scandals amongst others (Fleming & Zyglidopoulos, 
2009, p. 1–2). While in the United Kingdom, the pervasiveness of corporate corruption 
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was highlighted by the alleged presence of a high rate of insider trading which is reflected 
in the buying behaviour that precedes most mergers and acquisitions (Ibid, p. 2). The 
actions of public officials have not been spared either from the influence of corruption. 
This is seen from the scrutiny that some UK MPs came under over allegations of corrupt 
practices with regards to their expense accounts in 2009 (Evans, 2010). More recently is 
the alleged rise in unmonitored levels of corruption in the United Kingdom’s police force 
(Halliday, 2015; Wilson, 2016; Darbyshire, 2015; BBC, 2015). Thus, revealing that 
corruption is as present in the developed countries as it is in other nations at varying 
stages of development. 
Based on the foregoing, it is interesting that the focus of international organisations and 
most research on corruption is in the developing country contexts like it exists solely in 
these regions. This raises questions such as, does the level of refinement of the corrupt 
activity matter in determining whether an action is corrupt or not? Or is it the level of 
modernisation of the society that determines whether an act should be defined as corrupt? 
Based on a certain level of agreement that corruption involves exploiting a position or 
person in position in order to gain a specific advantage, lobbying and election campaign 
sponsoring which is prevalent in Western countries bear a strong resemblance to bribing 
public officials in order to influence their decisions (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 
2009, p. 90). Thus, a case may be made for the fact that while the developed countries 
may have moved on to what is described as ‘complex forms of corruption’ (Thompson, 
2000, p. 6) which encompasses the ‘shadowy world of implicit understandings, 
ambiguous favours and political advantage (Ibid, p. 7), developing states are still basking 
in simplicity and the easily identifiable forms of corruption that are the focus of various 
corruption surveys.  
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Measurements of corruption perception, most of which have been based on quantitative 
surveys by international organisations, have suggested the prevalence of the phenomenon 
in developing countries (Ikeayinbe, 2016). Its pervasiveness is argued to be a key 
contributor to the current state of poverty and public sector inefficiency, and a deluge of 
other ills, in the countries affected (World Bank, 1997). In the case of a developing 
country like Nigeria, past reforms have had little to no effect in reducing incidents of 
bureaucratic corruption or improving the efficiency and performance of the institution 
(Ahmed, 2007). This, therefore, calls into question the understanding of the problem the 
reforms were supposed to address.  
The popular understanding of corruption hinges on public officials being the main 
culprits. To this end, they have been depicted as the sole drivers of bureaucratic 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Hyden, 1995; World Bank, 1997) and this has been 
the basis of public service reforms. However, in certain forms of corruption, e.g. bribery, 
a bureaucratic official cannot be corrupt on her own as it involves more than one 
participant (Sikka & Lehman, 2015). One stakeholder that the official comes into regular 
contact with is the user of their services, but the service user is not usually considered as 
the initiator of a corrupt transaction, resulting in a scarcity of research examining her as 
a possible facilitator of these kinds of transactions. Questioning the current 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon, this study transfers the focus from the official to 
another participant, the service user, to examine her role in corrupt practices within the 
bureaucracy.   
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1 . 2 .  T h e y  a r e  A l l  C o r r u p t  
‘Luke, you are going to find that many of the truths we cling to depend greatly 
on our own point of view’ (Obi-Wan Kenobi, (1983) in the movie Star Wars: 
Return of the Jedi). 
‘They are all corrupt here!’ was a common sentiment encountered by Dracklé (2005, p. 
194) in his research on corruption in the south of Portugal. This statement characterises 
the international and local perception of corruption and the nature of its research. 
Generally, the term ‘corrupt’ denotes a form of moral condemnation (Larmour, 2009, p. 
121) that symbolises something intrinsically negative which leads most people to distance 
themselves from the act. In this respect, the definition of corruption is important as it 
determines the participants and actions which constitute the phenomenon.  
The role of the World Bank in the international society and their self–construct as experts 
in this area is significant as it encourages an adoption of a particular view of the 
phenomenon. This has led to the popularity of the Bank’s definition of corruption as ‘the 
abuse of public office for private gain’ (World Bank, 1997, p. 8) According to Polzer 
(2001) the conception of corruption by the Bank is value-laden and it acts as an ‘othering’ 
tool (p. 11). In other words, corruption is always perpetrated by other countries, other 
organisations or someone else (Lazar, 2005; Lennerfors, 2009). The Bank’s conception 
of corruption is based on a Western understanding of the phenomenon, ‘othering’ in this 
sense excludes Western countries and suggests that it is more of a developing country 
issue. This is reflected in the Bank and other international financial institutions (e.g. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) funding 
policies in countries regarded as having weak governance and economic structures (News 
& Notices, 1999). The general adoption of this frame of understanding corruption means 
that the ‘othering’ feature also finds its way into the local understanding of the concept 
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and a similar form of externalisation is thus reflected, just like in the phrase earlier quoted 
from Dracklé.  
Such adoption could mean that while it is easier to scrutinise the activities of others based 
on a popular understanding of corruption, the individual does not pay attention to how 
their actions and behaviour affect the perpetuation of the phenomenon and the society as 
a whole. In this context, whereas public officials are accused of corrupt practices it can 
be argued that there is a lack of self–awareness on the part of service users as to the impact 
of their actions on its reproduction. The same can also be said of the actions of 
international financial institutions. While the institutions’ sole focus is on opening the 
economy of a developing country up to the international society by reducing corruption 
through the improvement of governance and economic structures in the society (Hindess, 
2004), recommended policies are generally based on a western understanding of what 
‘should’ work (Polzer, 2001) e.g. the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the 
1990s. These policies were deemed counterproductive as their implementation resulted 
in an increase in corrupt practices and further economic downturn in target countries 
(Fidler, 2000). Policies based on a similar understanding of the phenomenon are still 
being presented despite their ineffectiveness over the decades (Polzer, 2001). This leads 
to a discussion of the objectives of this research.   
1 . 3 .  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  S t u d y    
This study represents a departure from the mainstream focus on public officials to address 
the knowledge gap that has been created on the role of service users’ in corrupt 
transactions. As such, it aims to understand the phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption 
as constructed by professional service users of a public bureaucracy. Through an analysis 
of their spoken experience, the goal is to illustrate how Users perception of the 
phenomenon has influenced their behaviour and interaction with the bureaucracy. 
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The study expects to provide deeper insights into the phenomenon, contribute to the 
sparse literature on service user corruption and inform reform policies targeted at 
reducing incidents of corruption in the public bureaucracies of developing countries, 
while also providing data for further studies in this area. 
1 . 4 .  T h e  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n  
In line with the stated objectives and the present nature of corruption research, the 
question to be examined in this study is “are service users merely the ‘unfortunate’ 
victims of bureaucratic corruption or co-producers of corruption?” 
1 . 5 .  S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  S t u d y  
Aside from previously stated arguments for considering corruption from a user 
perspective, two other arguments for this study is put forward in this section – the focus 
on the use of language in constructing corruption and the relevance of the research 
country. 
This research focuses on how corruption is discursively constructed through ‘talk’. Very 
few research in this area adopts a discursive view of corruption (Polzer, 2001; Gupta, 
2005). Due to the sensitive nature of the phenomenon, it is difficult to obtain natural data 
by way of observation (Blundo & de Sardan, 2006), thus, most researchers adopt a 
quantitative approach and this has contributed to the popularity in the use of surveys in 
corruption research. The focus on talk is essentially an examination of descriptions and 
words used in constructing everyday reality. This enables a deconstruction of metaphors 
and expressions to provide a better understanding of service users’ encounters with the 
bureaucracy and their role in corrupt transactions. 
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The significance of Nigeria in this study stems not only from its regional influence in 
sub-Saharan Africa. As a developing country that is constantly ranked low on 
international corruption perception surveys, e.g. it ranked 136 out of 168 countries 
(Transparency International, 2015), the findings and discussion from this country may be 
applicable to the situation in other developing countries with similar structures and 
experiences.  
The next section provides a pictorial guide to the contents of the thesis. 
1 . 6 .  S y n o p s i s  o f  T h e s i s   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Nigerian Public 
Administration through the 
Years 
Sets the scene for the study by 
highlighting the state of corruption 
research, how the study aims to 
contribute to it through its 
objectives and questions.   
Reviews the Nigerian context by 
considering the historical evolution of 
the public bureaucracy, and the past 
& present reform efforts.  
Chapter 3 
The Concept of Corruption 
Commences with a discussion of the 
definitions and theoretical 
perspectives on corruption and its 
various components. Then proceeds 
to the examination of service user 
corruption literature and corruption as 
conceptualised in the legal profession 
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Chapter 4 
Research Design, 
Methodology and 
Analytical Methods  
It discusses the underlying 
constructionist and interpretivist 
philosophy of this study which 
informed the qualitative case study 
approach and discursive method 
adopted for the analysis.   
Chapter 5 
The Lands Bureau: Service 
User Perception and 
Experiences 
Chapter 6 
Discussion of Findings 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The analysed data is presented here. 
The chapter is divided into two parts 
with the first part describes the data 
from the Lands Bureau and their 
perspective on concluding land 
transactions. While the second part 
juxtaposes this with service users 
description of their experiences.        
Details the theoretical linkage of the 
findings to existing literature. This is 
divided into two parts; the first part 
discusses findings on ‘talk’ e.g. the use 
of euphemisms to describe corrupt 
practices. The second part describes 
findings that focus on the nature of the 
‘interaction’ with the Lands Bureau.  
This chapter closes the discussion by 
providing answers to the research 
question. It discusses the 
contributions of this research and the 
implications thereof.  
  
21 
 
 
1 . 7 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
The understanding of public sector corruption is based on the fact that it is only carried 
out by public office holders and this is gleaned from the way the phenomenon is defined. 
The narrowness of this conceptualisation is emphasised by the different situations which 
may carry the tag ‘corrupt’, especially in situations where the initiator is not an office 
holder, while some situations may be easily identified others may not be so simple. Thus 
this informed an objective of this study to examine a stakeholder that is less understood 
in corruption studies, in order to explore such ambiguous situations. Aside from 
contributing to the little research that has been done in this area, this perspective is also 
significant for policy makers that are focused on reducing incidents of corruption in the 
public service.  
To set the context for this research, the next chapter delves into a detailed review of the 
literature on the historical evolution of the bureaucracy in Nigerian.        
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C H A P T E R  2  
N I G E R I A N  P U B L I C  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  T H R O U G H  
T H E  Y E A R S   
This research was begun based on the researcher’s perception that Nigeria’s public 
bureaucracies are ‘fantastically corrupt’ (BBC, 2016) and inefficient. The notion was 
founded not only on Nigeria’s ranking as a very corrupt country on corruption indexes 
provided by international organisations (such as the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and Transparency International (TI), but also on the researcher’s experience 
interacting with different public institutions in the region, most notably the Lands Bureau 
of Lagos state. This view led to the desire to better understand the bureaucracy and the 
issues that have led to a perception of poor performance on its part. The importance of 
this perspective lies in the fact that public bureaucracies play an important role in 
developing countries, and this role has been described as being key to the developmental 
process in those societies (Palombara, 2006). Consequently, this chapter reviews the 
literature on public administration in Nigeria and its development through the years.  
The rest of the chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section describes the 
colonial history of Nigerian bureaucracy, focusing on the Southern administration where 
the Lands Bureau of Lagos is located. How the post–colonial bureaucracy evolved is 
described in the second section, followed by a discussion of the current state of the 
institution and its post–independence performance. This section provides a detailed 
discussion of the perceived causes of the bureaucracy’s problems. The third section 
considers some post–independence reform efforts that were designed to improve the 
performance of Nigerian public institutions. A chapter summary and guidance for the 
next chapter is provided in the fourth section.      
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2 . 1 .  C o l o n i a l  R o o t s  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  B u r e a u c r a c y  
Arguably, the bureaucracy of a state may be seen as a reflection of the larger society. This 
is owed to the fact that the society, like public administration, is moulded by, amongst 
other things, the different experiences, history, values and culture of its people (Hyden, 
Jackson & Okumu, 1970; Claver et al, 1999) and the Nigerian bureaucracy is no 
exception.  
The establishment of bureaucratic institutions in Nigeria can be traced to British colonial 
activities in the region (Anene, 1966). In the early periods of colonial administration, 
Nigeria was divided into three separate regions. These were the Colony of Lagos, the 
Southern Protectorate and the Northern Protectorate. Although the different regions were 
conquered by Britain, each was administered independently from the other (Afigbo, 1991; 
Coleman, 1958) and thus evolved different forms of public administration. In 1906, the  
Figure 1: Geographical Boundaries of Colonial Nigeria 
 
Source: Rossiter & Flower (1986) 
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administration of the Colony of Lagos and those of the Southern protectorate were 
merged (Burns, 1955) and both  were administered as ‘Southern Nigeria’ protectorate 
(See Figure. 1). With this consolidation, Nigeria was effectively divided into Southern 
and Northern protectorates with each having its own form of public administration and 
bureaucracy shaped by the different history, culture and experiences of its people. 
Differences may have been exacerbated by the nature of traditional forms of 
administration in each region, thus contributing to the character and style of the 
bureaucracy that developed. As the focus of the research is on the Southern bureaucracy, 
the next section will proceed with a description of pre–colonial administrative styles in 
Southern Nigeria. 
2 . 1 . 1 .  T r a d i t i o n a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  S o u t h e r n  
P r o t e c t o r a t e  
Nigeria is home to over 350 ethnic groups (Otite, 1990) with a large concentration of 
these in the Southern part of the country. Describing the nature of the region, the 
renowned Nigerian historian, Anene argued that ‘the linguistic heterogeneity is so marked 
that neighbouring villages speak languages which are mutually unintelligible’ (Anene, 
1966, p. 8). This makes it impractical to discuss the nature of administration under all the 
ethnic groups in the region. As such, the section will only be focusing on traditional 
administration amongst the two dominant ethnic groups in the region – the Yorubas and 
the Igbos.   
Pre–colonial administration amongst the dominant groups in the South was characterised 
by semi-centralised and in some places completely decentralised structures. The Yorubas 
occupy the western part of the country where they operated a highly centralised socio–
political structure in the 17th and 18th century (under the Oyo Empire) (Eades, 1980).  
As a result of internal squabbles amongst the ruling class, the empire was fragmented into 
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autonomous states with semi-centralised administrative structures (Coleman, 1958). The 
office of the ‘commoner chief’ is a salient feature of the administrative order in the 
Yoruba society. This is because they were regarded as the king-makers and thus acted as 
checks on the powers of the king; this gave them the power to depose an erring monarch 
(Eades, 1980). As the name implies, they did not need to be of royal descent and could 
be chosen from any of the state’s traditional groups and societies.  
In contrast, the Igbos are located in the eastern part of the country in a society that was 
made up of small independent villages and operated a decentralised administrative 
structure (Coleman, 1958). Administration of the village unit is described as reflecting a 
form of ‘village democracy’ (Anene, 1966, p. 12) that made governance the responsibility 
of everyone. The ‘Council of Elders’ is the closest to a formal administrative organ in the 
region and it consists of the heads of different lineages; they do not strictly speaking 
perform the duties of legislatures, executives or judiciaries, rather they are seen as arbiters 
and keepers of the customs and traditions (Ibid, 1966, p. 13). The densely forested nature 
of this region has been suggested as a reason for the decentralised political order 
(Coleman, 1958). The topography prevented easy interactions between the villages and 
also the possibility of invasions (Anene, 1966). Hence, it was the last region in the area 
to be colonised by the British (Dudley, 1968). 
During the period before the colonial conquest, the entire Southern region was filled with 
the activities of European merchants and Christian Missionaries (Eades, 1980), this was 
mainly due to the coastal nature of the region (See Fig. 1). In the bid to convert the locals 
to Christianity, Missionary schools were established in the region as early as in the 1840s 
(Jarmon, 1988), long before the formal establishment of colonial governance in Lagos in 
the 1860s and in the other parts of the Southern region in the late 1880s (Burns, 1955). 
Thus, the growth of western–styled education amongst the people of the region meant 
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that there were qualified natives to take up positions in the colonial bureaucracy upon its 
establishment. The next section turns to a discussion of the growth of the colonial 
bureaucracy in Southern Nigeria.        
2 . 1 . 2 .  T h e  S o u t h e r n  C o l o n i a l  B u r e a u c r a c y   
The merger of the Southern administrations in 1906, i.e. the Colony of Lagos and the 
Southern Protectorate, saw a unified colonial bureaucracy within the region (Burns, 
1955). For administrative convenience, the region was subdivided into three provinces 
(see Fig. 2), the Western, Central and Eastern provinces (Nicolson, 1969). The  
Figure 2: Provincial representation of Southern Nigeria 
     
 Source: Adapted from Anene (1969) 
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administrative structure is centralised (See Fig. 3) with its epicentre in Lagos (Western 
region), where matters from the different provinces are referred. The administrative head 
of each province is called the Provincial Commissioner. The day-to-day running of the 
province is the duty of the Resident and this includes overseeing the administrative, 
judicial and political affairs amongst the natives (Nicolson, 1969). In the initial periods 
of colonial administration, there was a shortage of European manpower in the colonial  
Figure 3: Structural Representation of the Southern Colonial Bureaucracy
  
     
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by the researcher based on data from Crocker (1936) and Nicolson (1969) 
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Bureaucracy. This shortage of foreign manpower was due to the health challenges 
encountered by Europeans in West Africa. There was a high death rate from malaria fever 
and other diseases common to the tropics, and this earned the region the label of ‘the 
White man’s grave’, (Olusanya, 1982, p. 175). As a result of these issues, recruitment 
and advancement within the colonial bureaucracy were based solely on the skills and 
merit exhibited by the available population, until the arrival of British personnel (Crocker, 
1936). The late 1880s heralded the arrival of British personnel to the colonial service. 
This turning point is marked by the discovery of a cure for malaria, making the region 
more habitable. According to Crocker, a Resident Officer in the colonial bureaucracy, 
this group of recruits were barely more educated than the Africans they were meant to 
take over from, in some cases the locals were more educationally qualified, as they were 
mostly war veterans with ‘chequered careers’ (Ibid, p. 199). Their arrival, however, 
signalled changes in the practices of the bureaucracy which in turn affected its structure. 
One of the first features to suffer was meritocracy in the recruitment and promotion of 
Africans. In its place was the introduction of the practice of exclusion and the gradual 
demarcation of the colonial service along racial lines (Olusanya, 1982). Under the new 
practice, the higher cadre of the service was dominated by Europeans while the lower 
rung by the locals, irrespective of educational qualifications (Tamuno, 1972). Due to this 
arrangement, the higher cadre of the bureaucracy was addressed as the ‘European or 
British service’ while the lower cadre was called the ‘African service’ (Nicolson, 1969, 
p. 218); until 1946 when the Harragin Commission recommended that the names be 
changed to ‘senior’ and ‘junior’ services (Ibid, p. 249). 
The practice of exclusion in the colonial bureaucracy had a major impact on the local 
population. It resulted in the locals viewing the institution as an alien entity, in which 
they had no sense of belonging (Olusanya, 1982, p. 183). This conception of the 
bureaucracy persisted even after the independence of the Nigerian state. Accordingly, 
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Marinho, a former head of the Public Service Commission of the Western Region noted 
that the bureaucracy is still viewed as: 
A foreign capitalistic organisation owned by the White man for the purpose of the 
White man . . . An organisation in which the indigenous participator regarded 
himself, and perhaps correctly so, in the scheme of things as then prevailed not as 
owners of, nor even partners in the service, but as hired labourer with his monthly 
cash payment as the only motivation to work and as the only connecting link, a 
very tenuous one between him and those he professed to serve. In many quarters 
then, the approach to Civil Service was characterised by the old saying that 
‘whether the business prospers or not, the labourer must be paid their wages in 
full’. This generally speaking has been the way in which the public service has 
been conceived (Marinho, 1967, p. 97).       
This perspective of the bureaucracy resulted in Nigerians seeking out professions that 
provided them with alternative employment besides those of the colonial service, which 
led to the increase in the number of law and medical graduates (Olusanya, 1982, p. 179), 
as these professions allowed for private practice. 
In the 1940s, the colonial administrator at the time, Sir Arthur Richards introduced a 
‘Nigerianisation’ policy geared towards including the locals in the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy. Considering the ‘psychological fear of discrimination and domination’ 
(Kirk-Greene, 1975, pp. 19–20) that had been ingrained in the regional elites, this became 
a scramble for controlling representation in the regions, The policy evolved into a 
regionalisation policy which was expressed in the ‘northernisation’ (Mustapha, 2007, p. 
6), westernisation and easternisation of the civil service in the different regions (Gboyega, 
1984). In other words, each region undertook to populate their civil service with natives 
of that region. For the Southern regions it was much easier to achieve as the lower rung 
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of the colonial bureaucracy had been dominated by people from these regions, so most of 
the junior officials took up senior appointments with regional services (Oyovbaire, 1983). 
Regionalisation of the bureaucracy divided the institution into four parts, thus, in addition 
to the central colonial administration each region of the country (the west, east and north) 
then had the opportunity to develop its own civil service. Although the regions had a level 
of autonomy in the recruitment and promotion of officials, they were still subject to the 
control of the central colonial office and this reflected in the continuation of the practice 
of Europeans not serving under the locals (Nicolson, 1969) until they decided to leave 
the service.       
Aside from the issue of discrimination, some other problems identified in the colonial 
bureaucracy includes: 
1. Over-centralisation and lack of delegation – for example, there were frequent 
referrals by the provinces to the central service for guidance on practical 
application of policies and the running of day-to-day affairs (Crocker, 1936). The 
process involved was laboriously slow, as the request moved from the department 
heads, through to the residents until it finds its way to the office of the Governor-
General (Ibid, p. 237) (See Fig. 3, p. 25 for the different stages involved). The 
convoluted practice characterised most of the workings of the service and as such 
resulted in poor time management in the conclusion of tasks.   
2. Patronage – Started with the initial recruitment and posting of officials by the 
Colonial Office in London. Relationships with this key department determined if 
and what calibre of recruits a protectorate got, which has resulted in the creation 
of patron–client relationships (Tamuno, 1972, p. 199), a feature of the Nigerian 
colonial service. Due to the discriminatory practices within the bureaucracy, the 
institution was left with a limited number of locals in the lower echelon, and this 
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resulted in the need for patronage in order to attract locals into the colonial service 
(Nicolson, 1969, p. 230).        
3. More time spent on mundane issues – The huge number of senior officials to 
junior officials (See Fig. 3) has created the need for senior officials to spend more 
time on routine and mundane issues that could have normally been carried out by 
juniors (Crocker, 1936, p. 238).    
4. Competition amongst officials – attributed to the lack of esprit de corps amongst 
officials (Ibid, p.  239). The nature of the colonial civil service in Nigeria was 
such that, promotion to higher positions such as Residents and above is based on 
the recommendations of the Governor and his Lieutenants (Nicolson, 1969). 
Thus, due to economic considerations, officials may go to extreme lengths to 
create the necessary impressions, even at the expense of their fellow bureaucrat 
(Crocker, 1936, p. 240).     
5. Low salaries and poor living conditions – the colonial bureaucracy in Nigeria was 
characterised by poor salaries, health conditions and ‘shocking housing 
conditions’ (Nicolson, 1969, p. 224) for both the European and African service. 
The service was described by Clifford, the Colonial Governor, in 1919 as a ‘sick 
administration… [with employees that were] practically starving’ (Ibid p. 218). 
Examples were given of officers that had been with the service for over eight years 
and were still unable to support their family due to the meagre salary (Ibid, p. 
224). This led to low morale in the service. Due to a lack of funds and the refusal 
of the Colonial Office to respond to requests for assistance, the problem persisted 
(Ibid, p. 221).     
6. Over-stretched administrative machinery – the combined effects of the world 
wars (1914 – 1918 and 1939 – 1945), the notoriety of the working conditions in 
Nigeria, and the discriminatory practices against the locals constantly left the 
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colonial service shorthanded (Crocker, 1936; Nicolson, 1969). The practice that 
only Europeans made up the senior levels of the bureaucracy meant that the 
institution suffered when Britain required their services in times of crisis.        
These are examples of the legacy of colonial administration and the issues that the 
indigenous civil service had to resolve after independence. Considering that the main 
objective of the colonial bureaucracy was not the development of the host society but 
rather the imperial interests of Britain in the region (Anazodo, Okoye & Chukwuemeka, 
2012), the colonial institution was perceived as efficient at carrying out their objective 
despite the various issues (Nicolson, 1969).  As the bureaucracy was a foreign institution 
that was sub–planted in the region, how did the institution fare after the departure of the 
colonialists? The next section describes the post–colonial bureaucracy to date.  
2 . 2 .  T h e  P o s t – C o l o n i a l  B u r e a u c r a c y  i n  M o d e r n  
T i m e s  
Despite the problems with the colonial bureaucracy, the post-colonial bureaucracy was 
described by Olowu (2001), a professor of African public administration, as performing 
well in the early periods of independence as its policy implementation strategy helped 
growth and development. The then Premier of the western region of Nigeria, Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, described the region’s civil service performance – of which Lagos 
State forms a part – as being ‘exceedingly efficient, absolutely incorruptible in its upper 
stratum, and utterly devoted and unstinting in the discharge of its many and onerous 
duties’ (Awolowo, 1960, pp. 264–265). Murray (1970), commissioned as an expert to 
develop the western Nigeria civil service to achieve the regionalisation policy, confirmed 
this when he referred to the institution as ‘a pacemaker and model for other civil services 
in Anglophone Africa’ (Murray, 1970, p. 229). However, due to a combination of events 
the bureaucracy started a slide into inefficiency and poor performance from the mid–
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1970s (Olowu, 2001). This ranged from the heavy meddling of the military governments 
in the affairs of the bureaucracy (Omitola, 2012), to the mass termination of the 
employment of bureaucrats (Olowu, 1989), after which morale in the civil service 
dropped along with its performance. By 1985 the panel that was set up to look into 
reforming the institution described it as: 
A battered institution which has virtually lost its vital attributes of anonymity, 
neutrality and security of tenure; an institution in which morale had reached its 
nadir, in which excessive caution, undue bureaucratic practices and interminable 
delays have become the hallmarks . . . an institution which has become the object 
of constant criticism (Phillips, 1985, p. 293). 
The institution has continuously been perceived as being plagued, amongst other things, 
by the issue of corruption and inefficiency (Olumide, 2015; Olowu, 2010) and according 
to a former Head of Service, Ahmed (2007), the 21st century Nigerian bureaucracy is 
characterised by:  
 an antiquated, non-transparent and corrupt-ridden procurement system;  
 erosion of professionalism and esprit de corps;  
 a fundamentally flawed performance management system, devoid of 
objectivity in measuring performance;  
 an unproductive rule-based hierarchical system which stifles individual and 
corporate creativity as well as accountability;  
 a preponderance of unskilled staff constituting 70 percent of the entire 
workforce (Ahmed, 2007, pp. 4–10).   
Interestingly, the issues highlighted by Ahmed seem to be of the same nature as those that 
were described as plaguing the colonial bureaucracy. This has led to the argument that 
  
34 
 
the foundation of the Nigerian bureaucracy is where its problems lie (Hellsten & Larbi, 
2006).    
There are various reasons given in public administration literature for the problems in the 
Nigerian bureaucracy. The following sections examine two main perspectives on causes 
of bureaucratic inefficiency and poor performance that have come to characterise the 
public bureaucracy. 
2 . 2 . 1 .  T h e  M o d e r n i s a t i o n  P e r s p e c t i v e  
There are different variants (Olowu, 1988) of the modernisation view but the general 
premise is based on Riggs’s conception of the prismatic society (1964).  Riggs argues 
that a society that is transitioning from predominantly traditional to modern structures is 
going to be caught in a phase where the structures and norms from the past and the future 
interact to create something new. The nature of the new structures and norms are what 
distinguishes the ‘prismatic’ society. In this prismatic phase, the traditional structures are 
no longer whole and the modern structures are not fully developed, thus leading to a crisis 
of norms (this theory is discussed in more detail in chapter three). According to 
proponents of this view Nigeria, like other developing states, is passing through a phase 
in its transition to modernity and as such is faced with problems peculiar to such 
circumstances. The country is characterised by un–synthesised bureaucracies that are 
prone to normlessness due to the plurality of values to which the bureaucrats are subjected 
(Riggs, 1964, pp. 19–23), a mix of traditional and formal values. This has led to the view 
that the bureaucratic machinery was prematurely introduced into Nigeria through 
colonisation (Okoli, 1980) as there is no established way of synthesising the different 
values (Gusfield, 1971). In other words, in trying to balance conflicting values, some 
bureaucrats engage in corrupt practices that have invariably led to poor institutional 
performance and bureaucratic inefficiency. 
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Some advocates of this perspective argue that the intrinsic nature of the primordial or 
traditional values – e.g. gift giving (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), familial and clanship 
expectations (Werlin, 1972; Aluko & Adesopo, 2004; Hydén, Jackson & Okumu, 1970) 
– promote corruption and as such contribute to the inefficiency and poor performance of 
the bureaucracy. This is mainly because a key feature of gift–giving is the reciprocal 
obligation that follows (Mauss, 1966). With the obligation to reciprocate comes the 
possibility of corruption and the passing–off of a bribe as a gift. In response to this cultural 
argument about gifts, Hellsten & Larbi (2006) asserted that the problem with public 
administration in developing countries is not with the culture neither is it with the 
bureaucratic principles, the problem lies with the faulty foundation, ‘the lack of fit with 
societal contexts’ (Ibid, p. 137). The next perspective explores the political view as a 
reason for corruption, non-performance and inefficiency of the bureaucracy.         
2 . 2 . 2 .  T h e  P o l i t i c i s a t i o n  P e r s p e c t i v e  
Advocates of the political perspective hold the view that there was a gradual politicisation 
of the bureaucracy after independence and this is to blame for the downward spiral in the 
performance of administrative institutions. In support of this view, Hyden (1983) argued 
that the politicisation of the bureaucracy stemmed from the fact that the indigenous 
political leadership were unaccepting of the segregational policies of the colonialists 
which created a divide between the bureaucracy and the rest of the society, making them 
an elite class. Efforts to promote equality in the society led to a gradual corrosion of the 
formalistic ideology of the colonial times and this opened the backdoor for ethnicity and 
clanship in the bureaucracy (Ibid, p. 60).   
Another strand of the politicisation view de-emphasised the contributions of the colonial 
bureaucracy and highlighted the impact of indigenous political culture on the 
performance of the institution (Dibie, 2003a). Advocates of this view argued that the 
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political arena after independence was volatile and fragile and this resulted in alliances 
being drawn along ethnic and bureaucratic lines (Lofchie, 1967; Suberu, 2001). The 
volatility in the political arena stemmed from the struggle for leadership amongst the 
different regions (Dauda, 1990). The commencement of the civil war in 1967 put a further 
strain on the administrative capabilities of the bureaucracy as they were practically in 
charge of running the country (Heady, 2001;) due to military rulers’ inexperience with 
administrative affairs (Adebayo, 2000) and their pre–occupation with the war (Olowu, 
2001).      
In addition, there are arguments that the instability that has characterised Nigeria’s 
political administration and earned it the label of ‘a pendulum state’ (Heady, 1991, p. 
351) is responsible for the inefficiency and performance of the bureaucracy. Nigeria’s 
political history is replete with the frequent foray of the military into the political arena. 
Military regimes have ruled the country for approximately thirty years of the country’s 
fifty-six years since independence on 1st October 1960 (Ayo, Adebiyi et al., 2008). While 
there have been arguments as to under which regime the bureaucracy possessed more 
power and possibly performed better (Adamolekun, Erero & Oshinebo, 1991; Adeosun, 
2011; Adebayo, 2000), there is a consensus that the frequent power tussles have left their 
mark on the public administrative system. The constant radical change of strategy and 
focus by each ruler trying to leave his ‘unique’ mark on the country (Jackson, 1993) has 
resulted in the bureaucracy being in a continuous state of unsettlement.  
Policies under the various military regimes from 1966 until 1999 saw the stripping of the 
features of anonymity, neutrality and security of tenure from the bureaucracy (Omitola, 
2012). The period was dominated by the mass dismissal of bureaucrats without due 
process (Olowu, 1989, 2001) which violated the principle of security of tenure that had 
been upheld before then (Adamolekun & Ayeni, 1990). This was a watershed for the 
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bureaucracy as bureaucrats sought political affiliations in order to protect their tenure 
(Adebayo, 2000) and where this was not possible, they resorted to corrupt practices as an 
alternative to political protection (Anazodo, Okoye & Chukwuemeka, 2012). One such 
controversial policy by the military, which was later made a part of the Nigerian 
constitution, is that regarding federal character. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
2 . 2 . 2 . 1 .  T h e  F e d e r a l  C h a r a c t e r  E f f e c t  
The federal character principle was initially introduced in the 1950s as an informal 
political practice geared at preventing the domination of one ethnic group by others 
(Adeosun, 2011). It evolved into a form of affirmative action and was introduced into the 
1979 constitution to mitigate the effects of colonial policies, on some regions, that had 
resulted in differences in educational attainment (Igwe, 2012). In this form, the principle 
was used during recruitments and promotions in the Nigerian public service. In matters 
relating to the Nigerian public bureaucracy, the federal character principle systematically 
takes into consideration the ethnic diversity of the society, paying particular attention to 
the ‘under–represented’ regions in the public service in order to provide a just and 
equitable representation in the bureaucracy (Joshua, Loromeke & Olanrewaju, 2014). It 
provides thus: 
 The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and 
the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in a manner as to reflect the federal 
character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command 
national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons 
from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that 
Government or any of its agencies (Nigerian Constitution, 1999, S. 14 (3)) 
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A major reservation that was raised during a consideration of the provisions to be 
included in the 1979 Constitution was the ‘danger inherent in using a man’s ethnic or 
linguistic affiliation as the primary definition of his quality… [instead of] ideas and values 
which render the area or ethnic origin of a person irrelevant’ (Adamolekun, Erero & 
Oshinebo, 1991, p. 76). The rationale for its implementation was the domination of 
certain ethnic groups in government departments, ministries and agencies at the time 
(Mustapha, 2007; Afigbo, 1991).  
On one hand, proponents of the principle have argued that its implementation had not 
only resulted in a more representative civil service (Mustapha, 2007), it had also enabled 
fairness and equity in recruitments and promotions in the service (Adibe, 2016). On the 
other hand, critics like Ekweremadu, the Deputy Senate President, argue that the principle 
has downplayed meritocracy for the furtherance of ethnic and regional agendas 
(Alechenu, 2016), thus affecting morale and promoting political affiliations in the 
bureaucracy (Adeosun, 2011). In addition, the principle is said to favour the dominant 
ethnic groups (Suberu, 2001) to the detriment of the 350 other groups in the country. The 
sheer number of smaller ethnic groups may make it impracticable to provide 
representativeness, this may have led to the creation of the label ‘minority’ as a category 
for this group of people (Rindap & Mari, 2014). With this in mind, the implementation 
of the federal character principle in the regional bureaucracy is argued to have led to 
discrimination against minority ethnic groups as the requirement for representativeness 
may be said to be met by randomly selecting from the group labelled ‘minority’ (Suberu, 
2001). As such, political influence may be regarded as advantageous in this sense as it 
increases the likelihood of selection. 
Contrary to the aim of integration, the federal character principle is perceived to have 
emphasised divisions in the public service, tending towards regional and ethnic cleavages 
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and exhuming old hostilities and suspicions of domination (Kirk-Greene, 1975, p. 19; 
Crisis Group Africa, 2006). This may have promoted politicisation and corruption in the 
bureaucracy as bureaucrats were more concerned with nurturing political connections and 
giving out favours (Adeosun, 2011) than efficiently carrying out tasks. According to 
Suberu (2001, p. 121) the implementation of the principle has caused an increase in 
patronage and clientelistic relations in the bureaucracy where politicians lobby for 
bureaucratic positions for constituents. 
Aside from the reasons for bureaucratic corruption discussed above, there is the view that 
the poor and stagnant salaries of officials contributed to the spread of the phenomenon, 
this is explored next. 
2 . 2 . 3 .  B u r e a u c r a t s  S a l a r i e s  
Proponents of this view argue that the amount of wages that bureaucrats are paid in 
comparison to their counterparts in the private sector has contributed greatly to the 
problem of corruption and inefficiency in the public service (Olowu, 2010).           
Olowu (1993) and Prah (1993) observed that a host of the economic reform programs 
entered into by the government has inadvertently caused hardship in the society, and this 
is coupled with prevailing high inflation, a lack of upward review of salaries and a general 
deterioration of the economic conditions in the state. It helped create a chain reaction of 
bribery and corruption that has adversely affected performance, as bureaucrats have 
resorted to using their official positions to satisfy their needs (Prah, 1993), while 
subordinating institutional objectives and goals for personal gratification. These 
identified issues and causes in the public bureaucracy have created the need for reforms. 
Different political regimes, both military and democratic, have in the past embarked on 
reform efforts in order to improve the institution, these are discussed in the next section. 
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2 . 3 .  R e f o r m  R e g i m e s    
Since the implementation of the Nigerianisation policy in the 1940s, the practice has been 
that reforms in the federal bureaucracy are generally adopted and implemented by the 
state civil services. Hence, this section will focus on reform regimes initiated by the 
federal service and adopted by state civil services.      
Different Nigerian governments since independence have embarked on series of reforms 
aimed at improving the bureaucracy’s performance. Table 1 provides details of reform 
regimes from the colonial era till date. Most of these reforms have focused on structural 
issues such as the grading system in the bureaucracy, creation of different levels and 
departments and re-evaluation of salaries.    
 
Reform regime  Year 
 
Nature of Reform  
 
1. Harragin Commission  
1946 
Structural (created the 
senior and junior civil 
service framework) and 
Salaries 
2. Foot Commission 
1948 
Structural (implementing 
the Nigerianisation policy 
of the civil service) 
3. Phillipson–Adebo 
Commission 
1952–53 
Structural (to review the 
policy of Nigerianisation 
of the service) 
4. Gorsuch Commission 
1954 
Structural (divided the 
service into five different 
salary groups) and Salaries 
5. Mbanefo Commission 1959 Salaries 
6. Newn Commission 
1959 
Structural (re-designed the 
civil service as ministries 
to be headed by Permanent 
Secretary) 
7. Morgan Commission  1963 Salaries 
8. Eldwood Commission 
1966 
Structural (grading 
structure) and Salaries 
Table 1: Civil Service Reform Efforts: 1946 – 2016 
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Source: Created by the researcher  
 
Despite these efforts, the institution is still besieged by poor performance and corruption 
(Ahmed, 2007). The following sections will discuss in more details the highlighted 
reforms from Table 1 above, because these mark the turning points in civil service 
administration, and their impact is still being felt years after implementation.  
9. Adebo Commission  
1971 
Salaries and other 
conditions of service (e.g. 
training) 
10. Udoji Commission         
1974 
Structures & Personnel 
focused (re-organised the 
service for the application 
of managerialist 
techniques) and Salaries 
11. Williams & Williams  
1975 
Structures & Salaries 
(grading & salary 
structures of previous 
reform) 
12. Decree No. 43 (Civil 
Service Reorganisation 
Decree) 
1988 
Structural (radical re-
structuring of senior 
service posts) 
13. Ayida Review Panel 
1994 
Structural (review of the 
previous reform) & 
Salaries 
14. President Obasanjo’s 
Civil Service Review 
1999 – 2007 
Structural (re-structuring 
and merger of government 
Ministries and 
Departments; financial 
management and reduction 
of the bureaucracy’s 
overhead) & Salaries 
15. Oronsaye Panel 
2010 – 2012 
Structural (merger of 
departments and 
Ministries, limited the 
tenure of senior officers 
and financial management) 
16. Service reforms under 
President Buhari 
2015 – 2016 
Structural (focus on 
accounting practices, 
financial management and 
reducing overhead of the 
service) 
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2 . 3 . 1 .  T h e  A d e b o  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  1 9 7 1  
A Commission was constituted in 1971 after the conclusion of the Nigerian civil war of 
1967 – 1970 with the instruction to review the issues of wages and salaries of all levels 
of personnel in the public service (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). In its report, however, the 
commission went beyond the scope of its assignment and emphasised the need for an in-
depth review of the entire civil service by calling into question the ability of the institution 
to carry the weight of development (Collins, 1980) which had become crucial as a result 
of the war. Thus, it recommended that a review commission be set up to examine 
comprehensively the structural composition of the civil service (Salisu, 2003). This led 
to the setting up of the Public Service Review Commission in 1972, called the Udoji 
Commission.  
2 . 3 . 2 .  T h e  U d o j i  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  1 9 7 4  
A Public Service Review Commission was set-up in 1972 and was named after its 
chairman, Jerome Udoji. On the recommendations of the Adebo Commission, it was 
constituted to propose ways of increasing the efficiency of the Nigerian bureaucracy to 
enable it to meet its developmental mandate (Ikelionwu, 2011). The Commission 
tendered its final report in 1974.  
Drawing on the knowledge of its British and Canadian consultants (Olowu, 1989), the 
Commission’s recommendations were influenced by the contents of the Fulton Report of 
1968 (Olaopa, 2015), a review of the British civil service. The Commission’s 
recommendations are regarded as one of the most comprehensive civil service reforms in 
Nigeria’s history (Ibid, p. 3). Amongst other things they suggested the application of 
managerialist techniques in the public bureaucracy to improve its efficiency and 
performance (Adebayo, 2000, p. 213), a unified grading structure for the purpose of salary 
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administration (Ikelionwu, 2011, p. 36), a more detailed personnel performance 
management practice (Sekwat, 2002, p. 501) and training of officials (Collins, 1980). The 
implementation of the recommendations was another story all together, as the military 
government at the time decided to focus on only the part of the reforms that had to do 
with salaries (Olaopa, 2015, p. 4).   
In the guise of following the structural recommendations of the Udoji Commission the 
ruling military regime summarily dismissed about ten thousand (10,000) civil servants in 
1975 (Adebayo, 2000). Thousands more were dismissed between 1984 and 1985 for 
offences ranging from dwindling performance to drunkenness, without recourse to due 
process (Olowu, 1989, 2001). This violated the principle of security of tenure which 
before that time had been held sacred, and created fear amongst civil servants 
(Adamolekun & Ayeni, 1990). Consequently, the principle of neutrality of civil servants 
suffered, as political affiliations were sought in a bid to secure tenure of office (Adebayo, 
2000, p. 213; Njoku, 2005) and this impacted negatively on performance. However, 
critics of the Udoji Commission reform have argued that it was far from successful 
because it did not take into consideration the fundamental role that the political 
philosophy of the environment played on the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and its 
reform (Olowu, 1989, pp. 63 – 67). In essence, just as the bureaucratic institution was 
imported this reform was also imported, as such it suffered from the same issue of ‘fit’ 
with cultural context. This led to the development of another reform regime. 
2 . 3 . 3 .  D e c r e e  N o .  4 3  o f  1 9 8 8  ( C i v i l  S e r v i c e  
R e o r g a n i s a t i o n  D e c r e e )  
There are two main views on the exact point the post–independence Nigerian bureaucracy 
started the uncontrollable slide to perceived inefficiency. The first perspective argues that 
the summary dismissal of over 10, 000 bureaucrats in 1975 marked a turning point for 
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the institution (Magbadelo, 2016; Olowu, 2001), while the second argues that the effects 
of Decree No. 43 was the downfall of the institution (Abah, 2016). The foundation of 
Decree No. 43 can be traced to a panel that was set-up in 1984 headed by Prof. Dotun 
Phillips, to yet again look into improving accountability, efficiency and performance of 
the civil service and advice the government on reorganisation (Phillips, 1991). The panel 
presented its report in 1985 and the recommendations of the panel was incorporated into 
the provisions of Decree No. 43 of 1988.  
The Phillips panel focused on the structural composition of the institution and this was 
reflected in its recommendations. Three key features of the 1988 reform included:  
1. Abolishing the position of the Permanent Secretary and replacing it with a 
political appointee to be called Director-General who may be chosen from within 
the ranks of the civil service whose tenure terminates with the administration 
except where reappointed; 
2. The Minister, who is ordinarily the political head of the Ministry, also became the 
chief accounting officer – a role which was formerly under the purview of the 
Permanent Secretary (a career civil servant) who acted as a check on the powers 
of the Minister; 
3. Creation of an Audit Alarm System to ensure public accountability (Phillips, 
1991, pp. 230-231).  
Contrary to the expectations of the reformers, the implementation of the Decree was 
perceived to have had a negative impact on the bureaucracy’s performance. By making 
the top posts in the bureaucracy subject to political appointment, politicking became a 
formal feature of the civil service, as senior bureaucrats openly fraternised with 
politicians in other to gain their favour (Olaopa, 2015).  Also, while in theory it may be 
efficient and time-saving for one person to have the power to make decisions and to also 
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approve funds to implement the decision, in reality however, it creates issues of 
accountability and this was the case with the Ministers. Fusing the political and financial 
powers in the Ministers resulted in wastage of public funds and outright corruption 
(Adebayo, 2000). The only attempt that was built into the system to make Ministers 
accountable was the whistle–blower feature that provided that in the case of financial 
impropriety, audit alarm may only be raised by the auditor who incidentally could be 
‘hired and fired by the Minister’ (Olowu, 2001, p. 127). Thus, the reform was highly 
criticised for undermining the bureaucracy through a subtle infusion of politics and 
implementing changes that were capable of impairing accountability (Salisu, 2003) and 
as such contributed to the further poor performance of the civil service.  
The negative impact of this reform on the civil service resulted in the need to review the 
institution yet again in 1994. 
2 . 3 . 4 .  A y i d a  R e v i e w  P a n e l  o f  1 9 9 4  
The next Military regime which came into power summarily constituted a reform 
committee that was named after its chairman, Allison Ayida, to look into the provisions 
of Decree No. 43 of 1988 and make recommendations as to its amendment and to the 
general improvement of the civil service (Omitola, 2012). The recommendations of the 
Panel reversed a host of the provisions of the Decree which among other things included 
the restoration of the position of the Permanent Secretary who was to be a career civil 
servant and the accounting officer of the Ministry, leaving the Minister as the political 
head of the institution for directional purposes (Adebayo, 2000). This had the effect of 
depoliticising the bureaucracy to an extent and reinstated the former accountability 
structure. But how effective was the reform in improving the performance of the 
bureaucracy?  
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Before the 1988 Decree was repealed by the Ayida Panel reforms, its effects had been 
evident in the civil service (Abah, 2016) through the perceived pervasiveness of 
corruption, and the general state of the institution (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). However 
according to Olaopa (2015), a former Permanent Secretary, the Ayida Panel reforms did 
not introduce anything new, it merely reverted the bureaucracy to its pre–1988 form, at 
which time the institution was perceived as already being in a bad shape.  
This reform was the last under the Military regime before the democratic dispensation 
began in 1999. From here onwards the reforms to be discussed were instituted under 
democratic regimes saddled with reforming a bureaucratic institution that was carrying 
the burdens of the past. The following sections consider how they have fared in turning 
the institution around.                                             
2 . 3 . 5 .  P r e s i d e n t  O b a s a n j o ’ s  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  R e v i e w  o f  1 9 9 9  -  
2 0 0 7  
This review panel was tasked with repositioning the bureaucracy to be able to carry out 
its developmental function in a democratic era. As a result, the nature of the reform was 
quite extensive. Its recommendations focused on structural changes and the re-evaluation 
of salaries and other benefits. The recommendation of the commission was fashioned 
after the 1980s public service reform in Britain, under former Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, that was aimed at reducing the size of government amongst other things 
(Osborne & Pastrik, 1998). To achieve this objective, the reform committee 
recommended that various government ministries and departments should be merged 
while some others should be scrapped altogether (Okorie & Odo, 2014). The rationale for 
this view was that the bureaucracy had become too large, having various Ministries and 
departments carrying out similar tasks, thus bringing about corruption and inefficiency 
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(Omitola, 2012). This led to the dismissal of over thirty-five thousand public officials 
between 2005 and 2006 (Eme & Ugwu, 2011, p. 49).  
Aside from reducing the size of government the reform was also aimed at improving civil 
service accountability and promoting efficiency and performance through general 
reforms to salary packages (Omitola, 2012). Accordingly, the reform panel recommended 
the monetisation of some benefits and the sale of government-owned houses and cars to 
officials (Abah, 2016, p. 4).  
Critics of the Obasanjo reforms have argued that its impact on the bureaucracy was no 
different than previous attempts. The mass dismissal of officials emphasised the lack of 
security of tenure that has come to characterise the Nigerian bureaucracy (Adewumi, 
2012), and this is especially so when such dismissal is marked by allegations of lack of 
transparency (Okorie & Odo, 2014, p. 271). Thus like previous reforms, the drive for a 
lean government may have further contributed to the poor performance of the 
bureaucracy as civil servants were more concerned with preserving their jobs (Maikudi, 
2012) than delivering efficient service.  
In addition, the reform was argued to have fallen prey to task duplication and inefficiency 
that had resulted in the need to merge departments. The rationale for the merger of 
government departments, ministries and agencies was built on the fact that several 
departments were designed to perform the same tasks leading to conflict, waste of 
manpower, and financial burden on the government (Bureau of Public Service Reforms, 
2009). For example, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission are agencies with identical functions, to 
fight corruption, as such, they go after the same culprits (Raimi, Suara & Fadipe, 2013). 
Under the Obasanjo reforms three government agencies – Bureau of Public Service 
Reform, Public Service Reform Team and Federal Civil Service Commission – were 
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assigned identical tasks, implementing the mergers (Okorie & Odo, 2014). As a result, 
there was an overlap and conflict of interests amongst the agencies as to the form the 
merger should take (Ibid p. 271), resulting in the non–implementation of this part of the 
reform.   
The ineffectiveness of the Obasanjo reforms in improving the performance of the civil 
service led to the next government setting up the Oronsaye panel in 2010.  
2 . 3 . 6 .  O r o n s a y e  P a n e l  o f  2 0 1 0  –  2 0 1 2  
As with previous reform commissions, this panel was named after its chairman, Stephen 
Oronsaye, a former Head of the Nigerian Civil Service. The emphasis of the panel was 
on restructuring the bureaucracy by examining how the merging of ministries and 
departments, proposed under the Obasanjo reforms, could be realised (Oyedeji, 2016).  In 
its report, the Panel explained that the mass dismissal of the previous reform resulted in 
the bureaucracy having a pyramidal structure with an overcrowded top (Okorie & Odo, 
2014, p. 272), which resulted in stagnated promotion for those lower down the hierarchy 
(Ogunrotifa, 2012). This may have contributed to the poor performance of the 
bureaucratic institution as lack of promotion may lead to reduced motivation to work.  
In order to reduce the number of senior personnel at the top of the hierarchy, the Panel 
recommended that Permanent Secretaries and Directors should be allowed to serve a 
maximum of eight–years, subject to good performance (Ogunrotifa, 2012, p. 24), after 
which they should be retired. While this may be a pragmatic way of gradually clearing 
the top of the ladder, it ran the risk of being politicised (Adamolekun & Ayeni, 1990). In 
other words, a Permanent Secretary with the necessary political influence may not be 
judged solely by performance for extension of tenure. On the other hand, it was argued 
that the compulsory retirement of senior officials, which led to their loss of livelihood, 
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may have created the need for participating in corrupt activities (Okorie & Odo, 2014, p. 
272). In essence, the reform had no chance of succeeding as those to implement it were 
negatively affected by its provisions. 
Similar to the Obasanjo regime, the recommendations of the Panel were only partially 
implemented and the merger of government ministries and departments was also ignored. 
The continuing perceived inefficiencies of the Nigerian bureaucracy led to the reforms 
embarked on by the current president, Muhammadu Buhari.    
2 . 3 . 7 .  P r e s i d e n t  B u h a r i ’ s  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  R e f o r m s ,  2 0 1 5  -  
2 0 1 6  
The current civil service reforms being pursued by President Buhari are based on some 
partially implemented and unimplemented reform recommendations under President 
Obasanjo and the Oronsaye Panel (Abah, 2016). In the bid to reduce the size of the civil 
service, President Buhari has proceeded with the merger of some government ministries 
and departments and the dismissal of over ninety top bureaucrats (Payne & Laessing, 
2016). The most touted reform is the changes made to government accounting system, 
which created the Treasury Single Account (TSA) (Eme, Chukwurah & Iheanacho, 
2015). The TSA is a centrally controlled account which requires all government 
ministries, agencies and departments to remit all revenues to a central point. The rationale 
behind the scheme is that it promotes transparency and discourages corruption, as 
payments, expenditures and receipts are all centrally monitored (Bello, 2016).  
As an accounting and transparency policy, the TSA has been lauded as the best tactic to 
curtail financial loss in the public bureaucracy and curb corruption (Eme, Chukwurah & 
Iheanacho, 2016; Ude, 2016). According to Adeosun, the Minister of Finance, the 
implementation of this policy has resulted in over N3 Trillion (over £10 Billion) being 
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remitted by different government agencies, ministries and departments (This Day, 2016) 
to the central coffers. Thus, this reform has been lauded as a success as it has led to a 
significant reduction in public service accounting–type corruption (Bello, 2016, p. 5).  
Additionally, the Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS), of the 
past administration, which required the data of every government employee to be stored 
in a central location for better payroll management was expanded to cover most of the 
civil service (Balogun, 2016). The implementation of this reform has led to the detection 
of over 65, 000 fictitious employees (New Telegraph, 2016) called ‘ghost workers’, 
saving the government about $11.5 Million monthly in monies not paid to corrupt 
officials.   
However, due a lack of data, the impact of the reform on civil service performance and 
service delivery in general is still uncertain. With the economic focus of this reform, 
corruption ‘against’ the government may have been reduced, but can the same be said 
about corruption involving service users? The focus of these bureaucratic reforms in 
Nigeria have been on the institution to the exclusion of other stakeholders, suggesting 
that the performance and corruption problems of the bureaucracy can only be solved 
through an internal reform process. Hence, each reform regime takes a critical look at the 
structures of the institution to determine where the fault lies. In certain cases, wastage 
and siphoning of public funds may be reduced through policy implementation, but the 
issue of perceived bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency still persists.  
Various explanations have been proffered for the persistence of this situation, one of 
which is that the reform designs were imported from Western countries without a proper 
consideration of the cultural and environmental factors that would impede their 
effectiveness in a different setting (Olowu, 1989). Another argument is that the improper 
and partial implementation of reforms is responsible for the ineffectiveness of reform 
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regimes (Olaopa, 2015). Others have argued that insincerity and a lack of political will is 
a possible reason why some good reform recommendations are left on paper (Ogunrotifa, 
2012) and not pursued further. For example, with regards to political considerations, 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2006) argued that some past governors of Lagos state carried out 
politically motivated civil service restructuring which had been counter-productive as 
they led to further overlapping of functions and inefficiency. An example of this was the 
simultaneous creation of the positions of the Head of Service, Secretary to the State and 
the Office of the Chief of Staff; with virtually the same job description (Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, 2006, p. 181). The effect was that instructions from one office was overruled 
by the other. Such duplications and overlapping underscores the fact that some good 
bureaucrats are underutilised and this may create a situation of friction within the 
organisation that may result in delays in decision making and poor service delivery and 
organisation performance.  
Aside from the reasons described above, an absence of sincerity on the part of political 
and administrative heads have been blamed for the less than optimal impact of civil 
service reforms, as the implementation focus for reforms have been described as being 
cosmetic and peripheral with the emphasis on remuneration (Agagu, 2008). Table 1 
shows that the tradition of colonial civil service reforms, which was generally focused on 
civil service structures and salaries of officials, was sustained by successive governments 
after independence. Paying scant consideration to the need for attitudinal change which 
was highlighted by Marrinho’s (1967, p. 97) description of public officials’ psyche. A 
change in reform strategy might be necessary to achieve a different result. It is argued 
that the impact of stakeholders such as the service user, on the functioning and practices 
of the bureaucracy is oftentimes ignored and this is reflected in the structural focus of 
civil service reforms. 
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2 . 4 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
In terms of structure, the Nigerian bureaucratic institution has come a long way from its 
colonial administrative roots, but the paradox is that it still largely shares the same 
problems that plagued the colonial institution. One of the main problems of Nigerian civil 
service is the issue of bureaucratic corruption, which has led to poor performance 
(Anazodo, Okoye & Chukwuemeka, 2012). Over the years, different reforms have been 
recommended to improve the civil service, but with questionable results. This may be due 
to the ideological foundation of the issues, that the bureaucrats are the problem. Thus 
reforms have been centred on the bureaucratic structures and the bureaucrats, with no 
consideration of the role of other stakeholders in shaping the practices in the institution.  
Regardless of the target of bureaucratic reforms, corruption is still perceived as a key 
factor in the poor performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy, as such, the next chapter 
examines the concept of corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
 
C H A P T E R  3  
T H E  C O N C E P T  O F  C O R R U P T I O N   
Corruption is perceived as one of the main hindrances to efficient public service delivery 
(Cockcroft et al., 2008). In order to improve service delivery, it is important to understand 
its nature and why it defies the various reforms that have been embarked upon in the past. 
This chapter contains a review of the literature on corruption. The review begins with a 
look at the ambiguities surrounding the general understanding of corruption. Through 
examining some definitions and debates of the concept I will argue that the popular 
understanding of the phenomenon may not be telling the whole story, as it puts the focus 
wholly on public institutions to the exclusion of other stakeholders. 
The chapter is divided into four sections, the first being corruption as a concept. In this 
section the focus is on examining the various attempts at defining the phenomenon and 
the emphasis of these definitions on the public official. It goes further to discuss the 
various forms of corruption, the scale and theoretical underpinnings of these 
understanding of the concept. Different categories of corruption are also examined, 
highlighting one of its common forms, bribery. The section closely examines the nature 
of bribery and other related acts which are easily misunderstood with concepts such as 
gift giving. Section two discusses corruption in its relational context. The section reviews 
the research that has been carried out on service user involvement in corrupt practices 
and the general impact of the perception of corruption on the way service users construct 
their social reality. How corruption is understood from the perspective of the legal 
profession is addressed in section three. This section reviews how corruption is 
constructed in the legal profession under the legal ethics discourse, and how ethical 
dilemmas may lead to corrupt practices. This area is reviewed to help the reader to better 
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understand the context of my study. The main ideas I will be researching is drawn together 
in the fourth section along with the conclusion.  
3 . 1 .  D e f i n i n g  C o r r u p t i o n   
In recent times, there is a marked interest in the subject of corruption all over the world 
and this is evident from the substantial volume of research on the concept. An initial 
search of the term corruption within the last five years returned 151, 000 documents on 
Google Scholar, 22, 123 on JSTOR and 11, 093 on ScienceDirect. The yearly data 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of 'corruption' search from ScienceDirect (2012–2016) 
 
Year of publication Number of documents 
2012 1, 766 
2013 2, 125 
2014 2, 372 
2015 2, 869 
2016 (JAN - JUN) 1, 963 
Source: Created by researcher with data from ScienceDirect (accessed 20th June 2016)  
from ScienceDirect, as portrayed in Table 2, indicates a rapidly growing interest in the 
subject. Research interest in this area may be influenced by various ongoing corruption 
scandals e.g. the Petrobras scandal in Brazil (Segal, 2015), the FIFA and IAAF scandals 
(Miller & Barbash, 2015; WADA, 2016), and the growing body of work on anti-
corruption.  
However, the weightier question seems to be ‘what actually is corruption?’ While the 
term has been variously used to describe aberrant and illegal actions (Asian Development 
Bank, 1998) a striking feature of corruption literature remains the lack of agreement on a 
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definition. This section begins with a critical examination of some of the popular 
definitions, descriptions and categorisation of corruption. 
3 . 1 . 1 .  C o r r u p t i o n  a s  a n  e n i g m a  
The phenomenon has been described as being ‘elusive’ (Caiden, 2005, p. 286; Leys, 
1965) and ‘slippery’ (Shore & Haller, 2005, p. 8; Lazar, 2005) making it difficult to 
capture its essence. Many writers have either shied away from proffering a definition 
(Senior, 2006, p. 20) or stuck to a discussion of its different manifestations. In other 
words, as far as a standard definition of corruption is concerned, there exists no consensus 
amongst politicians (UNODC, 2004) as well as academics (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, 
1999).  
Despite the lack of a standard definition of corruption, researchers have defined and 
described the concept mostly from either a disciplinary or an ideological standpoint 
(Lennerfors, 2008; Meny, 1996). There are three key features that, however, cut across 
the different disciplines, these are: 1.) the notion that corrupt practice is tied to an official 
position, 2.) that there has to be a departure from the laid down procedural rules and, 3.) 
the departure is usually instigated by self-interest. The multi-disciplinary definitions, 
highlighted in Table 3 below, suggests that these features are not mutually exclusive, the 
three have to be present at the same time for there to be an assumption of corrupt practice.   
Table 3: Example of disciplinary definitions of corruption 
Author / Year Definition / Description of Corruption Discipline 
1. Brooks, 
1909, p. 4 
The intentional misperformance or neglect of a 
recognised duty, or the unwarranted exercise of 
power with the motive of gaining some advantage 
more or less directly personal. 
Political Science 
2. Nye, 1967, p. 
419 
Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (close family, personal, private clique) 
Political Science 
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pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery 
(use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person 
in position of trust); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-
regarding uses). 
3. Huntington, 
1968, p. 59 
Behaviour of public officials which deviates from 
accepted norms in order to serve private ends. 
Political Science 
4. Alam, 1989, 
p.  444 
Corruption…may be defined as (1) the sacrifice of 
the principal’s interests for the agent’s or (2) the 
violation of norms defining the agent’s behaviour.  
Economics 
5. Tarkowski, 
1989, p. 53–
54   
Corruption…is any activity motivated by interest, 
violating the binding rules of distribution, the 
application of which is within one’s responsibility…  
Sociology 
6. Meny, 1996, 
p. 313 
A clandestine exchange between two markets – the 
political and/or administrative market and the 
economic and social market. This exchange is 
covert, since it violates the public rules of law and 
ethics, and sacrifices the general interest to private 
gain (personal, corporate, factional etc.). Lastly, this 
transaction, which enables private actors to have 
access to public resources (contracts, financing, 
decisions) in a privileged and biased way (absence 
of transparency and competition), procures for 
corrupt public figures immediate or future material 
benefits for themselves or for the organisation of 
which they are members. 
Political Science 
7. Rose-
Ackerman, 
1996, p. 365 
Corruption…occurs in such societies when officials 
use their positions of public trust for private gain. 
Economics 
8. Neild, 2002, 
p. 6 
The breaking by public persons, for the sake of 
private financial or political gain, of the rules of 
conduct in public affairs prevailing in a society in the 
period under consideration. 
Economics 
9. Anand, 
Ashforth & 
Joshi, 2004, 
p. 40 
Misuse of an organisational position or authority for 
personal or organisational (or subunit) gain, where 
misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted 
societal norms. 
Organisation Studies 
10. Senior, 
2006, p. 27 
Corruption occurs when a corruptor (1) covertly 
gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to 
influence (3) action(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor 
or nominee, and for which the corruptee has (5) 
authority. 
Economics 
11. Ashforth, 
Gioia, 
Robinson & 
The illicit use of one’s position or power for 
perceived personal or collective gain. 
Organisation Studies 
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Treviňo, 
2008, p. 671 
12. Lange, 2008, 
p. 710 
The pursuit of individual interests by one or more 
organisational actors through the intentional 
misdirection of organisational resources or 
perversion of organisational routines. 
Organisation Studies 
13. Collins, 
Uhlenbruck 
& 
Rodriguez, 
2009, p. 90 
An act done with the intent to give some advantage 
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of 
others.  
Organisation Studies 
14. Roberts, 
2015, p. 82 
The illegitimate use of public or communal resources 
for private gain. 
Accounting 
Source:  Developed by the researcher       
 
An example of the first feature, that for an action to be deemed corrupt it must be tied to 
an official position, is given in Nye’s (1967) commonly cited definition of corruption as 
being ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role …’ (Table 3, No. 
2). When taken together with Anand, Ashforth & Joshi’s (2004) definition, ‘misuse of an 
organisational position or authority …’ (Table 3, No. 9), this suggests that corrupt 
practices can only emanate from persons occupying an ‘office’, in which case it is 
immaterial whether the position is held in a private or public organisation. However, as 
this research explores the nature of corruption in public institutions, I will be focusing on 
definitions with similar ‘public official’ outlook.  
Having established that an individual is a public official, the second feature which is the 
departure from official rules and regulations is the next requirement to be considered. 
This precondition is exemplified in corruption definitions such as Nield’s (2002) ‘the 
breaking by public persons… of the rules of conduct…’ (Table 3, No. 8), and Alam’s 
(1989) ‘the violation of norms defining the agent’s behaviour’ (Table 3, No. 4) amongst 
others. While it may generally be assumed that the norms that these authors refer to are 
those regarding the formal rules and regulations of the institution, the question may then 
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arise as to the position of informal institutional rules, i.e. organisational practices, 
considering the impact that they have in shaping the way things are done in the 
organisation (Keig, Brouthers & Marshall, 2015). It is unclear how informal norms are 
categorised, especially where the rules of informal practices are in opposition to those of 
the formal rules. In this regard, Huntington (1968) provides a much broader definition, 
‘behaviour of public official which deviates from accepted norms…’ (Table 3, No. 3). In 
this case, ‘accepted norms’ may be extended to cover departures from both formal and 
informal rules and practices. 
The final feature to be considered is that the public official is usually motivated by self-
interest or private benefit (World Bank, 1997). For the official to be regarded as acting in 
a corrupt manner authors such as Lange (2008) and Brooks (1909) have emphasised that 
exercise of authority should be ‘in the pursuit of individual interest’ (Table 3, No. 12), 
‘…with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal’ (Table 3, 
No. 1). While Brooks and Lange’s descriptions focuses on the benefits that accrue to the 
individual from a corrupt transaction, the definition by Ashforth, et al. (2008), i.e. ‘the 
illicit use of one’s position or power for perceived personal or collective gain’ (Table 3, 
No. 11), suggests that benefits from a corrupt transaction could also be in the interest of 
the organisation.                     
To provide a better understanding of the phenomenon, the following subsections provide 
a more detailed discussion of some of the definitional features of corruption.     
3 . 1 . 1 . 1 .  T h e  P u b l i c  O f f i c e   
Definitions of corruption suggests that an action must be carried out in an official capacity 
for it to be labelled corrupt. In other words, the official must use the powers and 
discretions associated with his or her public role to his own benefit. It has been argued 
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that this perspective of corruption is based on the assumption that a clear distinction exists 
between the public and private spheres (Mungiu, 2006) and the crossover between the 
spheres is what brings about corruption. The popularity of this strand of argument is 
predicated on Max Weber’s description of a legal-rational bureaucracy (Polzer, 2001, pp. 
18–19; Gerth & Mills, 1946). According to Weber, the ideal typical bureaucracy is an 
organisation that has attained the maximum level of rationalisation of services and 
interests. He argues that at optimum rationalisation, there is a clear distinction between 
the role and needs of the bureaucrat as a public official and his or her needs as a private 
individual, and there is no room for a crossover or overlap of those needs (Gerth & Mills, 
1946, p. 214–216). In other words, there is a requirement for the bureaucrat to keep the 
two spheres separate – public on the one hand and private on the other – to enable the 
growth of an efficient and rational bureaucracy. Corruption thus emerges where the public 
and private spheres are not distinguished (Ruud, 2000; Riggs, 1964), thereby 
undermining the rationality of the bureaucratic institution. It must, however, be noted that 
Weber’s conceptualisation of rationality in this manner was based on an ideal type of 
organising and not on reality.  
Aside from highlighting the sphere that corruption takes place, definitions of the concept 
also focus on the public official as the sole participant.  
3 . 1 . 1 . 2 .  T h e  P u b l i c  O f f i c i a l   
Popular descriptions of corruption emphasise the culpability of the public official. There 
is a pervading presupposition that the corrupt person must be in a public office and as 
such imbued with powers or authority that is misused for their own private needs (World 
Bank, 1996, p. 95; Neild, 2002, p. 6; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Nye, 1967). Hence the focus 
of most descriptions and definitions of corruption has been on a predetermined culprit – 
the public official – with hardly a mention of the existence of other participant(s) (Senior, 
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2006). This omission is further emphasised when, for example, considering the nature of 
bribery a form of corruption which is regarded as the most common manifestation of the 
phenomenon (Jain, 2012; Cleveland et al., 2009). The public-centric view of corruption 
fails to consider the interest-based nature of corruption (Roberts, 2015) which is by no 
means restricted to public office holders. As such, this popular definition of corruption 
can be said to raise issues of definitional boundaries. That is, at what point can a 
transaction be said to be corrupt? In the case of bribery, which ordinarily involves the 
exchange of money or any other form of payment for the extra services rendered by the 
public official – is it after the public official collects the money from the briber that 
corruption has taken place? Or does the term ‘corrupt’ only apply if the public official 
coerces the service user to make the payment? These are questions that are not addressed 
in corruption literature. Thus most corruption definitions do not take into consideration 
the role of other participants who can also initiate the transaction for their own reasons.  
In Senior (2006), the role of other stakeholders in a corrupt transaction is articulated. 
According to him, the following elements must be present for corruption to occur:  
A corruptor (1) covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee 
to influence (3) action(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor or nominee, and for 
which the corruptee has (5) authority (Senior, 2006, p. 27).  
In other words, the nature of a corrupt transaction is such that it can be initiated by any 
of the parties, therefore such a term as ‘corruptor’ is fluid and does not necessarily apply 
to the public official at all times as suggested by popular definitions of the phenomenon. 
The significance of this definition lies in the fact that it acknowledges the somewhat fluid 
nature of the relationship which exists between the parties in a corrupt transaction.  
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However, one of the possible drawbacks of this description is the requirement that the 
favour must be covert, which raises the question of what happens in a situation where 
exchange of favours is the norm and not the exception. By insisting that secrecy must 
characterise a corrupt transaction the description fails to take into consideration situations 
where corruption is systemic and as such could pass as ‘an unwritten convention which 
is known and accepted by all’ (Mény, 1996, p. 310).  
Furthermore, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) also argued that definitions which 
focus on public officials as the only culprit are too narrow as they do not take into 
consideration private actors in corrupt transactions (ADB, 1998). According to the ADB: 
Corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public and 
private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich 
themselves and / or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by 
misusing the position in which they are placed. (ADB, 1998, p. 9–10). 
Much like the definitions suggested by Senior (2006) and Collins et al. (2009) the ADB 
definition is more rounded as it considers the private and public office holders as potential 
deviants. Despite the Bank’s inclusion of private sector actors, the ADB’s definition 
could be regarded as a mere extension of the World Bank’s popularly cited definition of 
corruption – ‘the abuse of public office for private benefit’ (World Bank, 1996). As the 
definition may still be interpreted to mean that corruption is only perpetuated by office 
holders, regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector. Consequently, the 
ADB’s definition is still bedevilled by the question whether corruption is strictly an 
‘office holder’ problem and where the answer is in the negative, it gives no inkling as to 
who the other participants are in a corrupt transaction.  
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The difficulty of finding a definition to cover every form of corrupt behaviour has led 
researchers to either focus on a discipline–specific discussion of the phenomenon or 
examining the different manifestations of corruption. The next section explores specific 
theoretical foundations of some popular definitions and causes of corruption. It highlights 
the reasons why certain forms of corruption are prominent in some societies.  
3 . 1 . 2 .  C o r r u p t i o n  D i s c o u r s e  
Corruption discourses in the social sciences can be said to fall into either of two main 
paradigms – the structural or the interactional variety (Shore & Haller, 2005). According 
to professors of anthropology Shore and Haller (2005), the structural brand of corruption 
is most common in developmental studies, especially studies on the formation and 
development of societies and democracies. To proponents of this view, corruption is a 
phenomenon that occurs as a result of the nature and / or organisation of societal 
structures – which intrinsically is a symptom of an underdeveloped democracy or a 
society in transition. Examples of theoretical perspectives which fall under this category 
are those of Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucratic institution (Gerth & Mills, 1946) and 
Riggs’s theory of the prismatic society (1964), which is discussed under the structural 
functionalist perspective. 
In contrast to the macro perspective of the structural approach is the interactional school 
of thought. Proponents of the interaction variety of corruption discourse emphasis the 
individualistic feature of corruption (Shore & Haller, 2005; Johnston, 1996). It is 
grounded in the micro-level analysis of human behaviour. Examples of this approach can 
be gleaned from the popular definitions, discussed in Table 3 (p. 53), of corruption as the 
abuse of public office for private benefit. This perspective examines the behaviour of 
participants to a corrupt transaction but, in most cases, with a focus on the public official 
due to the perceived distinctions between the public and the private arena (Lennerfors, 
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2009). Two perspectives will be discussed under this heading – Rose-Ackerman’s 
institutional economics view (1999) which is also called the rational–actor approach and 
the relational view. The relational view was adapted from the principles of social 
exchange theory and developed out of the work of Marcel Mauss, Claude Levi-Strauss 
and Bronislaw Malinowski (Torsello, 2015, p. 169). 
Accordingly, the next section will proceed with the discussion of these perspectives by 
first examining the structural approach and then proceeding to the interactional approach. 
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 .  S t r u c t u r a l  P e r s p e c t i v e :  W e b e r i a n  I d e a l - T y p e  
B u r e a u c r a c y  
This perspective developed out of the work of Max Weber, a German Sociologist and 
political scholar. In his research on ideal-typical bureaucracy, he posited that this 
administrative form, characterised by hierarchies and a strict adherence to rules and 
procedures, is the most efficient form of organisation to eradicate the ‘spoils’ regime 
prevalent in America and Europe at the time (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 18; Lynn, 2006). It 
should be noted that despite his acknowledgement of the spoils system and political 
corruption in both Europe and America, corruption was not the main focus of Weber’s 
research (Rubinstein & Maravic, 2010). Rather he argued that the bureaucratic institution 
was indispensable to a society that seeks development and yearns to be more democratic, 
and this administrative tool can bring about the necessary changes through the process of 
rationalisation.  
As discussed in the sections explaining the definitional features of corruption, (Section 
3.1.1.1, p. 56), rationalisation is a key characteristic of Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucratic 
institution. It affects the functioning of the institution and the nature of the ensuing 
relationship between the bureaucrats and the people they serve. The institution is 
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described as highly efficient and staffed with specialist and objective officials, leading to 
the delivery of a considerably depersonalised service, strictly based on the rules and 
regulations of the institution; with one of its cardinal rules being the separation of the 
private needs of the bureaucrat from the needs of the office (Gerth & Mills, 1946, pp. 
215, 197). The focus on the individual public official in this manner resonates with the 
perspective of the interactional school of thought. However, the difference between this 
perspective and those of the interactional view is that the flaws in the structure of the 
bureaucracy are what gives rise to corrupt behaviour. These flaws are noticeable because 
the structures of the society and its various institutions are still in flux (Hoetjes, 1977 
cited in Graaf et al., 2010). Thus the full development of the institution and society will 
mean the crystallisation of a rational bureaucracy and the possible eradication of 
bureaucratic corruption.      
In discussing the ideal-type bureaucratic institution, Weber highlighted some of the 
important features of the institution to include, security of tenure, meritocracy in 
recruitment and depersonalisation of bureau officials (Gerth & Mills, 1946, pp. 196–203). 
According to these highlighted features, the Nigerian bureaucracy is yet to attain 
rationalisation, as the existing administrative institution is argued to lack some 
characteristics prescribed by Weber, such as meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
(Mustapha, 2007; Suberu, 2001; Minogue, 2000), tenure security (Adebayo, 2000; 
Adamolekun & Ayeni, 1990) and depersonalisation (Aluko & Adesopo, 2004, p. 18) 
amongst other things. As a result, the lack of these key features in the Nigerian 
bureaucracy creates opportunities for corruption and these opportunities are, arguably, 
exploited by some bureau officials. As stated earlier, due to the idealised character of the 
bureaucracy as envisioned by Weber, it is impossible for any bureaucracy to possess all 
the features. 
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3 . 1 . 2 . 2 .  T h e  S t r u c t u r a l  F u n c t i o n a l i s t  P e r s p e c t i v e  
One of the most influential works in this area is that of Riggs (1964) on prismatic 
societies. According to Riggs transitioning (prismatic) societies are a halfway house 
between underdevelopment (traditional) and being fully developed. In most of these 
transitioning societies, a foreign institutional process is influencing the traditional society. 
Due to the foreign nature of the institution the subsystems are in a constant state of flux 
trying to negotiate a settlement between adopting the practices of the foreign and retaining 
the traditional features. Consequently, the combination of these practices i.e. the 
traditional and foreign creates a form of unsettlement or uncertainty or even rebellion 
against the unrecognisable institution that has been created.  
To proponents of this view, a society is made up of different subsystems with various 
phenomena playing a role or function, in this case corruption is deemed a functional 
phenomenon. Corruption is regarded as a ‘functional disfunction’ which enables 
adaptation to changes in the various sub-systems (Porta, 1996, p. 349). Thus, advocates 
of the structural-functional approach argue that corruption is a tool to be utilised during 
the developmental process of the society at which stage it will help propel the wheels of 
development through snags occasioned by the change process. With this ideology is also 
attached a naive optimism that with development chances are that it would fade as the 
need for it diminishes (Werner, 1983). Riggs discusses these features in his explanation 
of the functioning of the adapted institutions that has been created, which he referred to 
as the sala model. 
In Riggs-style, ‘sala’ is another word for the bureaucratic institution that is plagued by a 
considerable level of corruption in a prismatic society. He posited that this may be as a 
result of the extensive overlapping caused by the imposition of new western practices on 
old traditional ones, thus leading to the proliferation of adapted practices, and these 
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adapted practices have corrupt features embedded in them (Riggs, 1964, p. 12–13). While 
the overlap apparently causes some form of heterogeneous practices in the different sub-
systems it is imperative to understand that it reinforces the creation of what may be 
described as ‘different publics’ – the modern public, influenced by western practices and 
the traditional public, influenced by prior socialisation. For emphasis, although officials 
in these modern institutions are expected to adhere to its prescribed norms and practices 
they are also members of the traditional public and thus subject to its norms and practices. 
Therefore, creating a situation that Riggs called poly-normativism (Riggs, 1964, p. 277–
278). A condition where the individual official is confronted with a variety of incongruent 
norms and is judged for his or her adherence or nonadherence by the two publics (Ekeh, 
1975). According to proponents of the functionalist perspective, corruption becomes a 
useful tool to navigate the resulting tensions created in the sub-systems due to the 
plurality of values and norms which have become highlighted as a result of the 
developmental change process.   
The form of dualism created in these societies was extensively discussed by Professor 
Ekeh, a renowned political scientist, in his influential work, Colonialism and the two 
publics in Africa (Ekeh, 1975). Of significance is Ekeh’s argument that the developing 
society (African) is made up of three realms. The ‘civic public’ – the western influence – 
the ‘primordial public’ – the traditional influence and the ‘private realm’. This description 
raises a curiosity of how the common understanding of corruption fits into this 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Based on the nature of dualism in corruption 
literature, which relates to the public and private spheres, the fit of these definitions to 
the developing (African) state context may be weakened by a lack of specificity as to the 
‘public’ it refers. In light of Ekeh’s propositions and Riggs discussion of the transitioning 
society, the current understanding of corruption which is arguably based on the 
presumption of a universal monolithic public seems unsubstantiated, as its non-existence 
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is what has been posited to be the main cause of corruption in these societies, because it 
supposedly connotes the unsettlement of the structures of the society during the change 
process. 
The subsequent sections now turn to an examination of micro-level considerations in 
corruption discourse i.e. the interactional approach to studies of corruption. Under this 
approach, the institutional economics perspective and the relational perspective are 
considered. 
3 . 1 . 2 . 3 .  I n t e r a c t i o n a l  P e r s p e c t i v e :  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  E c o n o m i c s  
A p p r o a c h  
This approach is grounded in the field of economics and made popular through the works 
of Rose-Ackerman (1999, 2004, and 2010). The focus is on the behaviour of officials of 
public institutions. According to proponents of this view participation in corrupt 
transactions is based solely on a consideration of profit maximisation. Thus, based on 
market considerations, the individual public official is in possession of a scarce resource 
which he or she can sell to willing buyers in order to maximise his own profit (Rose-
Ackerman, 2010; Jacsics, 2014). This perspective is based on a principal–agent discourse 
which posits that there is a conflict of goals between what is prescribed by the principal 
and what is eventually carried out by the agent (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). In 
other words, the agent is in violation of the entrusted interests of the principal in favour 
of a much lucrative personal gain.  
However, the premise of this argument seems to be based on an assumption that corrupt 
practice is restricted to the lower cadre of (bureaucratic) institutions or in the case of 
grand corruption, that there is another authority that could demand accountability of the 
senior public official. In cases of systemic corruption which has been referred to as 
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corruption based on a ‘collective action’ problem (Persson et al, 2013) or ‘social trap’ 
(Rothstein, 2011, p. 232) – meaning corruption that resonates within the entire society 
and not just the institution – this creates a much more complex scenario than the 
principal–agent theory may be able to explain. As the principal may also view corruption 
as the norm, thus the agent may not be seen as violating per se or the principal may have 
no will to enforce sanctions where there is a violation (Persson et al, 2013, 2010). Thus, 
reforms based on this popular model of combating corruption may be set-up to fail due 
to the complexity of the problem on ground.  
The next subsection turns to a discussion of the relational approach which also identifies 
with the interactional ideology.    
3 . 1 . 2 . 4 .  I n t e r a c t i o n a l  P e r s p e c t i v e :  R e l a t i o n a l  A p p r o a c h   
This approach developed out of anthropology, from the works of Malinowski (1922, 
1944), Mauss (1954) and Lévi-Strauss (1969) on gift giving and its use as a tool of 
exchange in building relationships and social interdependence. Social interactions, 
particularly interpersonal relations, calls for reciprocity. According to Blau (1964), the 
nature of the benefits from these reciprocal relations act as the sustenance for long-term 
relationships, but might not necessarily result in direct or immediate monetary rewards.  
Social exchange networks may become structured along two lines – vertical and / or 
horizontal (Jancsics, 2014, p. 364–365; Blau, 1964, p. 25–32; Malinowski, 1922, 1944). 
The vertical structure highlights the power imbalance between the members in an 
interaction, which results in a patronage situation. For example, a bureaucratic official 
and his or her superior may create a patron–client relationship which leads to the superior 
being unable to enforce sanctions against the corrupt junior official. On the other hand, 
the horizontal structure has reciprocity based on status equality of members or transacting 
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parties. Popular examples in this respect are the guānxi network in China (Matondo, 
2012), blat in Russia (Ledeneva, 2008) and confianza in Latin America (Lomnitz, 1988). 
In most of these cases, the networks are sustained through the exchange of favours 
between peers.              
It should be noted however, that the relational view of corruption is not far removed from 
Rose-Ackerman’s institutional economics perspective as they both explore the exchange 
of scarce resources between participants. Nevertheless, the main premise is that the strict 
economic view of utility maximisation is inadequate to explain the complexity of 
corruption (Torsello, 2015; Lomnitz, 1988). Proponents of this view argue that contrary 
to the institutional economics perspective of a simplistic agent–client relation, it may be 
more astute to consider a larger network of participants (Jancsics, 2014) whose informal 
mode of transacting has been built into the formal social processes (Lomnitz, 1988).  
It is essential to understand that the foundation of this relationship is mutual benefit based 
on trust. Trust in this regard relates to ‘relational trust’ (Rose-Ackerman, 2001, p. 529) 
based on reciprocity as opposed to trust in government and its institutions. In the case of 
developing countries, such as Nigeria, there is a general low level of trust in government 
and a diversion of trust to social networks along ethnic cleavages (Ekeh, 1975). 
Interactional exchanges which promote corrupt practices may become prevalent in these 
social networks, subjecting the bureaucratic official to what has been termed the 
‘economy of affection’ (Hyden, 1995, p. 8). That is the membership of a network that 
may require the public official to provide administrative favours and advantages to 
friends, relatives and other members of the network with the promise of future assistance 
or benefits when required (Lomnitz & Sheinbaum, 2004).  
  
70 
 
While the perspectives discussed in this section highlight the actions and behaviours that 
give rise to certain types of corruption in some societies, the next section discusses how 
these practices are grouped in corruption studies.     
3 . 1 . 3 .  C a t e g o r i s i n g  C o r r u p t i o n  
Categorising corruption may take one of two forms, a detailed or an overarching view 
(Lambsdorff, 1998). The detailed view focuses on the actions and behaviour that 
constitutes the corrupt practice, while the overarching view emphasises the scale and 
impact of the actions. Johnston and Sharma (2004) and the Asian Development Bank 
(1998) provided examples of the detailed view of corruption by describing some actions 
and behaviours which qualify as corrupt: 
 Bribery (extortion and kickbacks) – is a reciprocal exchange where the service 
user makes a form of payment to the public official in exchange for an extra 
service (Rose & Peiffer, 2015). Due to my interest in these types of 
interactions, the concept of bribery is explored in more depth in the next 
section; 
 Procurement fraud (including collusion, overcharging, or the selection of 
contractors, suppliers, and consultants on questionable criteria) – as 
governments are one of the biggest spenders in most societies (Sikka & 
Lehman, 2015, p. 62), this results in the area of procurement being highly 
susceptible to corrupt practices due to the extent of discretion exercised by 
public officials in this area (Neu, Everett & Rahaman, 2015);      
 Payments to government officials to foster or sustain monopolistic or 
oligopolistic access to markets and influence peddling (favour-brokering and 
conflict of interest) – these are some of the features of rent–seeking (Hillman, 
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2013). In this scenario the public official creates avenues for corruption by 
peddling his influence to the highest bidder;   
  Embezzlement of public funds and properties – relates to situations where 
public officials appropriate or divert public funds for their personal benefit 
(Morris, 2011); 
 Clientelism and patronage (politicians giving material favours in exchange for 
citizen and party support) – describes some reciprocal exchanges between 
people in unequal power relations (Jancsics, 2014). Continuity or iteration is 
described as a key feature of this type of relation (Hicken, 2011, p. 292)    
 Illegal campaign contributions (giving unregulated gifts to influence policies 
and regulations); 
 Obstruction of justice and interference in the duties of agencies tasked with 
detecting, investigating and prosecuting illicit behaviour. 
Under the overarching view corruption can be classified as being either petty or grand 
(Jancsics, 2013). According to Professor Theobald (2008), petty corruption which is also 
referred to as low-level corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), can be described as follows: 
Low level public servants (including police and military personnel) performing 
narrowly circumscribed roles within formal organisations, breaking or not 
observing rules and procedures in return for pecuniary rewards or other forms of 
self-aggrandisement (Theobald, 2008, p. 160).  
In contrast, grand corruption is in principle not so different from petty corruption. 
However, the players are more senior public officials in the highest levels of government 
– in dalliance with other politicians, private corporations and international agencies – 
with the power to not only bend rules but also create and influence policies for self-
aggrandisement (Maeda & Ziegfeld, 2015; Hellman & Kaufmann, 2001; Gray, 2015) and 
  
72 
 
oftentimes the monetary rewards from this is far more substantial than those involved in 
petty corruption. Therefore, considering the apparent huge and varied nature of corrupt 
transactions, this research does not presume to examine all the possible manifestations of 
corruption, rather the focus is on petty corruption especially in the form of bribery. As 
such the next section examines the concept of bribery in more details.  
3 . 1 . 4 .  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B r i b e r y  
Bribery is the most commonly encountered form of corruption (Jain, 2012), and 
depending on the participants and amount of money involved can either be grand or petty. 
Researchers in the health sciences commonly refer to it as ‘informal payment’ (Lewis, 
2010; Cockcroft et al., 2008; Gaal, & McKee, 2006;), while in the social sciences it is 
sometimes referred to as ‘rent’ or ‘rent–seeking’ (Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
Rent–seeking can be distinguished from bribery, although the distinction may be blurry 
in certain circumstances. Rents have been likened to favours or influential gifts wielded 
by a public official (Hillman, 2013) and in order to obtain these rents, resources are 
expended by the rent–seeker (Aidt, 2016). In other words, bribes may be paid in the 
pursuit of a rent. Rent–seeking is a broader concept identifying certain actions and 
behaviour that is concluded with a bribery transaction. The ambiguity surrounding these 
concepts creates the need for a deeper exploration.  
Understanding the concept of bribery is particularly important because of its prevalence 
in the day-to-day contact between the individual and the government in most developing 
countries (Blundo et al., 2006). According to Rose & Peiffer (2015) this phenomenon 
directly affects more than 1.6 billion people each year (p. 2). Despite the significant 
number of people affected by this form of corruption, very little research is focused on 
understanding this concept from the perspective of those that it is described to affect 
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(Jancsics, 2013). To provide a clearer picture of this widely impacting phenomenon the 
next subsection commences the review of bribery by examining its definition. 
3 . 1 . 4 . 1 .  D e f i n i n g  B r i b e r y  
Much like corruption, defining bribery has been a difficult task for researchers due to a 
lack of consensus as to acts which should carry the tag. Social practices in some 
developing societies, particularly gift–giving, creates further division among researchers 
on acts which should be categorised as bribes (Gordon & Miyake, 2001). Unclear 
boundaries between where a gift stops and a bribe begins have contributed to the lack of 
a universally agreeable definition of bribery. Rose & Peiffer defined bribery as: 
An exchange between an individual and a public official in which the former gets 
a service to which he or she is not entitled and the official gets a material benefit 
(Rose & Peiffer, 2015, p. 3). 
This definition represents the popular understanding of bribery (Lindgren, 1993) and 
reflects the guilt of both participants i.e. the briber and the official. Although it clearly 
states the participants and their roles, it also raises the issue of how to measure the actual 
services that a user is entitled to get, as this may not be easily identified in certain 
circumstances. Take for example when dealing with a public bureaucracy with 
characteristically long and indeterminable processing times, how will the entitlement of 
a service user be determined? Also, with regards to the definition, others have argued that 
a bribe–related benefit does not necessarily accrue to the official, it could be for the 
benefit of a third party (Bello, 2014).        
Providing a broader definition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) described bribery thus: 
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Involves intentionally offering, promising or giving any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage to an official or decision maker, with the intention that the official or 
decision maker acts or refrains from acting in relation to the performance of their 
duties (OECD, 2013, p. 10). 
This definition emphasises the culpability of the bribe payer without clearly identifying 
those of the official. In this sense, for a payment to be labelled a bribe it has to originate 
from the service user, what then will such a payment be called where it is requested by 
the public official? Such a request has been described as the main feature of ‘extortion’ 
(Grødeland & Koshechkina, 1998, p. 672). Similarities between bribery and extortion 
leads to the need to distinguish the acts. Extortion by a public official has been defined 
as: 
The seeking or receiving of a corrupt benefit paid under an implicit threat to give 
the payor worse than fair treatment or to make the payor worse off than he is now 
(Lindgren, 1987, p. 825).  
Based on these definitions of bribery and extortion, identifying the ‘initiator’ of the 
transaction presumably determines the label that is attached to the act. In the case of 
bribery, emphasis is placed on the service user being the initiator while the opposite is 
the case for extortion. With extortion an important distinction is noted, this is the 
requirement that threat be used by the official to influence the action of the service user. 
This element is significant because in the absence of such threat a request for payment by 
the official does not translate to extortion as long as the service user is still given a fair 
treatment (Lindgren, 1993), it rather amounts to soliciting for bribes. However, the 
question still remains, in the absence of an institutional benchmark what constitutes ‘fair 
treatment’? Simply put where a service user makes informal payment to get something 
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‘extra’, bribery has occurred, but where the absence of such payment leads to a less than 
normal service, this leads to an implication of extortion (Lindgren, 1987, p. 826).  
The reciprocal nature of bribery transactions has led to the argument that reciprocity 
distinguishes the act of bribery from other social practices which may disguise a similar 
exchange (Tanzi, 1998). This view on reciprocity leads to a discussion of such similar 
exchange in the form of gifts.  
3 . 1 . 4 . 2 .  G i f t  E x c h a n g e  a n d  B r i b e r y  
Gift giving is considered an essential part of social interaction as it creates social bonds 
between people. The controversial nature of the practice has resulted in the lack of an 
agreeable definition amongst researchers interested in this social practice (Camenisch, 
1981). The dictionary definition of a gift as something given voluntarily without payment 
in return – as to show favour towards someone, honour an occasion, or make a gesture of 
assistance – reflects an ideal–type understanding of the practice. This understanding of a 
gift is the basis of the argument that ‘reciprocity’ is the main feature that differentiates a 
gift from a bribe (Tanzi, 1998, p. 565). Such conception does not reflect the reality of the 
practice (Parry, 1986, p. 455) as reflected in Mauss’s famous work on gift and its 
significance in the society (1966). The exchange is deemed important not only because 
of the value of what is gifted but more for the ‘spirit’ behind the gift that creates an 
obligation on the part of the receiver to reciprocate (Mauss, 1966, pp. 8–9). This is where 
gift’s similarity with the practice of bribing is emphasised, as a briber only makes a 
payment based on the assumption that the official will reciprocate by providing the 
required service. While the requirement to reciprocate is implicit in the case of gift 
exchanges, it is explicit in bribery as the corrupt transaction may be viewed as a form of 
contract, payment made for services rendered.   
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The difference between a gift exchange and bribery is also reflected in the moral 
undertone that the practice takes in the society. Generally, the exchange of gifts is 
positively perceived, while the opposite is the case with the payment of bribes. The use 
of the term ‘bribery’ denotes a moral condemnation of the act in question (Steidlmeier, 
1999, p. 125) and it makes participants to distance themselves from the negativity that it 
signifies. Common tools typically used to express morally repugnant or distasteful words 
are euphemisms and doublespeak (Mintz, 1992). These linguistic tools are used to purify 
words to disinfect them from the associated negativity. Thus by relabelling negative acts 
with positive ones there is a gradual distancing of the negative interpretation. In the case 
of bribery and gift-giving, the requirement for reciprocity that is tied to both acts may 
enable corrupt parties to pass off a bribe by relabelling it as a gift. Therefore, in societies 
where gift–giving is an integral part of the relationship network, there is the tendency for 
a blurring of the line between a bribe and a gift (Steidlemeier, 1999), making it that much 
more difficult to determine when the line is being crossed.  
Consequently, language plays an important role in how an exchange is constructed by the 
parties involved. The relabelling of corrupt exchanges through the use of euphemisms 
and doublespeak has created the need to pay closer attention to what people say in order 
to be able to decipher what they actually mean (Pinker, Nowak & Lee, 2008, pp. 833–
834). This underscores the argument of discourse analysts that social interactions cannot 
be understood in isolation of the discourses that give them meaning (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002, p. 3). It would be enlightening to explore how service users in this context use 
language to discursively construct their actions and interaction with the bureaucracy.  
The review thus far has critically examined how corruption researchers have constructed 
the public officials as agents of corruption in their exploitation of institutional structures. 
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The next section sees a departure from this view to explore the role of service users in 
corrupt practices and how they are perceived and constructed by researchers in this area. 
3 . 2 .  T h e  S e r v i c e  U s e r :  A  S i l e n t  S u p p o r t i n g  C a s t ?  
This section explores the role of service users in bureaucratic corruption and how they 
have been cast in previous public administration literature. The review emphasises the 
dearth of literature in this important area and suggests a closer look at the roles of 
participants in a corrupt transaction.   
As discussed in the sections on defining corruption and bureaucratic reforms in Nigeria, 
the perspective of bureaucratic culpability is so prevalent in corruption research that there 
are limited studies on the role of the service user in its reproduction (UNODC, 2011; 
Smith, 2010). An instructive study in this regard was carried out by Smith (2010), a 
professor of anthropology, on the social reproduction of corruption amongst Nigerians. 
His work highlights the everyday participation of the ordinary Nigerian in petty 
corruption, specifically in the form of bribe payment. Describing the role of individual s 
in corruption, Smith encapsulates the paradoxical roles which people in this community 
face as thus: ‘ordinary Nigerians are participants in a process wherein they are 
simultaneously the main victims and the loudest critics’ (Smith, 2010, p. xii). The 
statement clearly shows that the people, in this case service users, have a role that they 
play in the perpetuation of corrupt practices, but what is the nature of this role? 
Researchers in this area are silent on the issue.  
A review of the literature revealed that very few corruption researchers consider the 
perspective of service users (Jancsics, 2013), and where they do a macro perspective is 
preferred. Two main reasons have been suggested for the preference of a macro view, the 
first is the ready availability of countrywide data from Corruption Perception Indexes 
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(CPI) (Andersson & Heywood, 2009). The second is the assumption that participants in 
corrupt transactions are unwilling to talk about their participation (Blundo et al., 2006), 
hence a reliance on quantitative techniques that take an overarching view of the issue. 
Macro perspectives of the concept have led to researchers not paying enough attention to 
service user corruption. Compared to other disciplines the public health sector reveals a 
growing scholarship in this area. Some of the research on service user corruption in this 
field includes examining the impact of informal payments amongst users of the Greek 
health services (Souliotis et al., 2016), analysis of the practice of informal payments 
amongst rich and poor users of health services across thirty–three African countries to 
determine its impact on quality of service (Kankeu & Ventelou, 2016), and a study of 
service users experience of health care in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after some major 
reforms (Cockcroft et al., 2008), amongst others. A key issue raised in discussions on 
service user corruption is the impact of perception on the behaviour of service users 
(UNODC, 2011) and how some of these perceptions are not founded on the actual 
experience of the individual’s interaction with the institution. However, the perception 
held plays a role in influencing Users’ behaviour and subsequent interaction with the 
institution. As a result, the following subsections will examine the literature for the impact 
that perception of corruption has on the way service users interact with public institutions. 
3 . 2 . 1 .  I m p a c t  o f  S e r v i c e  U s e r  P e r c e p t i o n  o n  R e a l i t y :  A  
P o s s i b l e  C a s e  o f  D i s t o r t e d  V i s i o n  
Corruption and what is perceived as corrupt actions in a society may be described as part 
of a social process (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010) which reflects the general 
understanding of the rules and what constitutes a departure from the same. An act which 
may be deemed corrupt in one society might be normal or justifiable in another (Melgar 
& Rossi, 2012). However, perception plays a central role on how the rules are interpreted 
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and translated into actions (Goffman, 1959; Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). Social 
perception itself has been described as possessing ‘subjective influences’ (Jussim, 2012, 
p. 14) which may consist of individual expectations, fear, bias etc. These subjective 
influences are deployed to interpret social environments, interactions and reality (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1966). The importance of perception in any society is particularly noted in 
the relationship between the individual and the government, as the perception the public 
has of its government influences the level of perceived corruption in its agencies (Van de 
Walle & Bouckaert, 2003) and the society as a whole. This in turn informs the actions of 
the service user when interacting with the public institution. For example, Nigeria’s rank 
at number 136 out of 167 countries on Transparency International’s CPI database 
(Transparency International, 2015), and the fact that the ‘fantastically corrupt’ comment 
of Prime Minister, David Cameron went viral could form the basis of perceptions held by 
business people thinking to enter the Nigerian market. Such perceptions could influence 
their behaviour by prompting them to seek out ‘middlemen’, who supposedly understand 
the way things are done, for corrupt transactions from the outset before actually 
interacting with the market to determine whether it is corrupt or not.  
Similarly, the level of tolerance to corrupt activities may be amplified by a high rate of 
perceived corruption in the society (Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004). The response of the 
government to high-profile corruption scandal is identified as a key influencing factor in 
this respect (Ibid, p. 384). As this informs the general public, service users and 
bureaucrats alike, of the acceptability of corrupt actions and the extent to which it should 
be recognised as the norm or otherwise. In such societies, there is the possibility that the 
majority of the people that take part in corruption assume it to be the norm (UNODC, 
2011), and in any case a victimless crime. Addressing the issue of tolerance and 
normalisation of corruption in the African context Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, a professor of 
African public administration, and Osei-Hwedie (1999), noted that in Nigeria corruption 
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is now perceived as a way of life while in Sierra Leone it has attained the level of being 
perceived as a culture (Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, 1999; Smith, 2010). Based on these 
observations, the likelihood that service users in these societies are merely passive 
participants or by-standers, is quite low.  
However, users are still generally perceived and strictly cast in the literature as victims, 
without taking into consideration the variable nature of corrupt relations. Justifications 
for such typecasting have included: the pursuit of quality service (Souliotis et al., 2016; 
Ensor & Thompson, 2012; Gaal & Mckee, 2006); evasion of red-tape (Melgar, Rossi, & 
Smith, 2010); educational attainment of the individual service user which enables 
knowledge and understanding of the proper procedure (Melgar & Rossi, 2012); 
indigenous traditional beliefs in the society (Hyden, 1995; Moyo, 1992), fear of being 
sanctioned by bureaucratic officials where bribe is not paid (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012) 
amongst others. These arguments do not take into consideration the influencing ability of 
perception. Research in some countries have noted the impact of perception on service 
user actions and behaviour, these are discussed in the next subsection.  
3 . 2 . 1 . 1 .  ‘ W e  O u r s e l v e s  A r e  G u i l t y ’  
So far in this review, ‘perception’ has been extended as a concept of significance, but to 
what extent does it influence service user behaviour? A United Nations report on Serbian 
public service users suggests the possible psychological impact that the perception of 
corruption has had on the perpetuation of bureaucratic corruption (UNODC, 2011, p. 35). 
This impact is reflected in the fact that in more than half (56%) of bureaucratic 
encounters, service users are the initiators of bribe payments and such involvement is 
rationalised by the perception of mutual benefit (UNODC, 2011). The data on service 
users in the Czech Republic and Slovakia reveals that the problem of bureaucratic 
corruption does not reside solely with the bureaucrats as more than half of the respondents 
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believe that bureaucratic corruption is being sustained by the majority of service users 
who are eager to bribe officials for services (Miller, Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001). 
Furthermore, the data from Nigeria also reflects the culpability of the service user in the 
social reproduction of corruption (Smith, 2010).  
Considering the impact of perception in shaping the behaviour and disposition of service 
users towards bureaucratic corruption it is unsurprising that the data from Latvia reveals 
that majority of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘a system whereby people 
could anonymously report instances of corruption would not be successful because 
corruption is a natural part of our lives and helps solve many problems’ (Anderson, 1998, 
p. 48). The data from Ghana also suggested that a considerable percentage of respondents 
were reluctant to report the collection of a bribe (Ofori-Atta & Gadzekpo, 1999) on 
similar grounds. Thus, justifying a Ukrainian service user’s statement that: ‘we ourselves 
are guilty’ (Miller, Gr⊘deland & Koshechkina, 2001, p. 75). Despite evidence pointing 
to a co–production of corruption, (UNODC, 2011; Miller, Grødeland & Koshechkina, 
2001; Anderson, 2001) researchers in this area have consistently sought to justify the 
participation of the service user in corrupt activities. 
An effect of a high rate of perceived corruption in the society is that it may not reflect 
social reality. In other words, a public display of governmental tolerance for corruption 
may not be consistent with practices in every government ministry or department (Miller, 
2006). Thus creating a distortion between what is perceived and what is experienced. The 
World Bank research in Latvia is an example of a situation where perception does not 
necessarily reflect reality. The findings from Latvia suggests that the prevailing 
perception about the judiciary was that bribes were a necessity 30 to 40 percent of the 
time, however, only 14 percent of actual service users experienced the need to pay a bribe 
(Anderson, 1998, p. 48). The United Nations researched Serbia and found that the lands 
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registry was generally perceived to be one of those institutions immune to corruption, but 
actual experience reveals that this institution has one of the highest records of bribery 
from service users who encounter it (UNODC, 2011, p. 37). Miller, Grødeland & 
Koshechkina (2001) reported similar findings from their field work in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, where over four-fifths of their respondents 
perceive that a bribe would most likely be needed in an encounter with the state ministry, 
however only a fifth had ‘rarely or never’ experienced fair treatment without the payment 
of a bribe (Miller, Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001, p. 91). A similar conclusion was 
drawn from the research in Romania (Anderson et al, 2001). This illustrates that a reliance 
on only the perception of service users as the basis of a reform may be misleading, thus 
a better understand of what influences their construction of reality is essential (Miller, 
2006). This is important because the variation between perception and what is 
experienced might have a substantial impact on service delivery and its improvement 
(Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). Previous reform efforts may have been focusing on just 
the perception of corruption and not the actual experience of service users.  
Despite possibilities of service user induced corruption and the arguments in some 
quarters of the unbalanced nature of current research in corruption (Robertson, 2006; 
Hindess, 2001; Vogl, 1998), the majority of the literature on corruption still adopt a rigid 
public sector perspective in studying the phenomenon (Jancsics, 2013). This may largely 
be as a result of the pervading ‘othering’ (Polzer, 2001, p. 11) or externalisation 
(Lennerfors, 2009, p. 12; Dracklé, 2005) of corrupt practices in the society. Corruption is 
viewed as sinister, people rarely admit to their voluntary participation in such practices 
but rather transfer the blame to another, and in this case, the usual culprits are the public 
office holders, hence the current dearth of literature on service user corruption, 
particularly the role of local private and professional individuals in corrupt practices. 
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The growth of evidence on acts of bribery and other forms of corrupt practices by 
international businesses in developing countries led to the current international regulatory 
regime (Pae, 2008). Although the regulations are geared towards discouraging 
international bribery and other corrupt practices (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 1997; 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977; Leigh & Evans, 2007), the extent of their 
effectiveness is debatable (Sikka, 2008). While the importance of researching the 
practices of these international organisations is ever present, as they have been implicated 
severally for laundering monies for political office holders in developing countries and 
bribing officials to obtain contracts (Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006, p. 20), 
this group of culprits do not sum up private participation in public corruption. A 
consideration of this is noted in the work of Sikka, a professor of accounting, on the role 
of accountants in the perpetuation of corruption (Sikka, 2008). In his research, he 
examined the involvement of accountants in corrupt practices by analysing the inherent 
professional skills which properly qualifies the individual professional and firm to 
participate in corruption unfettered. This is an exceptional example of an insight into 
specific professional bodies which is rare in corruption literature and thus bears further 
consideration. In this regard, this study seeks to examine another professional body, legal 
practitioners, whose inherent skills and legal obligations makes them vulnerable to 
corrupt practices.  
The next section considers the relationship between legal practice and corruption. It 
specifically discusses how the nature of legal practice and the skills of the legal 
practitioner can be used for corrupt ends. 
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3 . 3 .  T h e  L e g a l  P r a c t i t i o n e r  a n d  E t h i c a l  
C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
A discussion of corruption within the legal literature is generally found under the 
discourse of professional misconduct and legal ethics. While there are lots of discussions 
about unethical practices amongst legal practitioners, there seem to be a literary 
reluctance to go a step further to examine corruption and corrupt practices amongst 
lawyers. Therefore, to proceed with this unexplored area the next section will turn to the 
critical examination of legal and professional ethics which is supposed to guide the 
actions and conducts of members of this group. 
From an outsider’s perspective the legal practitioner, ordinarily, represents a symbol of 
ethics. Legal practitioners all around the world are subject to a form of legal ethics, 
whether codified or otherwise, which in Nigeria is primarily contained in the Legal 
Practitioner’s Act (2004) and the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 
(2007). In the United States, it is referred to as ‘professional responsibility’ and legal 
practitioners are subject to the rules and guidelines adopted by the American Bar 
Association which is contained in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Schiltz, 
1999). In the United Kingdom, the profession is not fused as it is in Nigeria and the United 
States and legal practitioners have to either choose to be a solicitor or a barrister, and they 
both have different rules on ethics. On the one hand, solicitors are guided by the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority’s Code of Conduct (2011) and on the other hand, barristers are 
guided by the Bar Standards Board and the Bar Council (The Bar Council, 2016). Due to 
the dearth of literature on legal ethics amongst Nigerian lawyers and the similarity of the 
professional framework in Nigeria with those of the United States, there will be a reliance 
on the extensive ethics literature of the latter. To understand what legal ethics means to 
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legal practitioners in order to appreciate how its violation ties in with corruption, the 
following subsections examine the concept.  
3 . 3 . 1 .  E x p l o r i n g  L e g a l  E t h i c s  
Like most concepts, ethics has various meanings depending on who is asked. It has been 
described as the moral compass which directs the choices and behaviour of individuals 
based on general beliefs of right and wrong (Velasquez, Andre, Shanks & Meyer, 2015). 
However, this description is regarded as being too broad for legal practitioners due to the 
inherency of contradictions in the practice of law (Chambliss, 2012). These contradictions 
have led to legal practitioners occupying ‘institutionally schizophrenic’ (Wolfram, 1986, 
p. 585) roles. The basis of such contradictions is usually professional or personal. 
Professional contradictions arise due to the conflicting duties that the practitioner owes 
to the courts and the client (Rules of Professional Conduct, 2007, rule 30; Hussey 
Freeland, 2012). While personal contradictions originate from the practitioner’s 
consideration of such matters as finance and reputation in their legal practice. These 
contradictions will be expanded later. The meaning of legal ethics will be discussed first. 
3 . 3 . 1 . 1 .  D e f i n i n g  E t h i c s  i n  L e g a l  P r a c t i c e   
According to Black’s law dictionary, a widely used reference dictionary for lawyers and 
students of the law, the third definition of legal ethics is: 
A lawyer’s practical observance of or conformity to established standards 
of professional conduct (2009, p. 976). 
This definition emphasises adherence to established standards as the criteria for 
complying with ethical requirements. In other words, as long as the practitioner conforms 
to the requirements prescribed in the written or unwritten codes of conduct there is an 
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assumption of ethical practice. The next question that arises is how comprehensive are 
these ethical codes of practice? The codes are such that they provide basic ethical 
requirement and give practitioners considerable discretion to determine what is ethical in 
situations not specifically provided for (Matther & Levin, 2012; Wilkins, 2012).  It is 
doubtful that any one code of conduct will be able to provide for every ethical dilemma 
that a practitioner may likely encounter. In practice, where the basic prescribed standard 
and ordinary morality are in conflict, legal practitioners in most cases revert to the 
professional code of conduct as the requirement expected and nothing more (Schiltz, 
1999; Chambliss, 2012) resulting in a narrow construction of legal ethics. Which leads in 
certain circumstances to practitioners being accused of unethical conduct (Frenkel, 
Nelson & Sarat, 1998).    
Further clarification was provided on legal ethics, by the Black’s Law Dictionary. It went 
on to elaborate; 
In one sense, the term ‘legal ethics’ refers narrowly to the system of 
professional regulations governing the conduct of lawyers. In a broader 
sense, however, legal ethics is simply a special case of ethics in general, 
as ethics is understood in the central traditions of philosophy and religion. 
From this broader perspective, legal ethics cuts more deeply than legal 
regulation: it concerns the fundamentals of our moral lives as lawyers’ 
(Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 3 (1992) quoted under 
“Legal Ethics” in Black’s Law Dictionary, 2009, p. 976) 
Despite the broader perspective advocated above, there is a difference between finely 
stated moral advice and the decisions a practitioner has to make when confronted with 
the scenario (Frenkel, Nelson & Sarat, 1998). In reality these unregulated situations create 
dilemmas that act as the rationale for some unethical or even corrupt decisions that legal 
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practitioners make in the course of their duties. Tenbrunsel & Messick (2004) explain the 
downward spiral of decision making from the straight-and-narrow to the unethical and 
corrupt in a framework called ethical fading. This framework will be explained in the 
next subsection. 
3 . 3 . 1 . 2 .  E t h i c a l  F a d i n g  a n d  L e g a l  P r a c t i t i o n e r s  
This is a process whereby ethical decisions have gradually been ‘bleached’ of their moral 
implications to the extent that the social actor does not see the absence of morality in his 
or her decisions. Thus, a legal practitioner in this state may participate in bureaucratic 
corruption without a consideration of the ethical implications of such actions while 
rationalising that they have followed the letters of the rules of professional conduct which 
advocates for a seasoned representation of clients’ interest. A person in this state may, 
arguably, be regarded as being under the influence of ‘self-deception’ (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004) 
Self-deception has been explained by the dual concepts of ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge of 
the contradictory nature of the belief that is held’. In order words, where a person knows 
that s/he holds a contradictory belief and still acts on it, there is an assumption that such 
deceptive acts are intentional (Levy, 2004; Deweese-Boyd, 2006). Recent studies on the 
subject have gradually moved away from this strict culpability view. Self-deception may 
be as a result of falsely believing or being unaware of motivational biases that underscore 
our actions and judgments (Mele, 2001; Messick & Bazerman, 1996). Consequently, self-
deception can make a legal practitioner act in a self-interested manner with no regards for 
ethical considerations, while holding the belief that s/he is being objective. Tenbrunsel & 
Messick posits that there are ‘enablers’ which aggravate self-deception, three of which 
are; language euphemisms, the slippery slope of decision making and biased perceptual 
causation (2004). These self-deceptive enablers reinforce this state by re-labelling the 
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ethically questionable actions, rationalising the actions in terms of its economic or legal 
importance and transferring the blame or responsibility for the act to another, thus 
discarding the attendant ethical burden.  
Applying the concept of self-deception to the legal practitioner, there is an assumption 
that the letters of the codes of professional conduct are being followed, however, the line 
between ethical requirements and morality can be blurred to non-existence. The 
professional is probably unaware that the morality has been drained from his or her 
actions. An example of this is given in the quote by Schiltz, a professor of law and a 
serving judge in the United States federal court, as thus: 
Unethical lawyers do not start out being unethical […] they do not become 
unethical overnight; they become unethical […] a little bit at a time […] 
by cutting a corner here, by stretching the truth a bit there. Let me tell you 
how you will start acting unethically: It will start with your time sheets. 
One day, not too long after you start practicing law, you will sit down at 
the end of a long, tiring day, and you just won't have much to show for 
your efforts in terms of billable hours. It will be near the end of the month. 
You will know that all of the partners will be looking at your monthly time 
report in a few days, so what you'll do is pad your time sheet just a bit. 
Maybe you will bill a client for ninety minutes for a task that really took 
you only sixty minutes to perform. However, you will promise yourself 
that you will repay the client at the first opportunity by doing thirty 
minutes of work for the client for "free." In this way, you will be 
"borrowing," not "stealing” [emphasis mine]. And then what will happen 
is that it will become easier and easier to take these little loans against 
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future work. And then, after a while, you will stop paying back these little 
loans (Schiltz, 1999, p. 917). 
Of particular importance in the above quote is the euphemistic use of borrowing in place 
of stealing. The nature of such relabelling may act to distance the speaker from any 
possible negative interpretation of their actions by others and most especially to 
themselves. Thus crystallising the self-deceptive tendencies alluded to by Tenbrunsel & 
Messick (2004). Also, these self-deceptive tendencies may have the ability to make the 
professional believe that since corrupt transactions are deemed popular in the public 
sector, bribing officials to allegedly hasten the transactions of their client may not be 
breaching any ethical or moral duty (Robertson, 2006). But rather, they may see 
themselves as ‘obeying’ the perceived norms of transacting business with government 
departments. Continuous exposure to such corrupt practices leads to the slippery slope of 
decision making, thus, dissociating the individual from their actions and enabling the 
rationalisation of corrupt behaviour (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004).  
The inherent conflict which exists in legal practice and the consequent minimalist 
construction of the rules gives practitioners the ‘discretionary space’ (Wilkins, 2012, p. 
25) to construct the kind of ethics they would like to practice. Some authors have argued 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008, 2010; Neu et al., 2015; Dalton, 2006) that discretion is often the 
subject of abuse and the foundation for corrupt behaviour. However, due to the alleged 
schizophrenic nature of legal practice and the preponderance of conflicting values, the 
possibility of providing strict rules of ethical conduct for all legal practitioners may be an 
illusion. This is mainly because it raises contextual issues which Chambliss (2012) refers 
to as the benchmark problem. Due to the nature of conflicts in the practice of law, what 
then is the desirable standard to determine the ethicality of a legal practitioner’s actions? 
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Also in what context can a practitioner be said to have overstepped her discretionary 
boundaries in the fight to protect the client’s interest?       
3 . 3 . 2 .  C o n t e x t u a l i s a t i o n  i n  L e g a l  E t h i c s  
Deciphering the applicable context in which to apply specific rules of professional 
conduct has always been an issue in the legal profession (Mather & Levin, 2012). The 
main cause being ethical dilemmas brought about by the concurrent duties a practitioner 
owes to the client and court. These two duties reflect the professional and personal 
conflicts which the practitioner encounters in practice. The duty to the court is allegedly 
based on a call to serve the public and to aid in the administration of justice (Hussey 
Freeland, 2012). However, it is characterised by uncertainty as to what the duty actually 
entails (Gaetke, 1989). The duty appears to be in stark contrast with the duty to the client, 
who is regarded as ‘the first and foremost concern’ of the legal practitioner (Patterson, 
1979, p. 1263; Mtavangu, 2015).  
The conflicting interests of the public and private roles have raised arguments as to 
whether the practice of the law should be regarded less as a profession and more as a 
business (Whelan, 2009). If it is to be regarded more as a business, under what context 
will the practitioner be viewed as an ‘officer of the court?’ As legal practitioners are not 
measured on their duty, but on their finances and reputation (Aspen, 1994, p. 517), they 
are in the ‘business’ of the law, and like investors, clients pay attention to this bottom line 
when shopping for representation. Thus a quote from the Interim Report of the Committee 
of Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit (1991) in the United States is 
informative of this current state of legal practice:  
‘The law profession is now a competitive business with enormous 
pressures on lawyers… I have found a “kill or be killed" attitude between 
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lawyers who will probably never see an opposing counsel in another case. 
Clients also seem to want lawyers who take the "Rambo" approach and 
lawyers give in to this pressure (cited in Aspen, 1994, p. 517). 
If the above interpretation is coupled with the ambiguity surrounding the role of the legal 
practitioner as an officer of the court (Gaetke, 1989), there is bound to be greater 
identification with the much clearer client-centred role. At this point the personal 
dilemma becomes mixed up with the professional, as competition amongst practitioners 
for clients enables the client to ask the impossible and the practitioner may not be in the 
position to refuse. This type of pressure may induce the practitioner into a sort of ‘the end 
justifies the means’ form of legal practice which may in turn gradually drain out ethical 
considerations from legal decisions. 
The diversity of legal practice area is another reason for professional conflict. The codes 
provide generalised ethics to be observed by all practitioners, but it might be inapplicable 
in the context of the specific practice area (Wilkins, 1990). For example, there is a 
significant difference between the norms and ethical considerations of a divorce 
practitioner, a property practitioner and those required in insolvency practice. As such 
ethics in these specialised areas are fuzzy and mostly left to the discretion of the legal 
practitioner (Chambliss, 2012; Wilkins, 2012) guided by the norms prevalent in that field. 
The norms might tend towards unethical practice, and even the normalisation of corrupt 
activities if unfettered discretion is allowed in these specialist areas. Thus this review 
suggests that the conflict–prone arena of legal practice may be an area ripe with corrupt 
practices. As such, it would be interesting to study the legal practitioner as a user of public 
services and how the nature of the legal terrain, in general, shape their interaction with 
the public bureaucracy.  
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3 . 4 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
Corruption in the public sector has generally been viewed as a public official related 
problem, and this is reflected in the definitions and general understanding of the 
phenomenon. The tendency to view the official as the sole participant in corrupt 
transactions stems from the alleged distinction between the public and the private roles 
of the official. It has led research in this area to ignore the role and impact of other 
participants in bureaucratic corruption, despite existing data suggesting the active 
participation of service users in the reproduction of the phenomenon (UNODC, 2011; 
Miller, Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001; Smith, 2010).  
This review exposes a dearth of research on service users’ participation in corruption. 
The few research in this area has focused on the perception of corruption rather than 
actual experience. Perception of corruption does not reflect the actual level of corruption 
in the society, rather, it has been suggested to increase participation in the reproduction 
of the phenomenon (Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004). Thus, understanding the role of the 
service user in bureaucratic corruption is important as it informs on how their behaviour 
impacts on the services of the public institution and the perpetuation of bureaucratic 
corruption.  
The research gap on corruption in legal practice is fascinating considering that the legal 
profession is prone to ideological conflicts. In order to fill this gap, will it not be 
interesting to study the legal practitioner as a user of the services of the public 
bureaucracy? In this quest, the study will discursively construct the ethical environment 
of legal practice in Nigeria and how this affects the interaction between the practitioner 
and the public institution. Thus enabling a better understanding as to their participation 
or otherwise in bureaucratic corruption.  
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C H A P T E R  4   
R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N ,  M E T H O D O L O G Y  A N D  
A N A L Y T I C A L  M E T H O D S  
The review of corruption research in Chapter three led to two discoveries. Firstly, the fact 
that there have been very few empirical studies on corruption amongst service users, and 
secondly, the existence of the phenomenon is barely acknowledged in the legal 
profession, despite the annual increase in studies on corruption (See Table 2, p. 47). In 
the field of law, corruption is revealed to be a topic that is taboo, hence the use of the 
word ‘misconduct’ with regards to any untoward behaviour amongst practitioners. Such 
a substitution suggests the level of importance of language usage in constructing 
phenomena and social reality. But this important role of language is not reflected in 
mainstream consideration of corruption. Also not reflected is the role of service users in 
a corrupt transaction; this research aims to address these knowledge gaps as shown in the 
objectives outlined in the next section.   
4 . 1 .  A i m s  a n d  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  S t u d y   
This study aims to improve the general understanding of corruption by providing 
empirical data on the gaps in the study of service user corruption and legal profession 
construction of the phenomenon. Representing a departure from the mainstream focus on 
public officials this research sought to provide a better understanding of service users and 
their role in a corrupt transaction. Owing to the fact that bureaucrats are not the sole 
participants in a bribery transaction, the research aimed to shed more light on the nature 
of such transactions and the role played by service users in the reproduction of same. The 
study also sought to understand the nature of the interactions between service users and 
service providers and how this interaction shapes the behaviour of the service user. 
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The lack of research on corruption amongst legal practitioners and service users provided 
me with the opportunity of filling these gaps simultaneously, through a consideration of 
the legal practitioner in his role as a service user. In other words, the study aims to 
understand the phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption as constructed by professional 
service users, in this case, legal practitioners, of a public bureaucracy. The resulting goal 
is to illustrate how their perception of the phenomenon has influenced their behaviour 
and interaction with the bureaucracy through an analysis of their spoken experiences. A 
reason for the emphasis on spoken experience is not only because this perspective is 
underutilised in corruption research, but also because it provides an effective way to 
distinguish between the perceptions and experiences of the individual and the effect of 
this on their behaviour.     
Consequently, the study expects to contribute to the literature and inform reform policies 
through a better understanding of incidents of corruption in the public bureaucracies of 
developing countries, while also providing suggestions for further studies in this area.   
4 . 2 .  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n  
The research sought to provide answers to the question ‘are service users merely the 
‘unfortunate’ victims of bureaucratic corruption or co-producers of corruption?’ 
The nature of this question led to a review of my past encounters with certain public 
institutions in Nigeria, and a notable one is the Lagos state Lands Bureau. In my capacity 
as a legal practitioner, I have had extensive experience interacting with the different 
departments of this institution and I am familiar with the informal notoriety of the 
institution with regards to bureaucratic corruption and poor service delivery, but I never 
considered the impact of my actions on the Bureau and how this might shape the nature 
of the service that is delivered. As such, the study’s focus on how legal practitioners 
discursively construct corruption through the description of their experiences interacting 
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with the services of a public institution provides a unique insight into how interaction is 
constituted through talk. 
The remainder of this chapter provides comprehensive details of the research design 
adopted, the discussion of which is divided into six sections. Description of the 
philosophical and theoretical view underpinning this research is provided in the first 
section. The section highlights the interpretivist and constructionist foundation of the 
research. The second section discusses the inductive approach that was employed as a 
result of the nature of the enquiry. This is followed by a discussion of the qualitative 
methodological choice and consideration of the approaches popularly used in corruption 
research, highlighting their fit or lack thereof with the present study. The fourth section 
describes the different analytic strategies that were examined and the rationale for 
choosing the case study approach. A discussion of the research techniques employed is 
carried out in the fifth section and this section is divided into two, pre-fieldwork and post-
fieldwork. Pre-fieldwork describes the rationale for the selection of the public institution, 
the participants and ethical considerations made before the actual data gathering exercise. 
The section on post-fieldwork describes the data management and analysis process and 
reflexive activities of the researcher. Section six provides a chapter summary.  
Commencing the discussion is a pictorial adaptation of the research ‘onion’ by Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill (2012, p. 128) (See Figure 4), showing the different layers of the 
research and what was covered in each layer. 
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Representing the outer layer, the first section provides a description of the theoretical and 
philosophical foundations that underpin the study, this is discussed next. 
4 . 3 .  P h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n d  T h e o r e t i c a l  V i e w  
A research enquiry is shaped by the nature of its philosophical assumptions, which is 
made up of the ontology and epistemology. Ontology refers to the nature of social reality 
(Raadschelders, 2011), in respect of which three key decisions have been identified. 
According to Hansen (2010) these include making decisions about what exists, what 
should be studied and what constitutes the basic nature of what is studied. Ontology 
encompasses how corruption is perceived and conceptualised in the different fields of 
research, particularly in public management, and an understanding of the different 
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features that make up the phenomenon (Blaikie, 2007). As such, the understanding of 
corruption could either be from an objectivist viewpoint – the belief that a phenomenon 
or its meaning is separate from the social actor and not determined by them – or from a 
subjectivist / constructionist perspective – which holds that a phenomenon or social 
reality is in a constant state of being constructed by social actors (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2012; Bryman, 2016). Epistemology, on the other hand, is described as the 
theory of knowledge, it determines the nature of acceptable knowledge in a discipline and 
ways by which it may be generated (Blaikie, 2007; Yin, 2016). Orlikowoski & Baroudi 
(1991) identified three epistemological perspectives – positivist, interpretivist, and 
critical perspectives. Positivist epistemology seeks to apply the principles of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality, through theory testing and the application of other 
quantifiable measures (Yin, 2009). The interpretivist epistemology resides at the opposite 
end of the continuum to the positivist. It advocates an acceptance of the subjective nature 
of social participants in the attribution of meaning to social phenomena and social actions 
(Bryman, 2016), and as such rejects the detached quantification of positivists. Critical 
perspective resides somewhere along this continuum depending on the focus of the 
researcher. This epistemological position highlights the influence of processes and 
structures of dominance on the behaviour of social actors (Schensul, 2008). Due to its 
focus   on societal structures and its position on the epistemological continuum there is 
the possibility of an overlap with the other epistemological views.  As such, it is argued 
that a critical study could lean towards a more positivist view of a phenomenon – as 
commonly seen in corruption research in the fields of economics and accounting – or 
towards an interpretivist view – as seen more in organisation studies and anthropology. 
In this study, I adopt a critical view of corruption from an interpretivist epistemology. In 
other words, I consider the influence of social structures and day-to-day interactions on 
how corruption is perceived and constructed by the social actor. 
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Accordingly, this research enquiry is grounded in the social constructionist perspective 
which draws on the interpretivist idea of the importance of understanding the differences 
between humans and their role as social actors (Silverman, 2010). Social constructionism 
emphasises that ‘reality and knowledge are constructed and reproduced by people through 
communication and interaction’ (Tracy, 2013, p. 63), and language has been identified as 
a key medium for these sorts of communication and interactions (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966). Thus, to understand the nature of corruption and corrupt transactions, it becomes 
imperative to study the language used by participants to construct these interactions and 
transactions. Berger and Luckman in their influential work The Construction of Social 
Reality (1966) defined language as ‘a system of vocal signs’ (p. 51), a form of linguistic 
signposting which signals to recipients, of the communication, the form in which the 
response is to take. As such, reciprocity is a key feature of language–use in interactions, 
which makes it more interesting to study in the context of corruption. The complexity of 
communication and the need to unravel the language that is used in interactions is also 
evident in the works of Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963, 1982), an eminent scholar in the 
intricacies of face-to-face interactions. In Behaviour in Public Places (1963, pp. 15 – 17) 
and Encounters (1961, pp. 17 – 18), he highlights the features of language and 
communication to be more than mere vocal and linguistic capabilities, it is extended to 
include other ‘expressive signs’ which is understood by the parties in the interaction. In 
other words, an individual can transmit non-verbal information and this information is 
only decoded by the intended recipient (Goffman, 1963). Therefore, it is highly likely 
that an observer of a bribery transaction may be oblivious to communications taking place 
between the parties, especially where there is no physical exchange of money. The 
complexity of this situation underscores Goffman’s call for a better understanding of the 
‘interaction order’ (Goffman, 1982), an interaction space which could either be face-to-
face or otherwise, where participants based on prior dealings with existing parties or 
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experience of dealing with others, understand the rules of the interaction. Thus, gaining 
an insight into corrupt interactions from the perspective of a participant may provide a 
better understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
Previous research on corruption, as discussed in chapter three, revealed the ontological 
importance attached to definitions of corruption, as this determines the participants and 
the nature of the actions considered corrupt. However, most researchers of corruption do 
not acknowledge the relational nature of the phenomenon, instead adopting more of a 
positivist approach to exploring the concept. The non-adoption of an interactional view 
may account for the lopsided approach to the study of corruption prevalent in this area of 
research. 
The next section discusses the second layer of my research onion, which elaborates on 
the approach that was employed in this constructionist study of corruption. 
4 . 4 .  R e s e a r c h  A p p r o a c h   
There are two main approaches that may be applied in a research enquiry, the deductive 
and inductive approach. The choice of which to apply in practice is linked to the 
philosophical assumptions of the researcher, that is whether positivist or interpretivist. 
On one hand, the deductive approach generally commences with a theory from which 
hypothesis are drawn and tested to verify its truthfulness or accuracy, on the other hand, 
the inductive approach proceeds with the collection of data from which theories 
explaining phenomena are derived (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The growth of the inductive 
approach is attributed to the inadequacy of the usual ‘positivist testing’ in addressing 
issues of social relations (Ibid, p. 25). However, there are arguments that both approaches 
represent an ideal form as no social science research strictly utilises the one without 
elements of the other (Eriksson & Kovalainen, p. 22). Explaining the nature of their 
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grounded theory design, Corbin & Strauss (2008), stated that while their research is 
regarded as an inductive enquiry because the theory is derived from the data, the research 
process also involved the application of deductive reasoning (p. 326). Thus, academic 
enquiries make use of both approaches, but to varying degrees.   
The approach favoured by a researcher is reflected in the choice of methodology, which 
could either be qualitative or quantitative. Hypothesis testing feature of deductive 
reasoning is commonly paired with quantitative methodology, while the exploratory 
nature of the inductive approach is more suited to qualitative methodology (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). These two represents the popular methodological choices available to a 
researcher and they are explored next in a discussion of the third layer on the research 
onion. 
4 . 5 .  M e t h o d o l o g i c a l  C h o i c e  
On one hand, the word quantitative identifies the weight attached to the quantification of 
data, that is the numerical representation of data collected in the study of concepts and 
phenomena (Babbie, 2013). On the other hand, the word qualitative suggests a focus on 
the unmeasurable qualities of concepts, phenomena or processes (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005). It places a particular focus on the context in which the data is being produced and 
the meaning-making process in those social situations (Krauss, 2005). The difference 
between the two approaches is argued to be epistemological – what is acceptable 
knowledge and the process of generating the same in a field of study (Tuli, 2010), thus 
bringing us back to the positivist / interpretivist continuum (see Section 4.2). What 
informs the actual application of one over the other, or in some cases both, is the nature 
of the research question and the phenomena to be studied (Yin, 2014). 
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The rest of this section is divided into two – the first part examines the methodology 
popularly used in corruption studies, while the second part identifies the method adopted 
in this study.  
4 . 5 . 1 .  P o p u l a r  M e t h o d s  i n  C o r r u p t i o n  S t u d i e s   
Corruption researchers tend to use the quantitative methodology, especially survey 
research method. This may be due to the difficulty of employing the anthropological 
approach of direct observation to corruption as it is generally perceived as an illegal 
activity (Bader, et al., 2013; Blundo et al., 2006) which participants seek to keep covert. 
This leads researchers interested in studying the phenomenon to instead rely on how 
corruption is generally perceived in a society or organisation (Lewis, 2010). Heavy 
reliance is thus placed on corruption perception indexes (CPI) (Miller, 2006) compiled 
by organisations such as Transparency International. The CPI is essentially based on 
surveys of perceptions of corruption in about 168 countries (Transparency International, 
2015). Additionally, data from Serbia (UNODC, 2011), Latvia (Anderson, 1998), 
Romania (Anderson, 2001), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ukraine (Miller, 
Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001) reveals that a complete reliance on only the perception 
of corruption might be misleading, as it does not reflect the actual experiences of the 
people intimately involved with this phenomenon.  
Underscoring the unsuitable nature of the survey research method, anthropologist Sardan 
et al. (2006), argued that the questions contained in a survey are interrogatory by nature 
as they tend to restrict the responses of participants, thus inducing participants to assume 
a defensive posture (Blundo et al., 2006, p. 11). Questions about participation in 
corruption touch on a person’s definition and understanding of what constitutes corrupt 
actions, and their perception of themselves, as such this might lead respondents to 
redefine the phenomenon. The survey research method cannot capture the self-deceptive 
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indications given by individuals who are already on the ethical fading path (see Section 
3.3.1.2). Thus such participants can portray themselves in a favourable light (Goffman, 
1959) by resorting to constructing complimentary accounts of events or transferring the 
blames or responsibilities for their actions (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), and this cannot 
be questioned due to the rigid nature of a quantitative approach.  
Since I was studying how people talked about a sensitive topic like corruption, I knew I 
needed a methodology that would allow for flexibility in the field in addition to other 
considerations, and the quantitative approach will not effectively capture the required 
data to answer the research question. Thus, I adopted the qualitative approach.  
4 . 5 . 2 .  M e t h o d o l o g y  A d o p t e d  
The nature of my research query involved understanding how participants constructed 
their experience and the social processes that informed such construction and this falls 
under the purview of the qualitative approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Pope, Royen & 
Baker (2002), aptly described a qualitative enquiry as:     
The systematic collection, organisation, and analysis of textual material derived 
from talk or observation. It is rooted in the interpretive perspectives found in the 
humanities and social sciences that emphasise the importance of understanding, 
from the viewpoint of the people involved, how individuals and groups interpret, 
experience, and make sense of social phenomena (p. 148). 
The focus on this research on the relational and discursive influences of corruption 
represents a different perspective that is rarely discussed in the literature, as such the 
application of the ‘usual’ methods of research will not feasible. Thus in order to provide 
a deeper understanding of the concept of corruption, the inductive approach was applied 
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and the application of qualitative methodology ensures adaptability, an important feature 
for the study of a phenomenon that is deemed covert.  
The next section discusses the fourth level of the onion, the adopted strategy that provides 
direction for conducting this research. 
4 . 6 .  R e s e a r c h  S t r a t e g y  
A research strategy is described as a framework that provides direction for answering the 
research question (Farquhar, 2012). The researcher has a number of strategies to choose 
from, the selection of any, however, must take into consideration the philosophical, 
theoretical and methodological foundations of the research and the fit with the enquiry. 
Some of the strategies commonly used in qualitative research are grounded theory, 
ethnography, and case study. As a research strategy, grounded theory provides a detailed 
roadmap on conducting inductive research, with the main aim of developing theory from 
data (Silverman, 2013). This roadmap covers the collection of data, its management and 
organisation into analytical codes from which theoretical deductions are made (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). As my research is not focused on the development of theory but rather on 
providing alternative explanations for the existence of a phenomenon, the grounded 
theory approach did not provide the right fit. 
Another approach that I considered was ethnography; mainly because it has been 
established as a strategy commonly used in the study of groups and the nature of their 
interactions and culture, since the initial period of colonial rule in so-called ‘primitive 
societies’ (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). I considered adopting this strategy 
because it touches on the objective of this study to understand the nature of interactions 
between service users and service providers and how this shapes the behaviour of the 
service user. However, two key features of the ethnographic strategy made its use in this 
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research impracticable, and they are the requirement for the researcher to be immersed in 
the social settings of the phenomenon and the use of observation as one of the methods 
for data gathering (Bryman, 2016). The sensitive nature of corruption and the fact that 
participants in such informal transactions tend to keep it covert makes the immersion of 
a researcher into such social settings for the purposes of observation and data gathering 
risky (Blundo et al., 2006). Moreover, since the focus is on how participants discursively 
construct their interactions, this cancels out the need for immersion in the social settings 
and observation as a data gathering tool. The inadequacies of this strategy led to a 
consideration of the case study strategy.   
The case study can be described as a research strategy that is used to conduct the in-depth 
investigation of phenomena in their real-world contexts (Yin, 2014), and the phenomenon 
being studied represents the ‘case’. In principle, the case study strategy is similar to 
ethnography in the sense that researchers using either approach carry out an in-depth 
examination of phenomena within their social context (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 
2012). The key difference between the two strategies is the level of immersion, into the 
research environment, that is required of the researcher (Myers, 1999). In the use of a 
case study, immersion into the social environment of a study is dependent on the nature 
of the enquiry, while in ethnography immersion is fundamental to the study. Thus the 
case study approach is described to be a particularly good fit for studies that focus on 
understanding the context of complex phenomena and the social processes surrounding 
their enactment (Yin, 2014).  
A qualitative case study approach can be used to answer research questions that are either 
theory-driven – that is, geared towards the development or extension of a theory – or 
phenomenon-driven (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In the latter case, the justification 
for this type of enquiry should be based on the importance of the phenomenon and the 
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lack of existing applicable theory and empirical evidence (Ibid. p. 26). These research 
questions may form the basis of a single or multiple case study inquiry. A single case 
study could either be intrinsic or instrumental, depending on the interests of the researcher 
(Stake, 2005). The researcher adopts an intrinsic view where the focus is on a particular 
case without a consideration of its applicability to other cases, due to the uniqueness of 
the case or phenomenon under study, e.g. a study of hostage victims or the life of Michelle 
Obama. On the other hand, an instrumental view is adopted where the interest in a case 
is to provide an insightful explanation of a phenomenon and its context with the 
possibility of adopting similar interpretations in other cases (Stake, 1998). Researchers 
carrying out the multiple case inquiry are more focused on the generalisability of 
interpretations (Yin, 2014), and this is one of the criticisms of the single case study 
approach. It has been argued that the main purpose of a qualitative case study is not to 
proffer generalizable interpretations, but rather to provide a deeper understanding of a 
selected case (Stake, 2005, 1998).                 
The case study strategy was a better fit for this study as it provided a framework through 
which the complex phenomenon of corruption may be studied in different contexts 
(Stake, 2005) – institutional and relational – using different data sources (Baxter & Jack, 
2008). The flexibility of this approach (Farquhar, 2012) in adapting to changes in the 
field, makes it suitable for the study of a sensitive topic like corruption. This research 
adopts an instrumental case view to the study of corruption by examining how a group of 
service users talk about their interaction with the services of a public institution, with the 
objective of providing a deeper understanding of corruption. The next section discusses 
the techniques that were incorporated into this framework to answer the research 
question.  
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4 . 7 .  R e s e a r c h  T e c h n i q u e s  
This section describes the processes by which empirical data was selected, collected and 
analysed for the purpose of addressing the research question. The section is divided into 
two parts – pre–fieldwork, and post–fieldwork – and these are discussed next. 
4 . 7 . 1 .  P r e – F i e l d w o r k  
A step by step discussion of the different things that were considered before embarking 
on the fieldwork is provided under this heading. This covers the rationale for the selection 
of the public institution that was used, the participants, methods used for the collection 
of data and ethical considerations. 
An important consideration for a qualitative case study researcher is selecting the ‘case’ 
to be studied (Yin, 2014), because once a phenomenon has been identified, a case creates 
an opportunity for it to be examined (Stake, 2005). Selecting a case that creates a potential 
for learning may be regarded as more important than how representative a case is (Ibid., 
2005, p. 451). Most qualitative researchers adopt the purposive selection technique over 
the random selection method favoured in quantitative studies (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 
2007). The purposive selection technique advocates for choosing a research setting or 
group based on their ability to provide substantial information on the phenomenon under 
study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012), and this was the approach used in this study. 
This selection technique consists of two levels, context selection and participant selection 
(Bryman, 2016). A case may be examined from multiple dimensions and consisting of 
layers of contexts, from the institution to its different departments and groups within the 
departments. However, a qualitative researcher is guided by the research questions and 
the research objectives in focusing on the contexts which are able to adequately provide 
a richer and deeper understanding of the phenomenon (Farquhar, 2012). In this research, 
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the case is the service user and the context is a public institution, the next subsection 
discusses the basis for the selection of this context.                 
4 . 7 . 1 . 1 .  C h o i c e  o f  P u b l i c  B u r e a u c r a c y :  T h e  L a n d s  B u r e a u ,  
L a g o s  S t a t e  
In choosing the Lands Bureau of Lagos state, I relied heavily on my prior experience of 
interacting with public bureaucracies in Nigeria. This institution stood out as a research 
context, because of the popular perception that it is a hotspot for bureaucratic corruption 
(Ajayi, 2016; Sahara Reporters, 2010), and as such provides an opportunity to study the 
phenomenon. Also, the fundamental nature of land in a society and its considerable 
contributions to government revenue (Hudson, 2016), and the development process 
(Thontteh & Omirin, 2015) makes this an important context from which the phenomenon 
is examined.   
The Lands Bureau of Lagos state is the institution charged with the administration of land 
in the commercial capital of Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa. A land’s 
economic and social utility makes the institution charged with its administration 
vulnerable to corrupt practices (Burns & Dalrymple, 2012) and this is made apparent from 
the data on Serbia’s land registry (UNODC, 2011) which identifies a high perception of 
corruption in the department. While the Bureau is regarded as being characterised by 
complicated procedures which make it prone to corruption (Thontteh & Omirin, 2015), 
in the experience of the researcher, attention is not paid to the role that service users play 
in the reproduction of corruption. This knowledge is what the research aims to tease out.    
The next section describes the criteria for the selection of the participants from amongst 
users of the services of the Lands Bureau.   
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4 . 7 . 1 . 2 .  P a r t i c i p a n t s  S e l e c t i o n  
Identification of the group from which participants were selected was largely based on a 
review of the literature, personal experience and enquiries from informants working in 
the Lands Bureau. Section 3.3 which covers the examination of corruption in the legal 
profession revealed a reluctance to discuss the phenomenon within this professional 
group, thus identifying the possible research participants. Based on my experience of 
interacting with the Lands Bureau, I knew that legal practitioners are the group of service 
users that interacted more with the different departments of the institution compared to 
other professional users. This was further confirmed by the response from the informal 
enquiry to three officials from different departments of the Bureau. 
The next task was deciding how the legal professionals were to be recruited. Some of the 
selection strategies commonly employed by qualitative researchers include purposive 
random selection, convenience technique, snowballing, and typical selection. The 
rationale for using a purposive random selection for recruiting participants is the same as 
its use in a quantitative study – generalisability. It is commonly used by researchers that 
aim for the breadth of coverage over depth of analysis (Tracy, 2013, p. 134). The size of 
research participants is usually large, and based on the need for representativeness, each 
member of an identified group has an equal opportunity to be selected (Ibid). This 
approach is ill-fitted for this study as the focus is on the depth of analysis and not 
representativeness. Convenience technique is when a research bases the selection of 
participants on criteria such as fast, easy or convenient and not on any strategic or 
purposeful consideration (Patton, 2002). There are arguments that this approach may not 
produce credible data for analysis (Tracy, 2013), as such, it was not adopted in this study. 
The snowball technique is an approach where the researcher starts with a small number 
of key participants relevant to the study, and base the recruitment of other participants on 
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the recommendations of these informants (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). This 
technique is especially useful in situations where identifying members relevant to a 
research context become problematic (Bryman, 2016), for example researching a hidden 
phenomenon like genital female mutilation in some communities. The snowball approach 
was not relevant in this study because the population pool for the recruitment of 
participants was quite huge and it was not difficult to identify the service users in this 
group.                              
The typical selection technique involves choosing participants as a result of their 
identification with the phenomenon under consideration (Tracy, 2013) and legal 
professionals have been identified as the typical service user of the services of the Lands 
Bureau. Using this technique, I recruited property law practitioners by reviewing and 
obtaining the details of their firms from an online directory provided by HG.org, a global 
provider of legal information on law firms and legal services and also approached some 
smaller unlisted law offices. I then telephoned the firms to confirm that they interact with 
the Lands Bureau and then sent them copies of the participant information sheets 
(Appendix A). A total of twenty–four legal professionals were sourced from twenty-one 
commercial law firms in Lagos state, a selection size that was informed by the strategy 
and analytical approach (Silverman, 2013). The selection size took into consideration the 
in-depth nature of the analysis to be undertaken in understanding the role of service users 
in bureaucratic corruption. As such, the use of the research data is essentially intended 
for illustrative and explanatory purposes (Davis, 2004) and is not reflective of all service 
user interaction with the bureaucracy. The next section provides details of the participants 
that were recruited. 
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4 . 7 . 1 . 3 .  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  P a r t i c i p a n t s  
A description of the participants and their role is essential at this stage not only because 
it acts as a foundation for the detailed discussion that will follow in the subsequent 
chapters but also because it introduces the individuals whose experiences, claims, 
descriptions and perceptions are examined in this study.     
As far as legal practice is concerned, lawyers in Nigeria are trained generalists. While 
some law firms and practitioners tend to specialise in certain areas of the law like 
property or oil & gas laws, most firms and practitioners have the capability to practice 
in these areas as well. The section gives a detailed account of the experiences of 
property law practitioners in their interactions with the Lands Bureau. In particular, 
the part of property law practice under examination in this study is that which relates 
to ‘land’. The share of property law transactions that touch on land is vast and this can 
range from a transaction involving the sale or lease of land to a court judgment which 
touches on land. Specifically, this study focuses on land transaction types which 
ordinarily brings the legal practitioner in contact with the Lands Bureau as a 
professional service user.  
For simplicity, the practice area in Lagos state can broadly be divided into two, the Lagos 
Island and the Lagos Mainland. This factor is considered important because of the 
location of the Bureau itself which is situated on the mainland and quite a distance from 
the Island practice area considering the highly populated – with 21 million residents – 
and traffic-prone nature of Lagos state. Owing to this factor, it is imperative to understand 
if the location of the Bureau itself contributes to the manner in which service users access 
the services and the nature of the user / provider relationship. Twenty–two commercial 
law firms which engaged in landed property practice, although at varying degrees, were 
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approached but one firm declined to participate. While fifteen of these firms are heavily 
into land property transactions and construct themselves principally as land law 
 
Source: Google maps (2015) 
 
practitioners, the other six participants admit to an average to low participation in land 
transactions, four and two participants respectively. Average participation as used here 
means that land transactions do not represent the primary practice of the practitioner or 
the clientele of the law office, while low participation means that the practitioner 
infrequently engages in land practices. Importantly, different legal professionals with 
varying roles and levels of experience of interacting with the Lands Bureau were 
recruited. In three of the twenty-one firms, more than one participant was interviewed – 
Figure 5. Map of Lagos State 
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a senior and a junior professional. This variety enabled an understanding of the possible 
influence of ‘experience’ on conducting transactions in the Bureau.    
The next subsection provides a detailed description of the general structure of a 
conventional law firm and the position of each participant. 
a .  P a r t i c i p a n t s  A f f i l i a t i o n   
The structure of the law firms to which this group of service users are affiliated is 
mostly conventional – that is centralised (Chambliss & Wilkins, 2002a). In other 
words, the firms are hierarchical with authority flowing from top to bottom. The head 
of a law firm is referred to as the ‘principal’ and in the case of a partnership, partners, 
and these sit at the top of the law office hierarchy (see Fig. 8). The partners and the 
principal are usually experts in specific areas of the law and based on their position, 
form the core of the management of the law firm. 
The next on the hierarchical rung is the ‘head of chamber’ which is sometimes called, 
the practice manager. These perform the operational role in the firm and are in charge 
of the day to day functioning of the law office. Aside from practising as lawyers in 
certain cases, their duty also involves coordinating and monitoring the work output of 
the associates. It should be noted, however, that in most small sole-entrepreneurship 
firms this role is usually played by the principal. 
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       Source: Developed by the researcher based on information from the participants  
 
The two subsequent steps on the hierarchy after that of the head of the chamber are 
those of the senior and junior associates. Generally, there is usually no apparent 
difference between the classes of associates, and most firms refer to the other lawyers 
in the firm, i.e. excluding the partners and the heads of chamber as just associates. The 
difference between the two classes of associates is usually the level of experience and 
the type of legal work or transactions that each associate is permitted to be involved 
in, this is aside from their salaries. For example, in some firms, the junior associates 
are the ones tasked with the duty of interacting with the Lands Bureau. The reason for 
this duty being assigned to a junior associate was given by one of the principals as 
thus: 
[…] my time naturally is a lot more expensive than that of the admin 
officers or the junior colleagues in the office (LP 15).   
Partners or Principal
Head of Chamber / Practice 
Manager
Senior Associates
Junior Associates
Paralegals & Legal Executives
Other Administrative Staff
Figure 6. Structure of a conventional law 
firm 
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Next to the junior associates on the hierarchy are the paralegals or executive 
secretaries. This category of professionals are high up on the structural ladder of law 
office administrative staff. They are generally in charge of carrying out legal work 
which does not specifically require the attention of a lawyer but requires a knowledge 
of the applicable rules and procedures. Examples of such duties include filing court 
processes which have already been prepared by lawyers, management of landed 
properties on behalf of clients and in some law firms the duty of interacting with the 
Lands Bureau also falls within the purview of the paralegal. In three of the firms, 
interaction with the Bureau is seen primarily as the duty of a paralegal, this explains 
why three paralegals were interviewed.   
The twenty-four participants in this research are from different levels of a law firm’s 
structure, from the position of the partner / principal down to those of the paralegal / 
executive secretaries. Specifically, data was sourced from 2 partners, 9 principals, 2 
heads of chamber, 8 associates – which includes both senior and junior associates – 
and 3 paralegals.  
As a result of this variety, the discourse and experiences proffered by this group of 
service users are varied with a minimum of 2 years and a maximum of 32 years of 
experience of interacting with the Lands Bureau (Table 4 provides a detailed summary 
of each participant). This information consequently enabled an in-depth comparison 
of the various discourses at varying levels of experience with the aim of understanding 
if this affects the individual’s disposition to bureaucratic corruption.  
Next is a discussion of the ethical issues that had to be taken into consideration before 
the commencement of the data collection.    
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Participant(s) Designation in Law 
Firm 
Length of interaction 
with the Bureau 
(Years) 
Location in terms of 
practice area 
(Lagos)  
Extent of 
Land law practice 
LP 1 Principal 23 Mainland Land law practitioner 
*LP 2 Head of Chamber 5 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 3 Principal 10 Mainland Average participation in land matters 
LP 4 Senior Associate 5 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 5 Partner 24 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 6 Associate 3 Island Average participation in land matters 
LP 7 Principal 10 Island Average participation in land matters 
LP 8 Principal 21 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 9 Senior Associate 16 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 10 Associate 5 Island Low participation in land matters 
LP 11 Principal 13 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 12 Principal 19 Island Land law practitioner 
LP 13 Senior Associate 6 Mainland Land law practitioner 
Table 4: Details of Participants and Affiliated Legal Practice 
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LP 14 Principal 28 Mainland Land law practitioner 
*LP 15 Principal 32 Island Land law practitioner 
LP 16 Associate 3 Mainland Average participation in land matters 
LP 17 Head of Chamber 6 Mainland Land law practitioner 
LP 18 Managing Partner 10 Mainland Land law practitioner 
*LP 19 Associate 2 Island Land law practitioner 
*LP 20 Senior Associate 6 Island Land law practitioner 
LP 21 Principal 20 Mainland Low participation in land matters 
*PL 1 Head of Administrative 
Matters 
20 Mainland Land law practitioner 
PL 2 Legal Executive 22 Island Land law practitioner 
*PL 3 *Non-Litigation Manager 7 Island Land law practitioner 
 
(*) LP 2 & PL 1 – are from the same law firm; LP 15 & PL 3 – are also from the same law firm; LP 19 & LP 20 – are from the same law firm; (*) Non-litigation 
manager is also a paralegal 
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4 . 7 . 1 . 4 .  E t h i c a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
Due to the subjective and social nature of most qualitative research, the importance of 
ethical awareness cannot be overemphasised. A form of moral contract may be said to 
exist between the researcher and her participants (Stake, 2005), thus obligating the 
researcher to take certain steps to protect the integrity of the information that has been 
obtained. This is done by actively taking steps to obtain the informed consent of 
participants, ensuring confidentiality and anonymity, integrity and objectivity of the 
researcher (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012; Wiles, 2014), amongst other things.  
In consideration of these ethical obligations, before I proceeded with the collection of 
the data, I applied to the University of York’s Economics, Law, Management, Politics 
and Sociology Ethics Committee (ELMPS) in August of 2013 and approval was given 
in October, 2013 (Appendix C). The sensitive nature of corruption further emphasised 
the need to not only act ethically but to be able to convince my research participants 
of my ethical disposition. This led to them signing consent forms (Appendix B) which 
highlighted the fact that they could withdraw from the research at any time and a 
detailed description of the protocol for the protection of the recorded and transcribed 
data. The main concern that was expressed was the confidentiality and anonymity of 
their identity, and this was taken into consideration in the creation of generic pseudo 
names for the participants.     
The next section proceeds with a discussion of the techniques that were considered for 
a gathering of the data.  
4 . 7 . 1 . 5 .  D a t a  G a t h e r i n g  T e c h n i q u e s  
A key feature of the qualitative research is its focus on naturally occurring data (Miles, 
Huberman & Saldaῆa, 2014), in the absence of this, researchers seek to obtain this data 
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from those that experienced it or documents recording its occurrence (Stake, 2005). There 
are a number of methods suitable for this type of data gathering, however, the selection 
of any is based on the nature of the research inquiry. Some of these methods include 
observation, interview, focus group, and documents. The observation method is popularly 
used in ethnographic studies and in situations where it is possible to obtain naturally 
occurring data in a specific social setting.  It could either be participant or non–participant 
in nature. A key difference between the two types is the depth of embeddedness of the 
researcher in the social setting being observed. In the case of the participant observation, 
there is a requirement for the researcher to have firsthand experience of the social setting 
being studied (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Similar to the rationale provided in the 
discussion of the ethnographic strategy (Section 4.5, p. 97), the sensitive nature of the 
phenomenon under consideration makes the observation method an improper approach 
for the collection of data. 
The interview method is the most commonly used data collection technique in qualitative 
research (King & Horrocks, 2010). It is mostly used in situations where the researcher is 
unable to obtain naturally occurring data, in which case she relies on the descriptions of 
those that experienced or are part of the social setting. As such, it is described as a process 
whereby knowledge is constructed in the interaction between the researcher and the 
participant (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Two main types of interview frequently used in 
qualitative research are the unstructured and semi–structured approaches. The 
unstructured approach has also been called an ‘informal conversational interview’ 
(Patton, 2002, p. 342) because of the pattern the interview takes. There are no pre-planned 
guide questions as the researcher assumes an exploratory position and probe questions 
are based on information shared by the participant. Based on the conversational nature of 
this approach, the researcher enjoys maximum flexibility to individualise the process. The 
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downside, however, is that it could produce an unwieldy and incoherent amount of data 
that is difficult for the researcher to analyse (Ibid.).  
On the other hand, the researcher using a semi–structured interview makes use of guide 
questions covering the themes to be discussed. The list of questions provide direction for 
the interview and ensures that important areas are covered, while still allowing enough 
flexibility for the participant to adequately discuss a topic (Bryman, 2016), and the 
researcher to question the participant based on the responses. A third approach to the 
interview is the structured interview which is commonly used in quantitative studies and 
is one of the tools used in survey research (Ibid.).  Its name indicates the rigid pattern that 
it takes, as the researcher compulsorily relies on a list of questions, contained in a 
questionnaire, that must be addressed to all participants, with no allowance for deviation 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).      
 Similarly, the focus group method is conducting an interview with a group of persons on 
specific themes and topics, with particular emphasis placed on the interactive discussions 
amongst group members (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). This method was 
popularised by market researchers in their bid to gather information on customer 
impression of products and services (Patton, 2002). Focus group is advantageous for 
saving time and resources in a research project and the interactions amongst participants 
produce a rich data (Ibid). However, the views of the majority may lead to the silencing 
of dissenting or minority views in such group interviews, leading to the production of 
only a certain kind of data. Thus the focus group method was considered inappropriate 
for this study as the emphasis of the study is on how individual participant discursively 
constructed their experience of interacting with the Lands Bureau. A group discussion of 
such sensitive issues may cause participants with dissenting opinions or experiences to 
remain silent.       
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A common issue like fabrication of accounts may be encountered by users of qualitative 
interviews and survey method approach. Section 1.2 (p. 6), explains the fact that the 
negative connotation of corruption leads to a fair amount of othering and externalisation 
(Lennerfors, 2009, p. 12; Dracklé, 2005) by respondents who seek to distance themselves 
from such acts. Participants being interviewed may also be inclined to construct accounts 
that portray themselves favourably. But unlike the rigid nature of survey method, 
qualitative interviews can be adapted in real time to suit the emerging situation or data 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). In other words, additional unplanned questions can 
be put to respondents to investigate the nature of this information. 
Another source of data in qualitative studies are documents. These are referred to as 
secondary data largely because the researcher is not involved in its creation; it includes 
diaries, minutes of meetings, and other organisation publications or records (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). In a case study research, it is especially useful for providing 
contextual information (Mason, 2002) and corroboration, or otherwise, of evidence or 
facts (Yin, 2014). Documents are usually created for certain purposes, as such Yin 
cautions against an overreliance on information contained therein and rather advocates 
for the combination of this technique with others (2014, p. 108).  
Some of the techniques available to a qualitative researcher have been considered in this 
section, the next sub-section describes the method(s) adopted and the rationale for their 
adoption.  
a .  G a t h e r i n g  T e c h n i q u e s  A d o p t e d            
Semi-structured interview technique was used in this study because it provided a better 
fit for the explanatory approach taken to my discussion of service user corruption. In 
comparison to the unstructured and structured interviews, the highly adaptive and private 
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nature of this technique enables flexibility of discussions around predetermined themes 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).  The predetermined themes allow for direction and 
prevent the intentional avoidance of an issue which can happen in the use of unstructured 
or focus group interviews (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011), especially in the discussion of a 
participant’s role in corrupt transactions. Also, the flexibility afforded by a semi-
structured interview permits the discussion of sensitive matters in a less direct manner 
compared to a structured interview (Blundo et al., 2006). 
However, the use of a semi-structured approach is not without its shortcomings. For 
example, the one-on-one nature of the discussion is akin to being on the hot seat, thus 
creating unease in participants about discussing their involvement in corrupt practices. 
This is unlike the atmosphere in a focus group discussion where the possible ‘confessions’ 
of a fellow participant could naturally trigger the free trading of experiences (Miller, 
Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001). In this case, the fact that I was viewed as a colleague 
and not an ‘outsider’ contributed to the familiarity and openness which participants 
exhibited during the interview process. Additionally, the unease of participants was 
further assuaged by communicating the ethical obligations that I owed to them and this 
included the assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. The form of familiarity shared 
by the researcher and the participant may arguably create bias in the research (Brown et 
al., 1991; Galtung, 1969). This is however mitigated by constant self-reflection and a 
reflexive focus on how the researcher has impacted on the research (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). 
Documentary evidence was also relied upon to provide context for the descriptions of 
participants. Policy documents highlighting workflow processes and departmental duties 
in the Lands Bureau was obtained and compared with descriptions from the semi–
structured interviews.  
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b .  C o n d u c t i n g  t h e  I n t e r v i e w  
The interviews were conducted between November 2013 and February 2014. At the 
outset, I had divided the Lagos practice area into two – Lagos Island and Lagos Mainland 
– to understand if the location of the firm affected the way the participants interacted with 
the Lands Bureau. The mainland is larger in size than the Island (See Figure 7, p. 132) 
and it has more law offices, as a result I conducted nine (9) interviews on the Island and 
fifteen (15) interviews on the mainland. Recruitment of participants started with me 
approaching colleagues that I had worked with in the past, through this process I 
completed four interviews, all of which were on the mainland. After this, I conducted a 
search of commercial law practitioners in Lagos from the database of HG.org. 
Recruitment through this medium turned out to be more difficult than I had envisaged as 
a host of the contact details were outdated, especially for firms that did not have their own 
website. Contact details for all of the participants on the Island and nine (9) of the 
participants on the mainland was obtained from HG.org database, two (2) other 
participants were co-opted into the process by chance as their law firms shared the same 
building complex as some of the others that I had recruited earlier. I telephoned each of 
the firms to confirm that they interacted with the Lands Bureau and enquired if any 
practitioner was willing to discuss their experience with me. On confirming their 
willingness and setting interview dates, I requested for their email addresses and 
forwarded to them the participant information sheet which contained details of the 
research. 
All of the interviews were face-to-face and were conducted in participants’ offices and 
they lasted between forty-five (45) minutes and one hour. Printed copies of the participant 
information sheet and the consent form were made available and discussed at each 
interview and permission to electronically record the meeting was also sought before 
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commencement. Participants were comfortable with the interview being recorded, 
although in one case, I was told to turn off the recording device before discussions of 
involvement in some informal transactions could be revealed, at which stage I switched 
to note taking. The interview guide questions were made flexible to focus on the 
experiences of participants, and further questions developed out of their responses. It has 
been suggested that such interview strategies that specify issues in advance and allow the 
researcher flexibility to determine the sequence of questions result in the production of a 
comprehensive data that emphasises the circumstances of each participant (Patton, 2002, 
p. 349). However, the tailored nature of the interview may make comparing responses 
difficult (Ibid.). To prevent such difficulty, a number of similar questions were put to all 
the participants, and further individualised questions were developed from there. Some 
of the specific questions include: 
 How long have you been into land law practice? 
 How long have you been interacting with the Lands Bureau? 
 What kind of transactions do you conduct there? 
 Pick a transaction and describe to me the process from start to conclusion. 
 On this transaction, how many departments of the Bureau do you have to interact 
with? (And how long does it take to complete it?) 
 How easy is it to navigate through the different departments? 
 When you encounter bottlenecks how do you resolve them? 
 Describe a situation where you encountered a bottleneck and what you did to 
resolve it. 
The flexibility of the questions and the rapport between the researcher and the participants 
resulted in the free flow of information, even when they were talking about their 
participation in corrupt transactions. I find that this is incompatible with the argument in 
  
124 
 
the literature that participants in corrupt transactions would be unwilling to talk about 
their involvement (Blundo et al., 2006).        
The next section turns to a discussion of the post–fieldwork activities which include a 
discussion of the analytical methods considered. 
4 . 7 . 2 .  P o s t – F i e l d w o r k    
This section represents the second part of the research techniques highlighted on my 
research onion in Figure 4 (p. 94). It discusses the processes after the collection of the 
data. It focuses on the methods considered for the analysis of the data and the rationale 
for the choice of the one selected. Also, it describes the reflexive exercise of the 
researcher throughout the research process.      
4 . 7 . 2 . 1 .  D a t a  A n a l y s i s  P r o c e s s  
After the data collection, which was in a recorded format, the transcription process began. 
Transcription is a process whereby an audio or video data is reproduced verbatim, in a 
written format (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). This is a time consuming process, 
as a manual transcription involves the researcher listening to the recordings over and over 
again in order to get as close a reproduction as possible. As such, some researchers may 
either opt to engage the services of a transcriber or make use of voice–recognition 
software. I decided to transcribe my own interviews for two main reasons: it was cheaper 
to do so and it provided the opportunity to be completely immersed in the data (Bryman, 
2016). Using the Express Scribe transcription software, I manually reproduced the audio 
recordings into a written form, thus preparing the data for analysis.  
There are as many approaches to qualitative analysis as there are qualitative researchers 
(Bryman, 2016). Some of these include, grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 
  
125 
 
1994), analytical induction (Yin, 2014), thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), 
template analysis (King, 2004), discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), amongst 
others. However, grounded theory approach and discourse analysis have been identified 
as the predominant methods in social science research (Bryman & Burgess, 1994). Due 
to the focus of this research on ‘talk’ and the constitutive power of language, discourse 
analysis is considered a better fit for this study. As such, the following subsections 
presents a discussion of discourse analytical approach.  
a .  D i s c o u r s e  A n a l y t i c a l  A p p r o a c h  
‘Discourse analysis’ is an umbrella term that has been used to describe a variety of 
approaches that study ‘talk’, text and language in use (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Most 
of these approaches developed out of fields such as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, 
politics, psychology and critical studies amongst others (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
This multidisciplinary analytical approach emphasises the importance of language in the 
social world. Based on its strong constructionist foundation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), 
it advocates an understanding of how language (both oral and written) is used in the 
construction and reproduction of social practices (Potter, 2004; Dick, 2004).      
Four main discursive clusters have been identified based on the weight attached to a text 
versus the context and the epistemological grounding of the study, interpretivist versus 
critical discourse studies (Phillips & Ravasi, in Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 19) (see 
Section 4.2, p. 91). These clusters are social linguistic analysis, interpretive structuralism, 
critical discourse analysis and critical linguistic analysis. Figure 7 is described as 
representing a continuum and not a dichotomy (Phillip & Hardy, 2002, p. 20) between 
clusters, as such, the end points may be seen as ideal types. In other words, most 
discursive research do not fit neatly into one cluster, as the views and analytical technique 
adopted by a researcher may combine the features of different clusters. 
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The interpretivist end of the continuum is described as representing studies that focus on 
the social processes involved in the day-to-day construction of reality as compared with 
the critical researchers who are especially interested in power dynamics as represented in 
social structures (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). On the analytical front, these studies could 
either embark on the micro analysis of a text or focus on the social context. Interpretive 
structural studies focus on the analysis of social contexts and the related discourses, 
especially from a macro perspective (Phillip & Hardy, 2002, p. 23), e.g. Maile’s study of 
gender discourse in organisations (Maile, 1995). A social linguistic study, on the other 
hand, adopts a microanalytical construction of the text, a research practice common in the 
area of social psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). An example of a social linguistic 
research is Scollon’s study of mediated discourse as a form of social interaction (Scollon, 
2014). At the other end of the continuum, critical discourse analysts focus on the 
relational context of power and how it influences and normalises practices within social 
structures (Foucault, 1971; Fairclough, 2013), e.g. Uzuner-Smith & Englander’s study on 
the effects of neo-liberal ideologies on management practices in some universities (2015). 
Critical linguistic analysts also share a similar interest in power relations but with a focus 
Figure 7: Discourse Analytical Approaches 
Context 
Text 
Interpretivist  Critical 
Interpretive 
Structuralism 
Critical Discourse 
Analysis 
Social Linguistic 
Analysis 
Critical Linguistic 
Analysis 
Source: Adapted from Phillips & Hardy (2002) 
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on the micro analysis of texts, e.g. Salzer-Mörling’s study of how identity is constructed 
in organisations (1998). This research is situated within the social linguistic cluster as it 
identifies with the clusters practice of conducting a micro analysis of textual data to 
provide insights as to its function in the construction of phenomena (Phillip & Hardy, 
2002). 
Discourse analysis could either be used as a method of analysis (Silverman, 2013) or as 
a theoretical perspective (Phillip & Hardy, 2002, p. 60). Most researchers in this area 
focus on explaining the theoretical suppositions of the approach, but little is said about 
the actual method and process of analysis. As a method, it offers guidelines for the 
analysis of textual data through a focus on the linguistic structures, by closely examining 
variations in constructed accounts and linguistic functions of such construction (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). As an analytical perspective, discourse analysis provides the researcher 
with a theoretical lens through which the data may be understood. The focus of discourse 
analysis on linguistic structures may lead to a confusion of this method with other similar 
analytical techniques like conversation analysis, thus it is important to distinguish them. 
Both forms of analysis study the contextual nature of spoken and written texts in social 
interaction (Marra, 2013), however, conversation analysis is strictly concerned with the 
contextual use of these texts in the interaction under examination (Aguinaldo, 2012). A 
process which Holloway (1989) described as inferring that the ‘text speaks for itself’ (p. 
19). In contrast to conversation analysis, discourse analysis is built on the premise that a 
phenomenon does not happen in isolation and as such cannot be understood in isolation 
of the discourses which gives it meaning (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).  
The application of discourse analysis is not without its own challenges. An important 
criticism of this approach is that discourse analysts rely heavily on theories and discourses 
and not on the data per se (Aguinaldo, 2012; Wooffitt, 2005) and as such this raises the 
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question of validity and reliability (Marra, 2013). These arguments may be said to be 
related the notion of variability in discursive construction, thus resulting in the eclectic 
nature of interpretation. Nevertheless, the rigour of this analytical perspective is reflected 
in the synergy created by the combination of the texts, the context and the participant’s 
orientation (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Dick, 2004) which enables the researcher to 
construct a fuller picture of the phenomenon under study. Thus, as stated earlier, unlike 
conversation analysis which mainly focuses on the texts and its contextual use, discourse 
analysis zooms in on the social actors’ orientation which predisposes them to such a 
construction. Also, by applying the process of triangulation discourse analysts validate 
their research by comparing their findings with those from other sources such as existing 
research or results from other data sets (Mara, 2013). 
b .  M a n a g i n g  a n d  A n a l y s i n g  t h e  D a t a  
 A huge amount of discursive resources was produced from the semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted, as such, it was initially problematic managing and 
reordering them for analysis. Unlike the grounded theory approach that provides a clear 
and structured method for analysis to be followed, discourse analytical process is not as 
clear cut (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, like most other qualitative analytical 
methods, the process starts with coding the data, i.e. dividing the data into ‘manageable 
chunks’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 167). For this process, I adopted a template 
provided by Corley & Gioia (2004), a template now referred to as the ‘Gioia 
methodology’ (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013). It is an adaptation of the grounded 
theory approach which advocates rigour and a clear and concise presentation of the 
analytical journey. Combining this data analysis and presentation method with my 
selected approach of discourse analysis, provided the much needed guidance and some 
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skeletal structure for a young researcher to work with. In the Gioia method three levels 
of analysis are suggested (shown in Figure 8).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perception of Self 
 Our role (in 
relation to clients) 
 Our position (in 
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system) 
 
Perception of the Bureau 
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Bureau Officials  
 Work Attitude 
 Workload 
 Number of officials 
 
Bureau Processes 
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Formal Complaints 
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Figure 8: A Snapshot of Data Organisation & Analysis Progression 
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The first level deals with codes derived from the actual words of participants’, this 
represents the ‘informant–centric’ first-order analysis’ (Ibid., p. 4). The second order 
Agents (Internal Brokers) 
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 Transaction time 
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analysis is researcher-centric, as the researcher starts to group the themes and concepts 
emanating from the data. The third order sees a combination of the participant and 
researcher voices in the theoretical explanation of the phenomena. During the process of 
the analysis, I not only sought to understand areas of convergence amongst participants, 
but also to identify possible variability in their constructions and the role that they play 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
The policy documents from the Lands Bureau on procedural matters were used as the 
basis of the comparison and evaluation of participants’ descriptions on such matters as 
the trajectory of a transaction, timeframe for the conclusion of different transactions etc. 
Thus, providing a better understanding of participants constructed experiences. Chapter 
five provides a detailed description of the data.  
The next section describes some of my reflections on the research progression, 
particularly with regards to the data collection process.   
4 . 7 . 2 . 2 .  R e s e a r c h e r ’ s  R e f l e x i v e  A c t i v i t y  
Reflexivity is a key feature of qualitative research. Its importance lies in the ability of the 
researcher to be aware of her impact on the research being conducted, considering the 
highly subjective nature of qualitative research (Wood & Kroger, 2000). As a result of 
this and for the purpose of reliability (Silverman, 2013), qualitative researchers have to 
sincerely evaluate how they and their actions have impacted on the research.   
Before embarking on the fieldwork to conduct the interviews, I had some reservations as 
to whether participants would be willing to discuss their participation in bureaucratic 
corruption, more so as they were mostly legal practitioners. Due to this anxiety, I started 
off the interview sessions with colleagues that I was familiar with and found out that I 
had to tweak some of the questions and the order in which they are put to participants. 
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Importantly, I could sense a form of dualism in participants’ reaction during the 
interviews. On one hand there is an acceptance of the researcher as being a part of the 
legal culture and as such would understand the nature of the bureaucratic system, while 
on the other, the affiliation of the researcher with a foreign institution was perceived like 
she may have the ideological view held by ‘outsiders’ to the system. The first part of 
inclusion allowed participants to open up about their day-to-day interactions with the 
Lands Bureau, the difficulties they face and the problems that they think the institution 
has based on ‘our shared’ experience. At this level, they frequently called upon the 
researcher’s legal background in search of solidarity or understanding of the technical 
and difficult issues that they face in their legal practice and interactions before giving 
examples of how they overcame difficult situations.  
The second part reflected a level of exclusion. At this level, participants tend to stress the 
fact that not all officials are corrupt and that corruption is all over the world. I noticed 
that even amongst the colleagues that I had worked with before, I was treated as an 
‘outsider’ when it came to the issue of talking about corruption in the system. They were 
defensive and kept on emphasising that ‘corruption was everywhere in the world’, some 
out rightly said, ‘even the England that you are coming from […], there is corruption 
there’. So I got the feeling that in these cases they try to portray the institution in as good 
a light as they can. Some of them go over the participant information sheet again to create 
a narrative that they think would best suit the subject of the research. To counteract this 
participants’ response to me, I asked probe questions asking them to describe situations 
where they have experienced bureaucratic bottlenecks and what they did to overcome it. 
At which stage, they volunteer experiences contradicting their initial argument. 
Emphasising the inherency of contradictions in talk suggested by discourse analysts 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987), these two orders of perception by participants did not occur 
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in a neat sequence of one followed by the other, rather they were intertwined throughout 
the interview process.            
4 . 8 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
This chapter detailed the research design adopted in the study. Specifically, the theoretical 
and philosophical foundations which informed the methodological choices and methods 
employed in data gathering and analysis. It provided details of the fieldwork i.e. the 
participants that were interviewed, nature of the interview process and some reflexive 
notes of the researcher. The next chapter turns to a presentation and discussion of the 
data.  
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C H A P T E R  5  
T H E  L A N D S  B U R E A U :  S E R V I C E  U S E R  
P E R C E P T I O N S  A N D  E X P E R I E N C E S  
This chapter lays out a detailed description of the role of the Lands Bureau of Lagos state 
in the administration and management of the processes involved in obtaining the proper 
documentation for the valid transfer of a land title. It contrasts this information with the 
accounts of the experiences and perceptions of the participants who interact with the 
Bureau. This in-depth description provides the foundation for the subsequent discussion 
of the findings in the next chapter. While the focus of analysis in this research is the ‘text’ 
– which includes policy documents from the Bureau and the interview transcripts from 
participants – the description of the participants themselves gives a better understanding 
of the context of the experiences constructed.  
The first part of this chapter explores the historical development of the Lands Bureau 
from the pre-colonial era to its present form. It further lays out the current organisational 
structure and roles of some key departments in the Bureau, thus giving an understanding 
of the responsibilities and objectives of the Lands Bureau. In clarifying these objectives, 
the chapter continues with a detailed narrative on land registration and the formal 
processes involved in concluding these kinds of transactions as provided for by the 
Bureau. The second part of the chapter focuses on the participants’ descriptions of their 
experiences of going through the formal processes of lands transactions in the Bureau. In 
particular, it provides a detailed account of how participants attempt to control and 
manage their transactions with the Lands Bureau. These accounts provide a foundation 
for the comprehensive discussion of the data.  
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5 . 1 .  T h e  H i s t o r i c a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  L a g o s  L a n d s  
B u r e a u  
This section explores the evolution of land management and administration in Lagos from 
the pre-colonial era up to the present, under the stewardship of the Lands Bureau of Lagos 
state. This discussion enables a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 
the Bureau.   
Lands administration may be seen as the process of determining, recording and 
disseminating information about ownership, value and use of lands (Williamson, 
Enemark et al., 2010). In the Lagos metropolis, the administration of land has been 
influenced by the combined effects of the customary practices of the indigenous people 
and statutory provisions. For a long period of time during the pre-colonial era, i.e. before 
1861, land was owned by communities and families and its administration and 
management was generally based on the local custom applicable in that region. In other 
words, the use of lands for whatever purpose – which was mainly agricultural – was 
determined by the allocative authority of the traditional system that was applicable in that 
pre-colonial region. In the absence of land instruments and registration, the administration 
of lands in pre-colonial Lagos was based on the customary practices of the indigenous 
‘Yoruba’ tribe.  
5 . 1 . 1 .  L a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a m o n g s t  t h e  Y o r u b a  
P e o p l e  
 Before the colonial era in Nigeria, the administration of land was in accordance with the 
traditional laws and practices of the indigenous tribes. In the case of Lagos state whose 
indigenous tribe is the Yoruba people, land administration and management was vested 
in the family as a unit (Coker, 1958). Although the king was vested with sovereign rights 
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over all the lands within his jurisdiction, the right to administer and allocate these lands 
was vested in the land owning families. These duties were carried out by the head of the 
family, who is the most senior male member of the lineage.  
During this period, the sale of land was uncommon, as land was shared to family members 
according to their needs. However, where there is a need to apportion a part of the family 
land to outsiders’ i.e. non-family members, a tribute-payment system was put in place to 
identify the tenancy status of the person (Lloyd, 1959). Accordingly, ownership of land 
was established by proof of lineage, to the land-owning families. This was the mode of 
land administration and management during this period before the advent of the colonial 
era which saw the introduction of formal land registration that set the foundation for the 
institution that is now known as the Lands Bureau. This will be discussed in more depth 
in the next section.     
5 . 1 . 2 .  L a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  C o l o n i a l  a n d  P o s t -
C o l o n i a l  L a g o s  
Lands administration based on the Yoruba customary practice came to an end after the 
ceding of Lagos by its monarch to the British in 1861. Shortly afterwards, the 
administration of Lagos by the British led to the establishment of a Land Registry and the 
issuance of Crown Grants. The Grants were the first type of land instruments that were 
operated in Nigeria, with the first of such Grants registered in 1863 and the last Grant 
registered in 1918 after the amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos with the Northern 
Protectorate and the Southern Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914 (Lands Bureau, 2015; 
Ukaejiofo, 2009).  
Before the 1914 amalgamation, the Land and Native Rights Proclamation Laws were 
introduced in the Southern and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1900 and 1901 
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respectively (Ukaejiofo, 2009). This led to the introduction of the British land tenure 
system which, consequently, provided land title deeds to those acquiring ownership of 
land from land-owning families. Another effect of the British administration of Lands in 
Nigeria, and in Lagos specifically, was the introduction of a compulsory survey of lands 
from 1918; with modern land survey commencing in 1934. These are some of the features 
that formed the foundation for the present land administration procedures in the Lands 
Bureau of Lagos state.   
The periods after the amalgamation of the different regions in Nigeria and after the 
country attained independence in 1960 saw the centralisation of lands administration. 
This was as a result of the federal governance structure adopted by the country which 
empowered the federal government to assume control of lands administration for the 
entire country, to the exclusion of the state governments. The Federal Lands Registry was 
the institution that was then responsible for the general administration and management 
of land in the country. After the creation of Lagos state in 1967, the Lagos State Lands 
Registry was established. Although this brought land administration closer to the grass-
roots, de facto authority over its administration and management still remained vested in 
the federal government.  
The 1970s saw an actual shift in the authority over land administration from the federal 
government to the state governments. This change came on the 29th March 1978, when 
the Federal Military Government enacted Decree No. 6, which was published in the 
Official Gazette No. 14 vol. 65, Government No. 272 (Lands Bureau, 2015), also known 
as the Land Use Decree. The decree effectively vested the power to administer, manage 
and control lands within every state in the Governor of that state and also established the 
Land Use and Allocation Committee which was primarily responsible for advising the 
Governor on issues of lands administration and management. The change in authority led 
to the establishment of the Lands Bureau as the lands policy development and 
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implementation institution of the Lagos state government. In accordance with the Land 
Use Decree (now Land Use Act, 2004), the Lagos Lands Bureau was empowered to 
administer and manage lands within the metropolis on behalf of the governor. A 
fundamental consequence of this law is that for there to be a legitimate registration of 
interest or formal transfer of land title from one person to another, the Governor will have 
to grant an approval to such land registration or transfer transaction.  
5 . 2 .  T h e  D u t i e s ,  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  
t h e  L a g o s  L a n d s  B u r e a u  
This section details the role of the Lands Bureau in land management and administration 
in Lagos state. It describes the organisation structure and examines the duties and 
responsibilities of three of the key departments in the Bureau. These departments are 
examined because of their importance in the application process for the Governor’s 
approval to a formal transfer of land title.     
As a result of Lagos state being the commercial nerve centre of the country, the Bureau 
has been instrumental in boosting developmental activities within the state through the 
high demand and use of land for commercial, private and industrial purposes amongst 
other uses. The assigned responsibilities of the Bureau includes the following; 
 Administration of land use and allocation in the State 
 Formulation and implementation of policies on land matters 
 Issuance and revocation of Certificates of Occupancy 
 Funding of infrastructural projects for government schemes through the New 
Towns Development Authority 
 Monitoring and servicing the Land Use Allocation Committee 
 Acquisition of lands for overriding public interest 
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 Administration of subsequent transactions (e.g. assignment, mortgages, lease 
and power of attorney) 
 Administration and control of the Land Registry 
 Resolving land disputes/petitions 
 Compensation for acquired land 
 Administering neighbourhood improvement charges 
 Servicing and monitoring of the Survey Office 
 Registration of land titles/documents and storage of such records through a 
computerised system (Electronic Document Management Systems) (Lands 
Bureau, 2015). 
The highly commercial character of Lagos state is reflected in the extensive nature of the 
Bureau’s responsibilities. Also highlighted is the key position that land transactions have 
come to occupy in the state’s internal revenue generation and according to the Bureau, 
land ‘is one of the major sources of revenue for Lagos state’ (Lands Bureau, 2015).   
5 . 2 . 1 .  T h e  O r g a n i s a t i o n a l  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  L a n d s  
B u r e a u  
The Bureau is divided into eight departments which are called ‘directorates’ and these 
include:  
 The Directorate of Finance and Administration  
 The Accounts Directorate 
 The Land Use & Allocation Directorate (LUAD) 
 Directorate of Lands Services (DLS)  
 Land Registry Directorate 
 Directorate of Land Regularisation  
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 Regularisation of Federal Government Properties & Grants Unit  
 Office of the Permanent Secretary. 
Depending on the type of land title registration that is to be carried out, service users must 
interact with at least three of the departments shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. The Organisational chart of the Lands Bureau, Lagos State 
Source: Lands Bureau, Lagos state (2015) 
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The next section will provide a description of these three key departments. It will 
elaborate on the duties performed by these departments in the furtherance of the 
administrative and managerial roles of the Lands Bureau. 
5 . 2 . 1 . 1 .  T h e  D i r e c t o r a t e  o f  L a n d s  S e r v i c e s  ( D L S )  
This department is one which most users of the Lands Bureau are familiar with as almost 
all land document registration process involves one interaction or the other with its 
officials. Amongst other things, this department plays a major role in processing 
applications for the grant of the Governor’s consent to land transactions. During the actual 
process, it is in charge of correspondence with the service user and ensuring that 
application documents are forwarded to the appropriate Commissioners who approve the 
land transactions on the behalf of the Governor.     
The department is also directly responsible for and coordinating all matters that relate to 
the following: 
 Revocation of rights of occupancy and processing of compensation claims 
 Processing of requests for grant of land under the Private Developers Scheme 
 Administration of Neighbourhood Improvement Charge (NIC) 
 Consultancy services to ministries, parastatals and other state government 
agencies (Lands Bureau, 2015). 
5 . 2 . 1 . 2 .  T h e  A c c o u n t s  D i r e c t o r a t e  
This department undertakes the accounting functions in the Bureau and performs a vital 
role in the registration of land title process. In the course of the registration process, the 
accounts department must verify that all legal payments that are required of the service 
user have been made and the receipts tendered are genuine. Due to the nature of this 
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function, most of the other departments in the Bureau rely on its services before 
proceeding with the processing of land documents.     
Amongst other things, the department is mandated to carry out the following duties; 
 Ensures safekeeping of the funds of the Bureau 
 Ensures the proper recording of all accounting records and all transactions 
emanating from the Directorate concerning the Bureau 
 Ensures thorough reconciliation and prepares due bank statements 
 Advises Management on financial matters. 
5 . 2 . 1 . 3 .  T h e  L a n d  R e g i s t r y  D i r e c t o r a t e  
The responsibilities of the Land Registry are central to the administrative functions of the 
Lands Bureau. These responsibilities are conferred on the directorate by The Land 
Instrument Registration Law of 1925.  It confers authority on the Registry to have custody 
of all registered land instruments. This includes deeds of assignment, leases, subleases, 
mortgages, releases and assents, orders of court and judgements, purchase receipts, 
amongst others, and in recent times, to include the certificates of occupancy.  
According to the Bureau, this department has seen a huge success in its agenda of 
improving service delivery (Lands Bureau, 2015). With the recent move away from its 
old archiving system to a new electronic storage system, the department’s role has 
gradually evolved. This evolution has led to the constant development and modification 
of the duties of the Lands Registry. In particular, the department is charged with the 
responsibility to carry out the following functions: 
 Storage of proper records of all land transactions in Lagos State 
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 Registration of instruments affecting land in Lagos, which was introduced as far 
back as 1863. Since then the volume of paperwork had been enormous 
 Administration of the Electronic Document Management System (E.D.M.S). A 
project embarked upon by the Governor of Lagos State in January 2005. This 
reduced the volume of paper document handling 
 Scanning of title documents which began in February 2005 – so far more than 9.6 
million pages of Title documents have been scanned and archived 
 Managing the Mortgage Registry. 
 Managing the Acquisition and Excision Registry (Lands Bureau, 2015). 
Service users generally interact with this department at the beginning and towards the end 
of the land registration process. The stage of registering the land title document into the 
databases of the Registry finalises the process of obtaining the Governor’s consent to a 
land transaction. In addition to the registration of land titles that have been approved by 
the Commissioners on the behalf of the Governor, the Lands Registry as custodians of 
the original copies of registered land documents also provide the public access to view 
stored documents for the purposes of validation of title. In this case, they provide certified 
true copies (CTC) of these documents.  
The preceding subsections have laid out the details of the duties of some key departments 
in the Lands Bureau. This will act as the foundation for the discussion in the next section 
which will be focused on the official process of registering a land title in the Lands Bureau 
of Lagos State.    
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5 . 3 .  P e r f e c t i n g  L a n d  D o c u m e n t s  i n  T h e  B u r e a u :  T h e  
O f f i c i a l  N a r r a t i v e  
This section gives a detailed description of the official account of land registration in the 
Lands Bureau. It details the processes involved and the estimated time for concluding 
these sorts of transactions as provided by official documents. An exploration of the 
official account for concluding land registration transactions is imperative at this stage as 
it acts as the foundation for the subsequent discussion of service users’ experience of land 
registration.     
In the execution of a host of its services the Bureau works closely with the Office of the 
Surveyor General, the New Towns Development Authority and the Ministry of Justice 
amongst others. In theory, the process involved in seeking the Governor’s approval to a 
transaction involves seven steps from submission to conclusion (see Figure 10) and 
according to the Bureau takes a maximum of 30 days to complete. The process 
commences with the documents being submitted at the Bureau and an official case file 
opened on day one.  
 Stage 1 
Land documents are submitted by the service user to the Lands Bureau. A file is 
opened for the application and a file number is assigned and communicated to the 
service user.  
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Figure 10. The 30 Days Official Process for Land Document Registration at 
the Lands Bureau 
Source: Developed by the researcher based on data from the Lands Bureau, Lagos state (2015)  
 
 
 Stage 2 
The documents are then sent to the Office of the Surveyor General for charting to 
ensure that it is in accordance with what is in the official records and it is not a 
property under government acquisition. In other words, the Surveyor General 
investigates the actual status of the land through a verification of the survey plan. 
This is meant to ensure that the measurements of the land and its current status 
represent the true position as indicated on the documents that have been submitted 
to the Bureau. No specific time frame is provided for the conclusion of this stage. 
Stage 1
Applicant submits 
documents at the 
Lands Bureau - 1 day
Stage 2
Investigation of the 
land's status at the 
Surveyor General's 
Office 
Stage 3
Documents are returned 
to the Bureau for the 
assessment of fees (and 
issuance of Demand 
Notice 1-2 days) by the 
DLS 
Stage 4
Payment receipts sent 
to Accounts 
department for 
verification - 5-7 days Stage 5
Documents forwarded to 
Commissioner for 
approval on behalf of 
the Governor - 4-7 days
Stage 6
Documents sent for 
stamping - 2-3 days
Stage 7
Registration of the 
document at the 
Lands Registry - 2-3 
days  
Collection of 
registered title 
document - 2-3 days
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At its conclusion, the file is sent back to the Bureau to continue ‘the journey’ 
towards perfection.   
 
 Stage 3 
Upon confirmation of the authenticity of the documents with regards to the nature 
and characteristics of the land, the documents are returned to the Bureau. At this 
stage the Bureau assesses the fees to be paid by the applicant based on the 
particulars of the land. After this assessment, a ‘demand notice’ resquesting the 
payment of ascertained fees is usually issued by the Directorate of Lands Services 
(DLS) to the service user within a maximum period of 2 days. 
 
 Stage 4 
Once the required payments are made by the service user to the designated banks 
and the treasury receipts are submitted, the receipts are then sent to the accounts 
department for verification. This stage is prescribed to be concluded within 7 
days. 
 
 Stage 5 
After the payments have been verified by the accounts department, the Bureau 
forwards the documents to the designated Commissioner to approve the 
application on behalf of the State Governor. In the past, the duty to sign on the 
behalf of the Governor was carried out solely by the Commissioner of Justice, 
Lagos state i.e. the Attorney General. However, in the bid to perhaps reduce the 
bottlenecks and cut down the processing time of transactions, the duty to approve 
these transactions have been delegated to other Commissioners within the state. 
  
147 
 
Once the documents are signed within the 7 days prescribed, the file proceeds to 
stamp duties. 
 
 Stage 6 
On approval, the documents are sent from the Commissioner’s office for stamp 
duties and it is processed within 2 to 3 days then the file proceeds to the Lands 
Registry for registration. 
 
 Stage 7 
Once the documents have been stamped, they are sent to the Lands Registry for 
official registration. Registration at the Lands Registry indicates that the land 
documents have been perfected and ownership or possession has been officially 
transferred from one person to another. The documents are subsequently made 
available for collection by the service user. The registration stage is supposed to 
take a maximum of 3 days, with the collection of the registered documents by the 
applicant suggested to take 2 to 3 days as well.  
The process of perfecting lands documents as indicated above in the official narrative 
provides a clear, precise and structured process for lands registration. With the exclusion 
of the second stage where the processing time was not provided, the extent of clarity 
described makes concluding a lands registration transaction within the prescribed 30 days 
highly possible.  
The second part of this chapter compares the official narrative with what is experienced 
by legal practitioners in their interactions with the Lands Bureau.  
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5 . 4 .  T h e  J o u r n e y  t o  ‘ P e r f e c t i o n ’  i n  T h e  L a n d s  
B u r e a u :  3 0  D a y s  o r  3 0  M o n t h s ?  
This section explores the social reality constructed by this group of service users as to 
how they experience and perceive land registration services being delivered by the 
Lands Bureau. It details the stage by stage process of registering documents in the 
Bureau as experienced by the users of the service and juxtaposes this with the official 
account described in the earlier parts of this chapter. There is an in-depth exploration 
of how the service users attempt to manage and control these differences between the 
officially prescribed and the experienced in order to conclude their transactions at the 
Bureau. These accounts are important as they provide an understanding of the actions 
of the service user which possibly influences the nature of service delivery in the Lands 
Bureau.    
Upon the transfer of land title documents from one person to another, in the form of a 
sale, lease or any such transaction, the recipient approaches the Lands Bureau to 
protect their interest by registering the same with the Bureau. In this context, the 
registration of such interest is called ‘perfection’ of the title. According to the 
participants, examples of transactions that they frequently conduct in the Lands Bureau 
includes the creation and discharge of legal mortgages, registration of deeds of transfer 
of landed property, registration of deeds of lease, obtaining a Certificate of Occupancy 
(C of O), obtaining a deed of release, registering a deed of gift, and conducting a search 
of registered lands – verification of land title – at the Registry’s archives amongst 
others. The essence and core of these transactions is obtaining the Governor’s consent 
to the lands transaction. 
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5 . 4 . 1 .  T h e  P e r f e c t i o n  C y c l e  
This section provides a detailed description of the day to day encounter of the 
professional service user with the services of the Lands Bureau and some of the factors 
that shape the nature of the service user / service provider relationship.  
For the most part, the quest to obtain the Governor’s approval to a lands transaction is 
generally described as being marred by uncertainties and complexities which is 
conveyed by one participant’s description of the entire process as being a ‘journey’ 
(LP 3). Similar to the official process of land document registration discussed in the 
earlier parts of this chapter, participants also described that perfection of a title in the 
Lands Bureau generally involved seven stages, often with the addition of a bonus stage 
– archives. A close examination of Figure. 11 below shows a near identical description 
between the officially prescribed processes of registration and the ‘experienced’ 
version. This is excluding the absence of the 8th stage and the intricate relationship 
among the different stages which is absent from the official narrative. Much like the 
official prescription, the process of registration commences with the submission of the 
land documents at the Lands Bureau – for which a file is opened for it – from where it 
is later transferred to the Surveyor General’s office for charting and endorsement i.e. 
verification of land status.  
  
150 
 
 
  
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keys: Direction of workflow 
High-tension areas 
  Mid-tension areas 
  Low-tension area 
   
Stage 1
Applicant submits 
documents at the 
Lands Bureau - 1 day Stage 2
Investigation of the 
land's status at the 
Surveyor General's 
Office (1-4 weeks)
Stage 3
Documents are 
returned to the Bureau 
for the assessment of 
fees and issuance of 
Demand Notice by the 
DLS 
Stage 4
Payment receipts sent 
to Accounts 
department for 
verification (2-3 
weeks) 
Stage 5
Documents forwarded to 
Commissioner for 
approval on behalf of the 
Governor (1-5 months)
Stage 6
Documents sent for 
stamping 
Stage 7
Registration of the 
document at the 
Lands Registry (1-4 
months  
Collection of 
registered title 
document - 2-3 days
Stage 8
Archives
(Where queried 
documents are sent)
Source: Developed by the researcher based on data from participants’ 
participants. 
Figure 11. The 6 - 24 Months Service User Experience 
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Unlike the official account which omits the duration of this stage, participants’ 
description reveals that this stage could last between 1 and 4 weeks – often with an 
intervention on their part – before proceeding to the next stage: 
[…] the Surveyor General’s office may take around three weeks or 
longer if you don’t follow it up properly […] (LP 5). 
 
The lack of a prescribed time frame at this early stage may introduce uncertainty into 
the entire process and derail the 30 days official time scale for the conclusion of 
transactions.  
The third stage commences after the documents have been returned to the Lands 
Bureau, then a notice of demand for the payment of the assessed fees is sent out to the 
service user. Upon the payment of the required fees, the documents continue on their 
journey once again and are transferred to the accounts department for verification of 
payments which is the fourth stage. This is a decisive point in the entire process. This 
stage is critical because every movement of the document from here on reverts to this 
stage before any further action is taken on the file or documents and this stage is 
generally described as lasting between 2 and upward of 3 weeks as against the 
prescribed 5 to 7 days: 
[…] they say it shouldn’t go beyond 4 days but it seems that is not 
correct, that is on paper, right here in practice your process can 
actually be there for 2 weeks or even 1 month and see they told us that 
this thing [the entire land registration process] is supposed to be for 30 
days (LP 10).    
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After the verification of payments, the documents move to the fifth stage which is the 
point where the Commissioner approves the transaction on the behalf of the Governor. 
Before the approval is given a re-assessment of the documents will be carried out to 
ensure that the legal and procedural requirements have been met and that the required 
fees have also been paid. This phase is officially prescribed to take from 4 to 7 days. 
But some service users allege that this point of the transaction process lasts between 1 
and 4 months: 
Also, there was a time I submitted this deed of assignment for perfection 
and it went to the Commissioner for him to append his signature and 
the file spent like 5 months, just for him to append his signature […] 
(LP 17).  
But from experience what we see is that if a file is sent [to the 
Commissioner] it may take about 4 or more months before it returns 
[…] (LP 5).   
Some reasons were proffered by participants for this extended delay. One of these 
includes the possibility of the file being ‘queried’ – this is usually due to an issue 
relating to the nature, content or insufficiency of the tendered documents. When a file 
is queried it is sent to the ‘archives’ (stage 8 in Fig. 11), a central filing location within 
the Lands Bureau. Due to the difficulty of retrieving the file from the archives and in 
most cases the lack of communication that the file has been sent there, this raises the 
possibility that while applicants generally assume that the file is still awaiting the 
Commissioner’s attention the file may have spent a considerable time in the archives: 
[…] but you see [there are] sometimes a job may be queried, if it is 
queried it will move down again, back through the normal routes and 
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end up in the archives. If you take about one month you will be thinking 
your job is going but it is stuck […] (LP 18).   
Other explanations provided for the delay in this stage is the tendency to revert to the 
accounts department to re-confirm the payment of the fees and the general assumption 
that giving of approval to land transactions is not the primary duty of the 
Commissioner, as such the duty is carried out at his/her convenience.  
The sixth stage in the process involves sending the documents for stamp duties. It is 
generally agreed by the participants that this is the least time consuming stage of the 
entire process. While it also involves the verification of payments from the accounts 
department and the possibility of the documents finding their way to the archives, the 
processing time is perhaps faster because the focus of this department is ensuring that 
the stamp duties have been paid and nothing more. Thus it does not concern itself with 
the payment of other fees and the nature of the other documents. 
The seventh stage in the process of obtaining the Governor’s consent involves the 
registration of the documents at the Lands Registry. This stage is also crucial because 
the final registration of the documents crystallizes the ownership of the property to 
which it relates and these form the records that the general public will rely on. 
According to the procedural records of the Bureau, this stage is concluded within 2 to 
3 days, but the described experience(s) of the participants largely depart from this 
prescription. The consensus among participants is that this stage is concluded within 
1 – 4 months and this is essentially because a re-verification of documents and 
payment receipts is carried out, at this stage it is called ‘clearance’. This exercise 
involves taking two steps back in the process and liaising with the accounts department 
– clearance with respect to the payment of fees – and a scrutiny of the documents to 
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ensure compliance. The failure of which sees a file or documents being sent to the 
archives: 
So when you get to registration it’s another ball game. It can take 
another 3 or 4 months depending on how push-ful you are […] (LP 5). 
I obtained consent (Commissioner’s signature) on 18th of November 
2013 and it was ready from registration on 22nd January, 2014, that 
should be well over 30 days […] (LP 1). 
[…] then you take it for registration, that is another process on its own 
and the process may take like a month […] they keep going back and 
forth checking your receipts, checking your payments, your documents, 
root of title; they want to be really sure before they register it. (LP 20)   
The above descriptions illustrate the gap between the officially prescribed, ‘what ought 
to be’ and ‘what is’. This disparity is more pronounced with respect to the timeframe 
for the conclusion of transactions and the ‘complexities’ involved on the part of the 
service user, in ensuring that the transaction is concluded. For example, according to 
the official process, the documents are identified as being sent to the Surveyor 
General’s Office for verification of the land’s status, but as stated above no specific 
time frame is given as to when this stage should be concluded. This uncertainty at the 
beginning of the process may call into question the veracity of the allocated time frame 
for the other stages and the eventual conclusion of the transaction. However, it is 
doubtful that this singular anomaly can explain the huge variation in the ‘prescribed’ 
and the ‘experienced’ conclusion timeframe of a lands transaction. This, therefore, 
raises a strong interest to understand how these uncertainties and complexities 
surrounding service delivery affect the service user and shape the nature of their 
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interaction with the Bureau and its officers. The next subsection will explore how the 
participants discuss managing these complexities and uncertainties to conclude their 
transactions in the Bureau.  
5 . 4 . 2 .  ‘ I  A m  a  M e r c e n a r y ’  
Generally, the way people construct themselves or their social reality may be seen to 
influence their everyday actions and interactions with others (Goffman, 1959; Berger 
& Luckman, 1966). This may be said to be noticeable in the case of the professional 
service user. The nature of the position that this group of users occupies, requires the 
show of efficiency not only to keep their clients but also to gain new ones. Hence the 
general drive for efficiency may have resulted in the adoption of a number of identities 
by the participants: 
[…] I’m being given a job to do, I am a mercenary […] I’m a 
mercenary! I want to be seen as a lawyer that does things speedily (LP 
4).   
When I go to Lands, I need to be a miracle worker for my clients […] 
(LP 16). 
However, with regards to providing an efficient and speedy service to their clients, the 
consensus amongst this group is that the conclusion of a transaction within the official 
30-day period is an exception to the rule rather than the norm. Although the Lands 
Bureau’s vision statement is ‘fast-tracking land administration to harness Lagos State 
government’s revenue potentials and provide easy access to land for economic and 
social benefits’ (Lands Bureau, 2015) at present, the narrative of this group of service 
users reveals that the average conclusion time for the registration of a land document 
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is between 6 months and 1 year, with some cases remaining unperfected upwards of 2 
years: 
Despite that it’s supposed to be 30 days, you realise that on the average 
it lasts as long as one year […] (LP 1). 
There are some jobs that are there for about 2 years, 3 years but if you 
don’t have any delay by the time you’re spending 8 to 10 months you 
supposed to have your job done (PL 1). 
This extended timeframe for the conclusion of transactions may not work well with the 
ambition of a professional that seeks to be seen as a mercenary as this persona is 
characterised by exceptional service delivery; which in the case of the Lands Bureau 
cannot be guaranteed without taking some extra steps to ensure the required outcome. 
Some of the participants suggested that the reasons as to the delays experienced in the 
Bureau may be linked to the heavy workload of Bureau officials. This heavy workload is 
said to be reflected in the work attitude of the Bureau officers which in some cases may 
be those of an over-worked staff. For example, if the workload of an official is considered 
in conjunction with the number of available officials to do the job, bearing in mind that 
Lagos state is the commercial capital of Nigeria and the administration of lands is a major 
source of revenue for the State government, this may provide an explanation as to the 
long delays and the appearance of inefficiency on the part of the Bureau. Instructive in 
this regard is the description of two of the participants as regards their experiences with 
delay in the Bureau: 
[…] now in a day they can receive up to like 200 to 500 applications and 
you have one person to man these applications you know in each of the 
rooms… Basically the large amount of files that come in you know, well, 
contribute (LP 10). 
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[…] you know Lagos is congested…so that they have a lot of transactions, 
compared to the other states and you know Lagos state does a lot of land 
transactions, properties, that is the major investment in Lagos state. I 
think…that is why I feel the Lands Bureau is so congested because they 
have a lot of workload to do compared to other states […] (LP 6). 
 
Consequently, the workload of staff may negatively affect the processing time of a 
transaction and this is at variance with the need for speed of the professional service user, 
who may then look for other methods to short-circuit the bureaucratic system.   
Under certain circumstances, this ‘journey’ may be concluded within the officially 
prescribed time frame of 30 days. However, this rarely happens without the active 
involvement of the service user in the perfection process by way of actively controlling 
or managing the registration process. Such involvement may either take the form of 
constant self-monitoring of the documents: 
Once I submit the necessary documents for perfection, I make sure I go 
in there regularly enough to monitor the file […] (LP 19).  
[…] if you don’t follow-up your file remains on the table […] so it takes 
a lot of follow-up to ensure that you get results (LP 6).    
Or in some instances, the informal engagement of one of the Bureau’s staff, who then 
acts as a sort of ‘broker’ for those that will engage his / her services: 
b[…] you have to have an ‘insider’ that is just the fact, you must have 
an insider to assist you (LP 3). 
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You have to know people in that place, you have to hand it over to 
somebody; that is the person that will report to you […] (LP 11). 
Assuming as a lawyer you want to do it on your own without necessarily 
making use of them (insiders) you may have problems, but once in a 
while you hire their services to help you to navigate […] (LP 13).    
Regardless of the preferred method in the journey towards perfection, the consensus 
amongst this group of participants is that ‘monitoring’ – which is also described as 
‘follow-up’ by some participants – of the files or documents for perfection is 
fundamental to the successful conclusion of a transaction: 
[…] if you don’t follow-up, your file remains on the table or you have 
to trace the office where your file is if you can’t find it. So it takes a lot 
of follow-up to ensure you get results (LP 6). 
Thus, due to the importance of ‘follow-up’ as emphasised by participants, the next 
subsection will provide a detailed explanation of this fundamental activity in land 
registration.  
5 . 4 . 3 .  T h e  ‘ F o l l o w - U p ’ :  C o n t r o l l i n g  &  M a n a g i n g  t h e  
R e g i s t r a t i o n  P r o c e s s  
This section describes the methods which professional service users employ to manage 
and control bureau pathologies that manifest while transacting in the Lands Bureau, with 
the aim of minimising their effects on transactions. According to Thompson, the concept 
‘bureau pathology’ explains the effects of the features and structures of a bureaucratic 
institution on the behaviour of public officials. The excessive focus of the institution on 
routinized tasks, impersonality and hierarchy has resulted in creating pathological 
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behaviours amongst officials which is expressed by ritualistic attachment to routines, 
excessive focus on sub-goals (Thompson, 1977, p. 152) and the transference of 
responsibility to others within the hierarchy. An examination of how legal practitioners 
manage these pathologies is important because, amongst others, they manifest in the form 
of prolonged transaction delays which indirectly affects the reputation of the lawyer and 
how she or he is perceived by the client. The possible consideration of these factors may 
influence the professional to seek out less-legal alternative approaches to concluding 
transactions and these alternative approaches provides an insight into how legal 
practitioners conduct or facilitate these types of informal interactions.       
The three main approaches described by participants and which will be explored include 
the insider approach, the stage-by-stage approach and the complaint approach to 
concluding transactions in the Lands Bureau. 
5 . 4 . 3 . 1 .  T h e  ‘ I n s i d e r ’  A p p r o a c h  
The word ‘insider’ is used to identify a person who either works in the Lands Bureau as 
a Bureau official or as a clerk and due to this ‘residency’ status unofficially collects some 
form of payment from service users in exchange for the provision of some ‘extra’ 
services. Participants also referred to this group of people as ‘someone in-house’, 
‘somebody’, ‘agents’, ‘contacts’ and ‘resident contractors’ amongst others: 
[…] at a point lawyers become helpless, the people from outside become 
helpless […] on the average you still need someone in-house to help you 
push it […] (LP 1). 
The Lands has become so polluted that even those who are the senior 
officers there have agents that they use as well […] So some of the works 
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that lawyers do these are the ones that will do it, even clients go straight 
to them. Some of them call lawyers their clients […] (LP 9). 
[…] what it (the registration process) has succeeded in doing is to make 
the workers in that place semi-contractors. […] we all have our boys […] 
most of them have turned to resident contractors because they are the ones 
that actually can help you move the files (LP 18).  
The extra services that these insiders carry out include, completing an entire lands 
registration process, monitoring of files which the service user is processing or taking 
over of such files, locating missing files on request and generally providing information 
or assistance with regards to lands transactions in the Bureau. As a result of these extra 
services, they have come to be seen as indispensable by most of the participants in their 
interaction with the Lands Bureau: 
  […] you have to have an insider that is just the fact; you must have an 
insider to assist you (LP 3).  
Two main reasons were given for the alleged importance of engaging the services of 
insiders in land document processing. The first has to do with avoiding delays in the 
conclusion of transactions and the second reason which is closely related to the first, has 
to do with the professional’s desire to build and maintain a good reputation before their 
client. These two reasons will be explored in detail in the following subsections.  
a .  A v o i d i n g  D e l a y s  
Delays in the conclusion of transactions is a major issue that this group of professionals 
describe that they frequently encounter in the Land Bureau. This may be caused by any 
factor from the inherent uncertainties in the lands registration process, to the nature of the 
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bureaucratic institution itself. In the quest to avoid these frequent delays, they often devise 
different means to ‘control’ these situations. The use of an ‘insider’ is one of such control 
mechanisms that the professional service user employs to manage the bureaucratic 
challenges in the Lands Bureau.  
Insiders are contracted by the professionals to serve as their contact person in the Bureau 
while they engage their services. According to participants, the time-frame for the 
conclusion of a transaction varies where professionals employ the services of an insider 
as compared to when they decide to follow the normal bureaucratic process to conclude 
the transaction. The reason for this may be because the nature of the relationship between 
the professional and the Bureau official is quite different from the relationship between 
the Bureau official and the insiders. Since most insiders are themselves employees in the 
Bureau there is the opportunity for informal interaction and exchange of favours as 
between colleagues. These are features generally lacking in the relationship between the 
professional service user and the Bureau official. As a result of this existing status of 
‘good working relationship’, the insider naturally comes as a useful resource to be 
explored by the professional to speed up the time that is required for the conclusion of 
transactions:  
[…] these people [insiders] can even on their own go to each of these 
rooms (departments) and say “listen, are you done with this file? If you’re 
not done with it please sign”, unlike when I go there myself. So these 
people will just work around it [bottlenecks] since they’ve been paid to do 
the job. […] I think for that I’ve actually received one [a perfected land 
document] for a month […] (LP 10). 
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So that guy [the insider] is not obliged to do the job as per he is been paid 
a salary, he is now doing it based on the fact that he has a special interest 
in the file (LP 7). 
In other words, the use of an insider is described as being advantageous as their ‘insider’ 
status enables them to liaise with their colleagues as to prioritising files in which they 
have an interest in, thereby, cutting down the processing time for such transactions. 
Similarly, another suggested advantage of using the insider is as a result of the indirect 
impact they have on the reputation of the professional.  
b .  B u i l d i n g  a n d  M a i n t a i n i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  
R e p u t a t i o n s  
Ordinarily, the responsibility of legal practitioner towards their clients is generally 
determined by the ‘expectations’ of the latter. With regards to lands registration, a 
professional’s client could approach the Bureau directly to conduct transactions but 
instead elects to pay the professional to do this. In this regard, the expectation of clients 
is described as not being restricted to just getting the job done, but getting the job done 
within the shortest possible time as compared to if they had done it themselves:  
[…] at the end of the day you just want your job to be done because the 
client will not come to you and you will now tell them that it’s in 6 months. 
They will ask “what kind of lawyer are you, the last one we did was in 3 
months” (LP 18). 
[…] eyes are on you, and don’t forget that you are not the only lawyer; if 
you don’t do it right and on time […] next time they [the clients] won’t 
want to engage your services (LP 3). 
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[…] It keeps your reputation as someone that does the job on time as 
opposed to someone that waits […] I want to be seen as a lawyer that does 
things speedily (LP 4).    
The descriptions above hint at a certain level of expectation required of the professionals 
by their clients which may pose a challenge. This challenge is emphasised by the nature 
of the bureaucratic institution which is not ordinarily built for speed, and speed is a key 
expectation of the client. Thus, professionals tend to seek out alternative methods to 
satisfy their clients’ expectations in any way possible, and engaging the services of the 
insider is seen as beneficial in this regard. Due to the perceived impact that these insiders 
have on the conclusion time of transactions, most of the participants hold the view that it 
is virtually impossible to conclude transactions without engaging their services. Thus, 
they accept this practice of land registration as a norm that cannot be deviated from: 
You have to know people in that place; you have to hand it over to 
somebody; that is the person that will report to you (LP 9). 
[…] if you study this situation critically, I can say categorically that what 
works in that system is man-know-man; you must know someone! (LP 16). 
Despite the popularity of the above view amongst participants, a few dissenting 
observations are noted to the effect that using an insider may be a matter of the choice of 
a service user. As land transactions can, arguably, be successfully concluded in the 
Bureau without conforming to the norm of engaging the services of the insider:  
[…] you don’t need to give anybody anything, if your documents are 
complete you actually don’t need to tip anybody; just that you have to be 
going there and following it to make sure it is moving [from stage to stage] 
so that somebody will not just forget it on their table (LP 19).  
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 […] If you’re not receiving any pressure from anybody […] sometimes it 
can actually take the natural course and it will come out (LP 18).   
It is, however, apparent from the explanation of LP 18 that the option to engage the 
services of the insider may not entirely be voluntary as the ‘pressure’ for results by the 
professional’s client may be an influencing factor.  
Furthermore, the speedy conclusion of a land transaction is not dependent on the singular 
act of engaging the services of an insider. Participants’ descriptions show that the 
‘amount’ that is paid to an insider – which participants also called ‘mobilisation’ or 
‘facilitation’ sum – may determine the time frame for the conclusion of a transaction that 
the insider has been contracted to handle. In other words, an insider can be highly 
motivated and invested in a job where a substantial facilitation sum is paid by the 
professional and less motivated where a lower sum is paid for the same job; so this factor 
also affects the time it takes to conclude the job: 
[…] depending on how much you’re paying…if I give him like N1 million 
[£3750 Approx.] …he is going to personally carry the file, in fact they will 
close their eyes to approve every approvable! (LP 1). 
Similarly, the amount a client pays for services rendered has been described to also 
influence the steps which the professional takes in conducting the lands transaction. This 
is not unlike the case of the insider being motivated by the facilitation sum paid by the 
professional. In other words, the professional is also  motivated to engage the services of 
the insider by the amount that is paid by the client for his or her services: 
[…] if you have a brief of N50 million and the professional fee is 15% and 
another brief of N50 million and the professional fee is 5%; the one of 
15%, the way you’re going to handle it will be different from the one of 
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5% because of the consideration involved […] So it depends on the fee 
that you’re getting on that particular job (PL 1).           
This section has explored the importance of using insiders for conducting transactions in 
the Bureau. The next section will now examine another control mechanism, the stage-by-
stage approach. 
5 . 4 . 3 . 2 .  T h e  S t a g e - B y - S t a g e  A p p r o a c h  
This approach involves the professional personally following the progress of the file or 
land documents from stage to stage in the registration process, unlike the insider approach 
where the professional pays someone else to follow the file. The personal monitoring 
process requires that the professional physically go into the Bureau regularly to enquire 
about the location and stage of the land documents to be registered until the conclusion 
of the transaction: 
Once I submit the necessary documents for perfection, I make sure I go in 
there regularly enough to monitor the file […] (LP 19). 
Anytime I have a transaction there I go there like twice a week, Tuesdays 
and Thursdays […] (LP 10). 
This self-monitoring option is viewed by most of the participants as being tedious and a 
waste of resources such as time and money, hence the preference to engage the services 
of the insider:    
It is not that we cannot do it from the beginning to the end […] but I tell 
you the car park in that place is N500 inside, outside there is N200 and 
you have to queue to get that one. Now you can go to Alausa twice a week 
and you discover that your file has not even moved from one table to the 
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other. So in other words, you have paid another N1000, and your fuel is 
going […] assuming you go to Alausa 20 or 30 times before you get your 
thing, you have spent N20 000 or there about […] why do you have to go 
through all that while I can call my guys there? […] (LP 18).   
The description of LP 18 above once again highlights the role of individual ‘choice’ in 
determining how to manage and control their land transaction in the Bureau. While on 
one hand the use of insiders may be frowned upon by some: 
Knowing what I’m looking for I don’t usually look for a person who is 
going to help me because I know the sections, I know how the thing works, 
so I don’t usually employ anybody to help me look after my file (PL 2). 
[…] you don’t need to give anybody anything, if your documents are 
complete […] you have to be going there and following it to make sure it 
is moving so that somebody will not just forget it on their table (LP 19). 
On the other hand, the self-monitoring approach may not be completely devoid of 
informal payments, much like the insider approach. This method may be distinguished 
from the insider approach by the singular fact that the professional does not pay an 
‘individual’ to monitor or take over the registration of the documents. In fact, participants 
who employ this approach explain that at certain stages in the registration process, the 
need also arises for them to ‘facilitate’ or ‘mobilise’ a Bureau officer or clerk: 
[…] so basically if you want your file to be processed on time you’ll pay 
N1000 for typing and there are still a whole lot of things that you will still 
pay for to move from one officer’s table to the next officer’s table […] (LP 
2). 
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[…] if it’s not acceptable in one department then definitely another 
department will ask for it or will delay the job for a long time and you will 
just have to use your initiative to give them something to make it move […] 
(LP 17). 
The use of this approach becomes more problematic due to the fact that the need to ‘tip’ 
or ‘mobilise’ is multiplied. That is, it not only involves interacting with participants from 
the different stages in the registration process, it also involves the professional negotiating 
facilitation sum with different individuals as opposed to the insider approach where the 
insider does the negotiation on behalf of the professional.   
[…] since you know that there is no how the job can get done on its own 
without you intervening you have to be following it up. When it gets to 
Survey, you go to Survey and locate where the job is and ‘see’ the officer 
that is in charge […]. So that is what you continue doing from office to 
office until you get the whole thing concluded (LP 8). 
[…] if I have a file that I want to process I don’t just throw the file there; 
my file is going to so and so, I have to go and wait for the file to be there 
and go and ‘see’ the man so they can find my file out on time […] (LP 3). 
These descriptions show that the use of this method is also froth with its own peculiar 
problems and service users have to make a decision whether they are ready to take the 
issues on. This section has described the second method that professional service users 
employ to navigate and manage the complexities that they encounter in their regular 
attempts to conclude transactions at the Lands Bureau. While this approach may bear a 
close resemblance to the previously described insider approach, some unique 
characteristics which significantly distinguishes both methods were highlighted. 
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The next subsection will present the least popular control method employed by some of 
the participants in land registration, this is the complaint approach. 
5 . 4 . 3 . 3 .  T h e  C o m p l a i n t  A p p r o a c h  
As the name suggests, this approach involves service users making a formal complaint or 
petition to the appropriate authorities where they encounter poor or delayed services in 
the Lands Bureau. Such petitions or complaints are usually in a written form and 
depending on the nature of the petition are generally addressed to the Permanent 
Secretary, who is the administrative head of the Lands Bureau, or to the office of the 
Attorney General of Lagos state. Sometimes, these petitions are made directly to the head 
of the particular department in question and as a last resort to the office of the Governor 
of Lagos state.   
Of the three transaction control and management approaches described by participants, 
the complaint approach is the only one that – on the face of it – does not require informal 
payments to be made to get the job done. But it is still the least utilised of all the methods. 
Two main reasons were given for the underutilisation of this method. The first is the belief 
that the petition or the complaint will not be treated and where treated will undergo the 
usual bureaucratic stages leading to an extended time frame for the conclusion of the 
registration. The second is a possible victimisation of the professional by the erring 
official when he or she gets queried, if they get queried that is, amongst other things. 
 […] I wrote a letter to them…your letter will go through the process as 
well, it will be passed from one table to another. So if you want to wait, 
you wait. You can wait for another one year and your letter will still be 
moving (LP 3).  
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[…] because of the way the civil service is if you want to follow that path 
[formal complaint] and you’re complaining, your file will get missing and 
you remember you have a client; that is your overriding factor (LP 2). 
The possibility of victimisation is a factor which participants describe as fuelling the 
general reluctance to make formal complaints. This is more so in the case of the legal 
practitioner who regularly interacts with the Bureau on behalf of different clients. The 
frequency of the interaction between the professional and the Bureau creates the need to 
maintain a good working relationship with Bureau officials; as these are the people they 
do business with on a regular basis. 
[…] the fact is that because you work there regularly so even if there is 
any issue you won’t want to complain officially […] (LP 5).  
The explanations by participants show that alienating the officials by way of complaints 
may be detrimental to professionals who may in the future seek to undertake the stage-
by-stage approach of conducting transactions in the Bureau as they may become persona 
non grata in both the formal and informal realm of conducting business in the Bureau: 
There was a time I had a problem there, I wanted to take it up and they 
said “oga [sir], the best thing is for you to go and settle with this woman 
because you know you’re always here in Alausa; once she finds out you’re 
fighting her now or that you have reported her, all your job once they see 
it…you cannot locate your file again and you start having problems” (LP 
8).   
[…] I have had several encounters of that nature and when I threaten by 
saying that I’m going to report you to your management [...] the next thing 
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they will frustrate your work…they will give you excuses why that file will 
not move from that table (LP 7). 
Despite this cautious approach from most of the participants, two of the participants claim 
to have had positive feedbacks from writing petitions / complaints as a result of the poor 
services that they had received from the institution. While one of the participants 
addressed the written complaint directly to the head of the erring department, the other 
participant addressed it to the office of the Governor of Lagos state. 
[…] I remember last year (2013) I wrote a petition of a missing file against 
a particular department. So when I wrote the petition on behalf of my 
client, immediately they [the department] called me and invited me for a 
meeting (LP 12). 
[…] we wrote directly to the Governor itemising what had gone wrong in 
the past, you understand […] one of their cardinal policy is service 
delivery, so we take them up on that, that we have been on a C of O for 3 
years […] So if you don’t go through that process you will not get results 
(LP 11). 
These two participants claim to have had positive results from using this approach, 
however, this step may have been taken as a last resort as both participants also describe 
the convenience of using the insider method above all. In other words, the complaint 
approach is only used when all others fail to give the expected outcome.   
In summary, the views of participants in this study may appear to occupy the two ends of 
a spectrum with one side touting the inevitability of informal payments in the conclusion 
of a transaction in the Bureau, and the other affirming the pointlessness of making such 
payments. However, there is considerable overlap in these views as participants do not 
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rigidly fit on one side of the spectrum. Rather, they generally employ the tool which best 
suits their business needs at every point in time when dealing with the Lands Bureau, and 
this is regardless of their position on the spectrum. Also, although the participants occupy 
different legal roles and have varied years of experience dealing with the Bureau, based 
on the construction of their experience, there is no noticeable difference in the nature of 
their interaction with the institution.   
This section has examined some tools that service users employ to manage and control 
bureaucratic bottlenecks that they encounter in their attempt to conclude transactions in 
the Lands Bureau. Besides the need to have some semblance of control over their land 
transactions, participants also describe certain other factors which influence their 
behaviour and decision whether or not to get involved in informal transactions. The next 
section will explore some other influencing factors described by the legal practitioners.   
 
 
   
5 . 5 .  A n c i l l a r y  F a c t o r s  
This section examines other factors that this group of service users hint at being a 
contributory influence in the decision whether or not they should follow the informal 
route to conclude transactions in the Lands Bureau. Aside from the ever-present need for 
‘speed’ and the impact that this has on the professional’s reputation, two other factors are 
described as being important in reaching a decision on how the professional chooses to 
control and manage land transactions in the Bureau. The two factors examined in this 
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section are the nature of ‘competition’ in the legal profession and the socio-cultural 
environment that is Nigeria. 
5 . 5 . 1 .  C o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h e  L e g a l  P r o f e s s i o n  
There are discussions in the legal arena as to whether legal practice should be considered 
a profession or a business (Kirkland, 2005). This may largely be due to the business-like 
challenges that practitioners encounter on a daily basis, from the singular focus on the 
needs of the client to drawing up innovative strategies to attract more clients and increase 
profit amongst others. Describing the state of private practice amongst American lawyers 
Norman Spaulding (2003), a distinguished professor of law, noted the impact that 
‘competition’ is having on the nature and mode of delivery of legal services. In particular, 
he emphasised the fact that these competitions are not merely from the peers of the lawyer 
but also from other professionals and non-professionals alike (Spaulding, 2003). The 
argument by Spaulding seems to explain, in part, the reality constructed by this group of 
lawyers in their legal practice in the area of land administration. 
The practitioners describe the ever-present competition for clients not only among 
themselves as colleagues but with the ‘insiders’ of the Lands Bureau; who in this case 
have a clear advantage based on their residency status. This constant struggle to out-
perform the other party in order to gain the confidence and continuous patronage of the 
client lures the professional into the grey areas of document processing in the Bureau. On 
this issue of competition among lawyers, a participant noted the practice and its possible 
impact on other practitioners as thus: 
Some lawyers go there to strike a deal saying ‘please I want to impress 
my clients, I want to make sure that these papers are out as fast as 
possible’ […] Now [that] client will go back and say this lawyer helped 
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me to do this thing sharp sharp [quickly] and it came out this way […] 
when for instance the next person that wants to do it now comes to you 
and you tell them that these are the due procedures to follow, then they 
will say ‘how come? But lawyer this did it for this and how come it came 
out faster than this?’ They’ll move to that guy! (LP 7).           
Accordingly, the drive by the professional to keep his or her share of the client market, 
and possibly gain new ones, is also a contributory factor that shapes the behaviour and 
nature of the interaction of the professional service user with the institution. This form of 
intragroup interaction may create anxiety in other professional service users to pursue the 
informal option, due to the slow nature of concluding transactions via the formal 
channels.  
Aside from fellow colleagues, non-professionals, which in this context are the ‘insiders’ 
i.e. the employees and pseudo-employees of the Lands Bureau, are perceived by legal 
practitioners as a formidable competitor for their clients. The most emphasised issue 
described is the possibility of the client negotiating directly with the insider, thus 
rendering the professional’s role redundant. This fear of redundancy stems from the fact 
that the professional in certain respect occupies the role of a ‘facilitator’ of the informal 
service provided by the insider. Where the client no longer requires the services of a 
facilitator due to the fact that he or she has made contact directly with an insider, the 
professional loses the client to the competition. It may be difficult for the professional to 
regain back the client due to the additional benefits that the client gets from dealing 
directly with an insider.  
There are some clients that prefer to go to these people (the insiders) 
directly; and clients really would tell you that ‘I did one last two weeks so 
and so person in the registry did it for me […] I paid him only N50 000’ 
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you are a lawyer, you are asking for N300 000, so how would you now 
explain to your client? […] because they [insiders] are in the system it is 
faster for them […] (LP 9).      
The benefits to the client generally range from reduced financial obligations due to the 
elimination of the ‘facilitator’, to decreased transaction uncertainty as a result of dealing 
directly with a staff of the Bureau and the expedited conclusion of a transaction. Thus the 
professional is hard-pressed to prevent the loss of a client to either of the competition, i.e. 
to fellow colleagues and to the insiders. The strategy most common amongst the 
participants is to skilfully use the insider to provide an effective and efficient service that 
ensures the loyalty of the client. Consequently, foraging in the grey area of informal 
practices, in concluding transactions in the Bureau, is regarded as highly beneficial to the 
extent that it not only protects the reputation of the lawyer but also strengthens her 
position vis-à-vis those of the competition. 
The next section presents the practitioner’s description of the socio-cultural environment.  
5 . 5 . 2 .  T h e  S o c i o - C u l t u r a l  E n v i r o n m e n t  o f  L e g a l  
P r a c t i c e  
The individual may be construed as the embodiment of the socio-cultural environment in 
which she finds herself. In other words, the environment to a large extent influences and 
dictates the norms, values and behaviours subscribed to and displayed by the individual 
(Hofstede, 1980; Ho, Wang & Vitell, 2011). In acknowledgement of this view, this 
section explores the socio-cultural impact of land law practice in Lagos on this group of 
legal professionals. It examines their perception of the societal norms and values and how 
these possibly influence their decision whether or not to participate in informal 
transactions.  
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Discussing their experience, participants emphasised the impact that the socio-cultural 
environment has on the way they interact with the Bureau. Their description of events 
and reaction to the challenges they encounter in the Bureau can be linked to their 
perception of the ‘Nigerian’ public institution and the pervading societal norms. 
Interestingly, there was virtually no mention of the role of professional ethics in guiding 
their reactions to bureaucratic challenges. Rather, the prevalent views expressed tilt 
towards an adherence to the societal norms and values which in a nutshell is encompassed 
in the statement of one participant as thus: 
[…] you know the Nigerian habit and culture of corruption and then you 
know how it affects virtually everything in this country (LP 7).  
The above sentiment was echoed by all the participants in such expressions as ‘the 
Nigerian factor’ (LP 20), ‘do it the Nigerian way’ (LP 3), ‘but this is Nigeria’ (LP 5) 
amongst others. Participants explain away their involvement in informal practices as 
adhering to the pervading societal norms. One of the elements of the Nigerian factor 
being alluded to by most is the general expectation of poor services from public 
institutions: 
Even us lawyers, we are even used to handing it over to somebody because 
that stereotype something is there; that this thing (land documents) will 
not move except we give it to somebody […] so we are used to it (LP 11). 
Based on the above description, a lawyer that expects to encounter delays and possibly 
cases of missing files would generally take precautions to prevent such occurrence by for 
example engaging the services of the insider from the outset. This prevents her from 
engaging directly with the services of the institution and it would rather lead her to form 
her perception of the institution on such informal interactions. 
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Another element of this Nigerian factor is the popularity of corruption in the national 
discourse. Due to the generally high perception of corruption in the Nigerian society 
(Transparency International, 2012) there is the pervading belief that all public institutions 
are corrupt; as such nothing can be achieved without participating in informal practices: 
[…] sincerely there is a level of corruption in nearly all walks of life in 
Nigeria, I mean you can’t take it away (LP 4). 
But you see Nigeria still remains Nigeria and corruption is at the heart of 
it all, in fact everywhere, even in your home, school […] it is not peculiar 
to the Lands Bureau or to the government establishments (LP 6).    
These views depict the possible acceptance of what is believed to be the status quo thus, 
enabling a state of normalcy and routinization of corrupt practices. One of the participants 
provided an explanation as to the general acceptance of corruption and the belief that it 
is applicable in all aspects of Nigerian life: 
You see culturally people have not been used to good service delivery, so 
there is a cultural problem (LP 15).      
This explanation further highlights the possibility that the participation of service users 
in informal practices may be a result of the existing social norms whose root is traceable 
to the historical absence of a good service delivery track record by public institutions in 
the society. The perception of poor service delivery is promoted by a combination of the 
socio-cultural attitude to government work by Bureau officials and the social acceptance 
of this situation as inevitable by the service users. This explains the recurring description 
of government work and the attitude of its employees as thus: 
But the attitude is always there that it’s a ‘government job’, whatever I do 
I’ll be paid […] (LP 11). 
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I can express the common attitude in vernacular and I will interpret it, 
(speaks Yoruba language) ‘ise ijoba ko nse ise ase ku’ which means 
‘government work is not a do or die affair’, you don’t strain yourself when 
doing government work (LP 15).         
Therefore, it may also be argued that such acceptance of normalcy may have influenced 
the description of these corrupt practices which are expressed mainly through the use of 
euphemisms: 
[…] you know how it is in the civil service […] so to safeguard against 
that you do PR (Public Relations) (LP 2). 
[…] after paying the necessary official fees […] you will have to motivate 
the staff who will go and carry it out for you […] (LP 14). 
[…] to get anything done you have to facilitate it; to put it bluntly it is 
corruption (LP 15). 
It is observed that the use of these euphemisms made it easier for participants to freely 
talk about their participation in these informal practices. Hence a penchant for the use of 
words that convey a positive connotation of the informal practices. The downside, 
however, is that the use of these ‘positive’ words in explaining an otherwise negative 
action may over time filter the negative properties from the informal practice. Thereby 
resulting in normalcy and routinisation of the action. 
Another factor which is described as playing a role in the perpetuation of informal 
practices is the socio-economic status of Bureau officials. According to some of the 
participants, they are obliged to give monetary payments in the course of a lands 
transaction not because they were asked specifically but because of the general low socio-
economic condition amongst bureaucratic officials: 
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[…] I am not encouraging corruption […] but I ask you a question, how 
can a man who is tossing about a file worth for example N1Million and 
all he earns at the end of the month is N18 000 […] (LP 1). 
[…] I don’t blame the civil servants […] I don’t think they are being paid 
extra for every inspection they go to do […] giving them tips from time to 
time ensures that they [the transaction] will be done (LP 4). 
While the socio-economic condition of the country may have been used as a justification 
for participating in bureaucratic corruption, it is highly doubtful that payments by the 
service users to Bureau officials are based on altruistic motives despite arguments by 
practitioners to the contrary.         
In summary, aside from the need to conclude a transaction speedily and to protect her 
reputation, the legal practitioner is being plagued by other factors which are also 
influential in shaping her behaviour and the nature of her interaction with the Bureau. 
Chief amongst these factors has been shown to be the pervading societal norms, values 
and the business concerns with the constant need to be ahead of the competition.                                            
5 . 6 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
Juxtaposing the position of the Lands Bureau and the described experiences of the 
professional service user, the detailed accounts presented in this chapter illustrates some 
of the loopholes in the Lands Bureau’s processes which has given rise to a string of 
pathologies. In a nutshell, the findings from this analysis can be divided into three: the 
individual, institutional and societal dimensions. The individual dimension focuses on the 
internal processes and basis of the decisions of the professional to participate in 
corruption based on personal considerations. While the institutional and societal 
dimension focus on the external processes which influence the professional to participate 
  
179 
 
in these informal transactions. Specifically, the individual dimension explores discourses 
surrounding how the legal practitioner constructs self-identity, calculation of the 
professional fees and competition in the legal profession. The institutional dimension 
describes how the internal processes of the Lands Bureau impact and shapes the nature 
of the corrupt transaction, while the societal dimension considers the effect of perceptions 
of the larger socio-cultural environment on the interaction between the service user and 
the institution. 
The next chapter will proceed with an in-depth discussion of these findings. 
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C H A P T E R  6   
D I S C U S S I O N  O F  F I N D I N G S  
‘But we struggle with such thick layers of bias and rationalisation, 
compartmentalisation and denial that our choices suffer immeasurably…’ (Sissela Bok, 
1982, p. 71) 
Chapter five presented the data and interpretive analysis that was carried out on the semi-
structured interviews with twenty-four service users and Lands Bureau documents. 
Analysing the descriptions and accounts of participants and how they construct their 
everyday interaction with a government department, it was found that the service users’ 
role in bureaucratic corruption is not as passive as it is portrayed in the literature. The 
choice to be active or passive is dependent on certain factors identified as the societal 
dimension, institutional dimension and the individual dimension. These three factors are 
described to be interdependent. However, in making a decision whether or not to 
participate in bureaucratic corruption, the legal practitioner is largely influenced by at 
least one of these factors, but most times, by all of the factors. Thus, it is important to 
understand how these factors contribute to shaping the interactional relationship between 
the professional and the Bureau. These findings can also be considered from two other 
perspectives: the first relates to the creation of informal interaction orders between the 
legal professional and the officials of the Bureau, and the second identifies the revelatory 
role of ‘talk’ in constructing service user participation in corrupt practices. Accordingly, 
this chapter discusses the wider significance of these findings by linking them to existing 
theories and highlighting their contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon. The 
rationale for focusing on this type of participants is as a result of a review of the literature 
in Chapter 3, which revealed that most studies on corruption focus on the bureaucrat thus 
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resulting in a dearth of empirical studies on the actual role of the service user in corrupt 
transactions (Sikka & Lehman, 2015). By refocusing the lens on this less understood 
participant, the findings from this research suggests that there is a general 
oversimplification of the issues surrounding bureaucratic corruption; this lack of clarity 
may account, in part, for the ineffectiveness of past bureaucratic reforms.           
Therefore, the findings will be discussed under two main headings, the first addresses the 
creation of informal interactional relationships between the service user and the Bureau 
officials, and the factors that affect and shape these interactions. This section discusses 
the multi-layered nature of the interaction based on the propositions of Goffman (1983) 
in his theory of the interaction order. This is followed by a discussion of how service 
users talk about their participation in bureaucratic corruption, in the second section. The 
discussion of talk evaluates amongst other things the use of euphemisms by participants, 
through the lens provided by the theory of ethical fading as proposed by Tenbrunsel & 
Messick (2004). It especially focuses on its use with regards to their description of the 
‘self’ and the individual’s actions and the impact of this on the behaviour of participants. 
In summary, based on empirical evidence, the two parts of this chapter investigates the 
link between talk and action and argues its importance for a better understanding of 
corruption.          
6 . 1 .  D i s c u s s i n g  C o r r u p t i o n :  I n t e r a c t i o n  
This section discusses what the service users described as some of the factors that 
influence their interaction with the Bureau. A focus on the nature of their interaction is 
pursued here because one of the key findings of this research is that for a professional to 
successfully conclude transactions in the Bureau they must have a ‘strategy’ in place to 
control and manage bureaucratic bottlenecks as they occur. Most times, the employment 
of a strategy leads to the creation of informal interactions between the service user and 
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the Bureau official. These informal relations are influenced by various elements which 
have been divided into three layers: the societal dimension, the institutional dimension 
and the individual dimension. The elements are considered the different parts that shape 
the interaction order between the professional service user and the bureaucracy and as 
such needs to be uncluttered.  
To understand the nature of this interactional relationship, Goffman’s concept of the 
interaction order (Goffman, 1983) is used to discuss the findings. Building on the works 
of early social theorists such as Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel (Layder, 2006), 
Goffman constructs the interaction order as a domain built around the face-to-face 
relation between individuals in the social arena. This form of relation is opposed to the 
more impersonal situations of interactions, such as those over the phone or via other forms 
of technology. In this thesis, participants are the legal practitioners who directly conduct 
face-to-face interactions with the Bureau on behalf of their clients or in a personal 
capacity. This domain as constructed by Goffman identifies the fact that although the 
social actors bring with them, into the interaction arena, assumptions which may be socio-
cultural or otherwise, the arena is still regarded as being separate from the larger society. 
However, it is also linked to it as both spheres are not completely independent of one 
another, rather they are somewhat dependent on each other in what he referred to as a 
form of ‘loose coupling’ (Goffman, 1983). In this sense, Goffman identified the different 
arenas and the fact that the interaction order is influenced by factors external to it. Being 
one of the later works before his death, the theory was not fully developed (Burns, 1992). 
Putting together most of his work, which had been dedicated to the study of face-to-face 
interactions (Ibid.), Manning (1992) identified four tools that could be used to describe 
features of the interaction order: 
a. Spatial units 
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b. Verbal and non-verbal communication 
c. System and ritual constraints  
d. Participation units (p. 167). 
In the interaction order, spatial units relate to the nature of the physical presence of 
participants involved in the interaction. A face-to-face interaction is deemed necessary 
due to the importance attached to the non-verbal aspect of the communication that takes 
place within the space (Goffman, 1983). Although Goffman’s discussion of the 
interaction order was focused on people in close proximity, Marsh’s (2011) application 
of the theory extended this space to encompass the virtual world in her study of children’s 
online interaction practices. Such extension is important in today’s world where mobile 
and internet communication has encroached on the territories of traditional face-to-face 
interactions. Some of the participants interviewed described the fact that a part of the 
interaction order takes place in a virtual space, e.g. negotiation of ‘Public Relations’ fees 
(PL 1), negotiation of ‘terms’ for concluding a transaction with an insider (LP 10), both 
of which were described as haven taken place over the telephone. Thus, while the physical 
co-presence of participants may be useful, it is not essential and an absence of it is shown 
not to disrupt the workings of the interaction order. 
The second feature which is the verbal and non-verbal communication is essential in 
social interactions especially when dealing with face-to-face encounters. In the context 
of an interaction order, particular note is taken of the tone of voice and other little things 
about a participant’s body language to make certain inferences as to expectations and 
actions (Goffman, 1983, p. 3). This is especially so in the case of bureaucratic corruption 
where the body language, action or inaction of an official could be interpreted as a request 
for a bribe or as a prelude to extortion (Lindgren, 1987). The expectation of reciprocity 
in activities such as gift giving and the payment of bribe (Mauss, 1966) puts additional 
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weight on inferences from non-verbal communications. Thus aside from verbal cues, 
ritualistic or normalised inferences form a part of the language of the interaction order 
(Manning, 1992, p. 168), with participants developing their own vocabulary unique to the 
informal interaction arena. According to Goffman, in this social space, interaction–
specific vocabulary and interpretations are a form of system and ritual constraints that 
prevent the misinterpretation of both verbal and non-verbal communications within the 
order (Goffman, 1974). In other words, the interaction is shaped by the normative 
exchanges of information and cues peculiar to that order.     
In his discussion of the participation unit Goffman identified different social contexts in 
which individuals interacted (Goffman, 1971) and also highlighted the fact that 
participants interacting within these units draw on different social strategies that fit 
particular contexts (Goffman, 1963). This is similar to the argument of discourse analysts, 
that individuals draw upon different discursive resources based on the function that a 
description is meant to achieve. For example, to deal with the formal institution (the 
Lands Bureau), legal practitioners described the use of strategies that led to the 
construction of a victim persona, which is different from the strategies that are used when 
describing their informal dealings with internal brokers. This illustrates the fact that 
‘function’ determines the strategy that is employed in interactional environments. The 
remainder of this section discusses the factors that this group of legal practitioners 
described as shaping the order of interaction between them as service users and the 
officials of the Lands Bureau.  
Three main factors are revealed to influence the decision of participants and these factors 
represent a form of loose coupling, linking the interaction order to environmental and 
other outside influences. I have described two of the factors as the societal and 
institutional dimensions (See Figure 12), which represents the macro and meso–level 
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influences based on geographical and socio-cultural considerations. The individual 
dimension is the third factor and this reflects some personal considerations such as self-
identity and professional reputation, amongst other things. These are the layers of 
influences that is described by participants as being responsible for the nature of their 
 
 
 
  
interaction with the Lands Bureau. The following subsection provides a more in-depth 
discussion of the different dimensions. 
6 . 1 . 1 .  T h e  S o c i e t a l  D i m e n s i o n  
This context refers to the overarching elements that serve as a link or foundation from 
which other elements develop, much like a macro-level element. It is regarded as 
overarching because the structural and socio-cultural environment determines the 
accepted norms, values and resulting behaviour prevalent in a society (Ferrell & 
Societal dimension
The socio-cultural 
environment
Individual 
dimension
Identity; Nature of 
intra-group relation; 
professional fees 
Institutional 
dimension
The nature of the 
Lands Bureau 
The interaction order 
Source: Developed by the researcher based on data from participants 
Figure 12: Factors Shaping the Interaction Order and Relationship 
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Gresham, 1985; Triandis, 1989). As such, the macro-structures influence and shape the 
institutions and the norms and values in a given society. The norms and values do not 
only influence the actions of the bureaucrats, they also determine the responses of the 
users of the service thus, shaping the nature of their interaction.  
A perception that is widespread amongst this group of service users is that participation 
in corrupt transactions is virtually inevitable. This view is reinforced by the fact that 
Nigeria is perceived both locally (Okoosi-Simbine, 2011; Okereke & 
Kurotamunobaraomi, 2016; Suleiman & Karim, 2015) and internationally (Transparency 
International, 2015; World Bank, 2015) as a country with a high rate of corruption both 
politically and otherwise. Participants’ descriptions suggest that the social and economic 
environment in Nigeria is largely responsible for their decision whether or not to get 
involved in bureaucratic corruption. The pervasiveness of this perception is captured by 
the way participants frequently used such expressions as ‘the Nigerian habit and culture 
of corruption’ (LP 7), ‘there is a level of corruption in nearly all works of life in Nigeria’ 
(LP 4) and ‘Nigeria still remains Nigeria and corruption is at the heart of it all’ (LP 6). 
These expressions suggest the inevitability of corruption in the society and therefore hint 
at the pervading norms and values that predispose the professional to approach and shape 
the interaction order in like manner, with or without any encouragement from the 
bureaucrat.   
Consequently, based on the propositions of Goffman (1983) as to the workings of the 
interaction order, the professional in this case brings to the interactional relationship with 
the Bureau a preconception of the socio-cultural environment as being one that is highly 
corrupt and thus neither expects nor demands anything more of the system (Grødeland et 
al., 1998). Instituting a corrupt transaction, a strategy that is generally employed in the 
larger society to get things done, becomes replicated in the interaction as well. Thus, 
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interacting with the institution is viewed as a generic interaction with other structures in 
the society, resulting in the creation of smaller interaction contexts and the co-opting of 
the verbal and non-verbal communicative practices from the dominant social contexts. 
Considering the huge role of perception in shaping reality (Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010; 
Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003), the perception the professional has of the larger 
society thus plays a considerable part in shaping the interactional relationship and the 
interaction order. As long as there is a high perception of corruption in the society there 
will exist the willingness to co-create corrupt practices through informal interaction 
orders. As such, it may not matter whether the services of the Bureau improves 
(Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004) if all stakeholders are not carried along in the reform 
process. This, therefore, makes understanding the role of the service user in corrupt 
transactions a necessity and their exclusion from the bureaucratic reform process 
impracticable and unproductive.  
6 . 1 . 2 .  T h e  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  D i m e n s i o n  
This section examines the impact which the institution – a meso-level element – has on 
the way the professional service user describes and constructs the interaction order. 
Specifically, it examines how the Lands Bureau’s processes are organised and how this 
has so far been experienced by the professionals in a way which informs the way they 
shape subsequent interactions. It is found that the meso-level factors which influence the 
interactional relationship includes perception of the government and its agencies, the 
nature of the bureaucracy and organisation of its processes, these factors are discussed 
next.  
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6 . 1 . 2 . 1 .  P e r c e p t i o n  o f  T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  i t s  
A g e n c i e s  
Analysis of the interview data revealed a high perception of corruption towards the Lands 
Bureau. This is in part based on its service delivery track record as experienced by service 
users in their day to day interaction with the institution. The negative perception of the 
Bureau still prevailed despite the various reform efforts that were geared towards 
improving service delivery in the past. These reforms resulted in the implementation of 
the (customer) service charter in July of 2012 (Lagos State Government, 2013). Despite 
the admission of some of the participants as to the gradual improvement in service, the 
overall perception that the people have of the government still drives the negative 
perception of the Bureau. It has been argued that a general lack of trust in the (political) 
government creates a negative perception (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003; Bowler & 
Karp, 2004; Kumlin & Esaiasson, 2012) and distrust for its other institutions. This feeling 
towards the institution is shown in participants’ description of the Bureau as being 
‘polluted’ (LP 9), a ‘mafia’ (LP 8) and ‘military’ (LP 15) amongst other things. The use 
of such words shows a level of suspicion towards the inner workings of the organisation, 
much like the perceived ethically grey areas, in which the mafia and the military operate. 
Based on these descriptions it could be inferred that the Bureau as an institution of the 
government is perceived in the same light as the government itself. In other words, 
because the government is generally perceived to be corrupt, a level of corruption 
becomes expected of its agencies and ministries (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003; 
Nunkoo, 2015; Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2014; Bowler & Karp, 2004).   
The expectation of corruption influences how the service users approach and shape the 
interactional relationship. Since the society and its government – which are macro-level 
elements – are corrupt, this perception is in turn transferred to its institutions and 
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bureaucrats and these are later inputted into the interaction order. The perceived 
popularity of such transactions in the societal contexts, accounts for the ease in which 
participants are able to set up the institutional interaction order. Thus, the adequacy of the 
existing communicative order in the society may serve to expedite the creation of 
interaction orders between service users and Bureaucrats. Aside from the lack of trust in 
government, the nature of the bureaucracy is another factor that contributes to shaping 
the interaction order and this is discussed next.    
6 . 1 . 2 . 2 .  T h e  L a n d s  B u r e a u – ( c r a c y ) :  P r o c e s s  
U n c e r t a i n t y  
Being a bureaucratic institution, the Lands Bureau is susceptible to the ‘flaws’ common 
to such modes of organising. The bureaucracy’s meticulous attention to details which is 
reflected in its hierarchical nature has been argued to result in red tape and delays (Melgar, 
Rossi, & Smith, 2010). As such the nature of a bureaucratic institution may not be 
favourable to someone whose main focus is speed in the conclusion of transactions 
(Gruening, 2001), more so if they want to be seen as a mercenary (LP 4) or miracle worker 
(LP 16) who gets the job done promptly. Aside from the inherent issues common to this 
form of organising, the Nigerian bureaucracy is an institution that is argued to be 
characterised by a poor salary and benefits structure (Olowu, 2010), lack of security of 
tenure (Omitola, 2012), lack of accountability (Olowu, 2001; Bardhan, 1997), and 
corruption (Aina, 1982; Okereke & Kurotamunobaraomi, 2015) amongst other things. 
According to some practitioners, the impact of these different factors is especially 
reflected in the work attitude of Bureau officials. In some circumstances, they may 
become hostile and unhelpful (LP 3), leading to a frosty relationship between the parties. 
To avoid the hostilities occasioned by the different factors, participants adopt a strategy 
of mutual benefit. Thus, the creation of the interaction order enables an exchange 
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relationship between the service user and the official, as it provides an opportunity for 
the payment of a bribe for extra services: 
Now what I usually do is to just [ehm] pay somebody there […] you know, 
sometimes a staff, just pay the person […] these people will just work 
around it since they’ve been paid to do the job […] (LP 10).        
Such a construction portrays the interaction more as a transactional relationship than the 
payment of a bribe, thus resulting in the normalisation of the act and the reinforcement 
of the ritual.  In addition, the absence of conclusion timeframes at some stages in the land 
registration process creates uncertainties which service users aim to eliminate. The fact 
that the prescribed official times for concluding transactions are not adhered to creates 
opportunities where the discretion of the Bureau official can be bought or negotiated away 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008; Neu et al, 2015). In this sense, the interaction order provides the 
context and social space for such negotiations. 
The next section introduces the ‘individual dimension’, the third part of the multi-layered 
factors that influences service users participation in bureaucratic corruption.    
6 . 1 . 3 .  T h e  I n d i v i d u a l  D i m e n s i o n  
This dimension explores micro-level factors that influence service users’ actions. It 
considers factors that are of a more personal nature to the legal practitioner, examples of 
which includes: self-identity construction, the practice of calculating professional fees, 
client / professional relations, maintaining and growing professional reputation, amongst 
others. A discussion of this dimension largely overlaps with the discussion of ‘talk’, thus, 
the next section will provide an in-depth discussion of these personal considerations.   
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6 . 2 .  D i s c u s s i n g  C o r r u p t i o n :  T a l k  
This section highlights the importance of ‘talk’ in corruption research. It provides insights 
into understanding the impact that participants’ description of the phenomenon, in certain 
ways, may have on their actions and behaviour.  
A point commonly discussed in the literature is that the covert and stigmatised nature of 
corrupt transactions deters participants from talking openly about the phenomenon and 
their involvement in it (Blundo et al., 2006; Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Ambraseys & 
Bilham, 2011; Luo, 2002). Contrary to this position, I found during the fieldwork that 
participants talked about corruption freely and openly as being a routinized part of their 
everyday interaction with the Lands Bureau. However, with regards to their participation 
in the act, there was the introduction of the concept of the other in their descriptions. The 
‘other’ in this context is the individual’s way of explaining the reasoning behind an action 
or behaviour and deflecting the blame for such behaviour unto others, in this case to the 
Bureau’s officials. Other–ing is not new to corruption research, neither is it peculiar to 
service users. The very word ‘corruption’ (Polzer, 2001), its definition and the context in 
which it has been promoted by international organisations and Western countries 
(Hindess, 2004) has been argued to typify a form of othering. In the sense that, the current 
understanding and attention is focused on its easily identifiable manifestations which is 
common in developing countries, while there is silence on the ‘complex forms’ 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 6) prevalent in western countries. A typical form of this othering is 
apparent in the popularity of the discourse that bureaucrats are the sole peddlers of 
corruption, which in a roundabout way hints at the innocence of other participants in a 
corrupt transaction. Thus, the individual can effectively transfer any possible guilt felt for 
participation in such covert transactions. This is where the use of discourse analysis 
becomes advantageous, as it connects the language dots used by participants in their 
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descriptions and claims about a phenomenon, thereby enabling a clearer picture of their 
part.  
From the discussion of the important role of language, both verbal and non-verbal, in 
social interactions in section 4.3 (p. 96), and its key role in revealing the intricacies of 
document processing in the Lands Bureau (See Chapter 5, p. 145), it becomes clearer that 
there is a need to pay closer attention to the way people talk about their social reality. 
Aside from anecdotal descriptions of corruption, importance is rarely placed on how 
people talk about corruption (Gupta, 2005; Lazar, 2005; Robertson, 2006) i.e. how people 
describe corrupt practices and their role in them, and even more unpopular is an 
examination of service user construction of the phenomenon. The assumption of an 
imaginary code of silence amongst participants in a corrupt transaction has led to the 
heavy reliance on quantitative data in majority of corruption studies (Blundo & Olivier 
de Sardan, 2006), and this methodology does not allow for an in-depth analysis and 
understanding of participants’ responses. By employing a qualitative approach, the 
findings from this research suggests that people do talk openly about corruption, and in 
this case it is done through the use of a language tool called ‘euphemism’. According to 
some social psychologists (Tenbrunsel & Messick 2004), euphemism is oftentimes an 
enabler of ‘self-deception’, and this can lead to certain actions and behaviour. For a better 
understanding of the effects of these concepts on how corruption is constructed, the 
following subsections provide a more detailed discussion.     
6 . 2 . 1 .  S e l f - D e c e p t i o n  a n d  C o r r u p t i o n  
In chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.1.2, p. 81) I introduced the concept of self-deception which 
I described as being based on the assumption that individuals are falsely believing that 
they are doing right or are being unaware of motivational biases that underscore their 
actions and judgments (Mele, 2001; Messick & Bazerman, 1996). It is exemplified in the 
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description of some participants who hold the belief that their informal transactions with 
Bureau officials constituted a form of ‘contract’, which ironically required a level of 
professionalism on the part of the official: 
Now what I usually do is to just [ehm] pay somebody there […] you know, 
sometimes a staff, just pay the person, “listen you follow up on all the steps 
for me while I am in the office” […], since they’ve been paid to do the job 
for you while you’re working for the bank (LP 10).  
From the extract above, it is clear that oftentimes service users forget that such 
transactions still constitute a bribe to an official, which on one hand may be expedient, 
but cannot be ethically justified. Mainly because, not only has the attention of the official 
been diverted to focusing on personal interest subordinating the interests of the institution 
(Rose-Ackerman, 2008), this diversion affects other service users who may now 
experience poor services because the official is preoccupied. A reasonable person may 
then ask ‘why did the official collect the bribe?’. Studies have shown that low 
bureaucratic salaries is one of the factors that influence bureaucrats to demand or collect 
informal payments (Van Veldhuizen, 2013; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001; Montinola 
& Jackman, 2002). In the case of the Nigerian bureaucracy, there has been a steady 
decline in salary packages for over two decades in comparison with some other African 
countries (Olowu, 2010, 2001). As such it can be argued that service users capitalise on 
the salary issues in the bureaucracy for their own benefit: 
[…] I don’t blame the civil servants […] I don’t think they are being paid 
extra for every inspection they go to do […] giving them tips from time to 
time ensures that they (the transaction) will be done (LP 4). 
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This emphasises Tenbrunsel & Messick’s (2004) argument that ethical fading does not 
suddenly happen. As shown by the word ‘fading’, the individual’s ethical composition is 
gradually weakened through a process of re-labelling the ethically questionable actions. 
In which case, the service user starts to act in a self-interested manner with no regards for 
ethical considerations, while holding the belief that they are being objective. Thus, 
rationalising the actions in terms of its economic or legal importance while rejecting the 
associated ethical burden. This leaves the service user safe in the comfort of the notion of 
either being an altruistic person (contributing to the officials’ financial improvement) or 
a business-savvy individual who knows how to utilise an opportunity. The next section 
proceeds with a discussion of a key enabler of self-deception, euphemism.   
6 . 2 . 2 .  E u p h e m i s m :  I t s  R o l e  i n  t h e  C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  
C o r r u p t  P r a c t i c e s  
How many legs would a sheep have if you call its tail a leg? Four, because 
calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.      
   Abraham Lincoln (quoted in Sorkin, 1994, p. 103) 
Euphemism can be described as the use of indirect or positive words or phrases, in place 
of a harsh or direct word with the aim of masking something negative or unpleasant. In 
other words, euphemisms are employed to avoid a distasteful reality (Lutz, 1989) or 
discuss subjects culturally regarded as taboo or stigmas (Slovenko, 2005) an example of 
which is involvement in corrupt practices. The importance of language is once again 
emphasised, and by focusing on its constructive ability in this study, I am able to analyse 
the discursive role of service users in corrupt transactions.  
The use of euphemisms, is not necessarily a bad thing. They are employed in everyday 
discussions and have become a staple in a host of professions. Its everyday presence is 
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seen in the description of the death of a loved one as ‘passing-away’, the elderly as 
‘seniors’ and the crippled as ‘disabled’. In the professional sense, medical doctors are 
regarded as being adept at employing euphemistic words and phrases in order to manage 
the expectations and negative reactions of patients to diagnosis and in some cases prevent 
the stigmatisation of the individual (Ogden & Parkes, 2013; Tayler & Ogden, 2005; 
Rababah, 2014). Other common examples of professional usage include ‘collateral 
damage’ to describe the death of civilians by the military, ‘creative accounting’ by 
accountants to describe accounting practices which are not completely above board and 
‘rightsizing’ by companies who sack their employees in most cases for financial 
considerations.  
A consequence of the use of euphemisms is that through frequent usage the euphemistic 
words can over time cause a dissociation to the extent that an offensive or unpleasant act 
loses its negative connotation. Thus, causing individuals participating in certain negative 
actions to disconnect with the moral implication of their actions (Lucas & Fyke, 2014). 
In other words, language can be employed in a certain manner to act as a shield behind 
which individuals can hide from the morality of their actions (MacKenzie, 2000). Judging 
by the extensive use of euphemisms by participants in this study, it may be the shield by 
which service users have come to insulate themselves, to prevent them from considering 
their role in corrupt transactions and the motivations behind such participation. To shed 
more light on its usage, the following sub-sections discuss some euphemistic clusters that 
arose out of the analysis of participants talk, with regards to how they view themselves, 
their actions and their interaction with the Lands Bureau.       
6 . 2 . 2 . 1 .  E u p h e m i s m s :  R e f e r e n c e  t o  S e l f - I d e n t i t y  
Identities are constructed by social actors for different purposes, chief of this is based on 
how they want to be perceived by others (Goffman, 1959). This is the key thesis that runs 
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through most of Goffman’s work in his discussion of the intricacies of face-to-face 
interaction. In On Face-Work (1967), Goffman explained a ‘line’ (p. 5) as verbal or non-
verbal communication by a social actor, which reflects particularly an evaluation of the 
self, this self–portrayal is discussed under this heading. 
A key finding from the analysis of participants’ talk, is the conflicting portrayal of the 
self and the consequent ‘othering’ of acts deemed immoral or unethical. Various accounts 
from participants revealed a distinction between the self as a legal practitioner and the 
self as a service user. One version paints a picture of the self as a legal practitioner being 
subject to the needs and desires of the client, and as such is bound to do everything in 
their power to fulfil these needs. While the self as an ordinary service user is constructed 
as being subject to the workings of the bureaucratic system, and as such has no choice 
but to develop strategies to cope with the perceived shortcomings of the institution. Thus 
on one hand they variously refer to themselves as a ‘mercenary’, ‘miracle worker’ and an 
‘aggressor’, on the other hand they refer to themselves as being ‘helpless’ and ‘under 
pressure’.  
On the face of it these self-constructs may seem contradictory but in fact, they are 
different ways of constructing the self, based on the individual function that the narratives 
are meant to serve (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Both of these self-constructs serve the 
purpose of justifying the decisions made while occupying the different roles i.e. as a 
professional to the client and as a public service user. To discourse analysts these sorts of 
‘contradictions’ are not uncommon when individuals are describing or making claims 
about a phenomenon (Ibid, p. 38), hence the argument that there are versions or variation 
of accounts to be studied with regards to any one phenomenon (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). 
However, according to Roberts’s (2015) argument of the relationship between corruption 
and subjection, these self-constructs have the power to normalise and shape the behaviour 
  
197 
 
of individuals. By, describing the self as ‘helpless’ and subject to the omnipresence of the 
corrupt system, the service user effectively positions himself as a victim (Dracklé, 2005) 
that is left with no other choice but the unethical decision which has been made, thereby, 
displacing the responsibilities for any unethical action. This form of othering and 
displacement of guilt is reflective of the stance of the majority of corruption literature in 
their vilification of the bureaucrat (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 2008; Gray & Kaufmann, 
1998; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Cockcroft et al., 2008; De Zwart, 1994) and the non-
acknowledgement of the contributory role of the individual service user in the 
perpetuation of corruption. Thus, Bandura (1999) described this type of transference as a 
form of moral disengagement. 
Much like the concept of ethical fading, moral disengagement can also be seen as a by-
product of self-deception. This is because it causes an individual to restructure their 
understanding of responsibility for their actions and downplay the consequences of these 
actions to others (Moore, 2008). These two concepts may be argued to occupy both ends 
of the self-deception spectrum – with ethical fading representing the beginning of the 
spectrum while moral disengagement its end. In a construction of the self, the service 
 
 
Source: Developed by the researcher based on the concepts of ethical fading (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004) and moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999).  
  
User’s identity of being a victim may be found at the beginning of the spectrum (see 
Figure 13) where the individual justifies self-interested actions and behaviour with the 
explanation of the omnipresence of the bureaucratic system. Thus, referring to themselves 
Ethical fading
Moral 
disengagement
Figure 13: Progressive nature of self-deception 
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as being helpless and under pressure to deliver results to the clients. At the stage of 
describing the self as a mercenary, it may be argued that the individual is well past the 
ethical fading stage which will likely result in the service user reconstituting his or her 
understanding of ethics and morality, thus seeing unethical decisions as been 
unavoidable, and in certain cases as contractual relations.  
Specifically, euphemisms such as ‘mercenary’, ‘miracle worker’ and ‘aggressor’, 
amongst others could be interpreted as reflecting the moral disengagement part of the 
spectrum. This is mainly because the usage of the word mercenary, for example, connotes 
a person who is unencumbered by such considerations as morals or ethics but rather is 
loyal to the money (Lynch & Walsh, 2000). The nature of these self-descriptive terms as 
used by participants shows that these terms can be used to serve one important purpose – 
numb ethical considerations. Usage of such euphemisms by legal practitioners hints at 
the level of their willingness to participate in bureaucratic corruption, and this willingness 
to participate indicates an absence of force from the official. However, this lack of 
compulsion to participate is not reflected in the majority of literature on corruption.      
The next section discusses another cluster of euphemism, those that relate to service 
users’ actions while interacting with the Lands Bureau.  
6 . 2 . 2 . 2 .  E u p h e m i s m s :  R e f e r e n c e  t o  A c t i o n  
In describing their actions, participants generally shied away from using direct statements 
about their involvement in corrupt transactions with officials. Instead, they relied heavily 
on the use of euphemisms, especially with regards to making informal payments. They 
variously referred to the acts of bribing Bureau officials as, ‘motivating’, ‘mobilising’, 
‘facilitating’, ‘Public Relations’ (PR) or ‘see’ amongst others (see Table 5 for usage), 
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while also suggesting that these acts are necessary for fostering a good working 
relationship with the officials and a speedy conclusion of transactions in the Bureau. 
It is argued that the use of these sorts of euphemisms by participants can be seen as 
performing the act of shielding the individual from the morality of their actions. In other 
words, these sorts of words and accompanying explanations may be serving a 
rationalising purpose aimed to validate the actions to which it refers in the eyes of the 
individual (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). The use of such words as motivating, mobilising 
and facilitating may not be serving the sole purpose of rationalising. With the success of 
each act it refers to, it serves as a positive affirmation of good or ‘proactive’ behaviour 
and the repetition of this form of behaviour slowly leads to what can be described as 
ethical numbing (Bandura, 1999). 
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 Euphemism Excerpts Translation 
‘See(n)’  “…my file is going to so and so, I have to go and wait for the file to be there go and […] go and see the man 
so they can find my file…” (LP 3) 
Bribe 
‘Mobilise’ “…you’ll find that wherever you dropped your file you will find it there because you didn’t mobilise them, so 
to speak…” (LP 2) 
Bribe 
Public Relations (PR) “…but you know that they are expecting PR from you…” (PL 1) Bribe 
‘Grease palm’ “…in the process you can grease his palm and once you grease his palm amongst all the files he will bring out 
your own and attend to it…” (LP 8) 
Bribe 
‘Nigerian way’ “…and if you want to do it fast, do it the Nigerian way” (LP 3) Bribe 
‘Facilitate’ “You facilitate the thing [file], to put it bluntly, its corruption” (LP 15) Bribe 
‘Follow up properly’ “…the Surveyor General’s office may take two weeks or longer if you don’t follow up properly, you know 
what I mean [laughs]…” (LP 5) 
Bribe 
‘Something’ “…but she kept on insisting that ‘let’s go and see somebody and give them something’, but I told her no it’s 
not so, answer the query then it [the file] moves from there…” (PL 2) 
Bribe 
‘Motivate’  “…like that guy who was helping us to monitor the file who I initially approached, unless we motivate him he 
will not do anything…” (LP 14) 
Bribe 
Table 5: Examples of Euphemisms for Bribery as Used by Participants 
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‘Anything’ “…you won’t spend anything less than 6months if you don’t pay anybody anything…” (PL 2) Bribe 
‘Rub their hands’ “And at times, you just have to rub their hands to get the work done” (LP 13) Bribe 
‘Tips’ “…giving them tips from time to time ensures that they [the transaction] will be done” (LP 4) Bribe 
 
Source: Extracted from interview transcript data
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This form of ethical numbing is as a result of such repetitions that lead to the routinization 
of certain actions, and it has been referred to as the ‘slippery slope’ of decision making, 
which is also one of the enablers of self-deception (Tenbrunsel & Messick 2004). As 
more weight becomes attached to the positive results from such ethically questionable 
practices, it becomes sharper while other considerations of ethics fade into the 
background, an example is alluded to by a participant: 
[…] Even we lawyers’ we are even used to handing it over to somebody 
because that stereotype something is there that this thing will not move 
except we give it to somebody you understand […] (LP 11). 
Thus, causing a continuous slide in judgment and a positive affirmation of the unethical 
practice of ‘the end justifies the means’.  
So far, I have focused on the actions that the service users do in the Bureau, but not on 
the reasons why they go about involving themselves in those activities. The question then 
is, why do the professional service users go around motivating and facilitating officials? 
Is it because they just want to be done with a job as soon as possible? Or there are other 
factors that are taken into consideration in the decision to informally engage the services 
of these officials. The following sections discuss two examples described by participants 
as motivations for mobilising and facilitating.  
a .  T h e  A m o u n t  o f  t h e  P r o f e s s i o n a l  F e e s   
Specifically, this relates to the total amount that a client agrees to pay as legal fees. The 
narrative of participants revealed that in most circumstances this is crucial in determining 
whether or not the professional will participate in bureaucratic corruption. Previous 
literature on corruption suggests that bribing constitutes a form of nefarious payment 
which drives up transaction costs (Cockcroft et al, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2008, 2010; 
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Dalton, 2006). However, the findings from this study suggests that the cost of bribing is 
not necessarily separate from the actual transaction cost and as such may not constitute 
additional payment, rather, it is built into the professional fees and therefore 
indistinguishable from the regular transaction cost.  
According to the data a key reason for this lack of distinction is that there are no set 
standards prescribing the professional fees to be charged for these kinds of transactions, 
thus, giving the professionals the discretion to charge any amount they deem fit. Some 
corruption authors have argued that to a large extent corruption can be traced to the 
amount of discretion the individual bureaucrat or public office holder wields (Rose-
Ackerman, 2008, 2010; Neu et al., 2015; Hubert, 2010; Dalton, 2006). This case shows 
that the exercise of discretion is not the exclusive preserve of the officials, it also impacts 
on the decisions of this group of service users. In discussing the subject of opportunism 
Hawkins et al. (2011) argued that in general, people are inclined to exploit their 
discretion, and this is confirmed by participants’ descriptions (see PL 1’s statement 
below) that for the right price professionals may be inclined to pull out all the stops to get 
the job done as quickly as possible, thereby greasing the bureaucratic wheel to spin in his 
or her favour. 
[…] if you have a brief of N50 million and the professional fee is 15% and 
another brief of N50 million and the professional fee is 5%; the one of 
15%, the way you’re going to handle it will be different from the one of 
5% because of the consideration involved […] So it depends on the fee 
that you’re getting on that particular job (PL 1).  
Therefore, it is argued that legal practitioners’ behaviour and nature of their interaction 
with the Lands Bureau is, to an extent, influenced by the size of their professional fees. 
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As this gives them the discretion to choose whether to be an active participant, passive 
participant or non-participant in bureaucratic corruption.    
In other accounts, the need to facilitate is based on the requirements or needs of the client, 
as the professional is oftentimes given a specific period of time to conclude a transaction 
at the Bureau. Put differently, the need to retain the business of high-paying clients, whose 
patronage is tied to the financial viability of the professional, becomes the sole focus of 
the practitioner (Oko, 2007, 1994). Based on the extent of this power wielded by clients, 
on the finances of the legal practitioner, the professional is motivated to create and 
maintain a bond of loyalty as a way to sustain the continuous patronage of such clients 
(Kirkland, 2011; Hillman, 2000; Spaulding, 2003). As such, when participants were 
asked what if the amount paid by the client as professional fees is small, what will happen 
to the transaction? The most popular response was that they would likely not engage in 
any form of mobilising, and would rather let the transaction run its normal course. This 
finding contradicts the popular assumption that the service user is always a victim of 
corrupt bureaucrats (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) and that s/he is usually forced to participate 
in corrupt transactions. It shows that under certain circumstances the individual service 
user assumes the role of an active co-producer of bureaucratic corruption based on self-
interested considerations (Sikka & Lehman, 2015).  
b .  P e r c e i v e d  C o m p e t i t i o n  
Linked to financial consideration is the issue of competition, another factor which may 
lead the professional service user down the ‘slippery slope of decision making’. Findings 
from the data showed that certain behaviours of the professional can be traced to the 
pressure which comes from real or perceived competition amongst legal practitioners. 
This perception is underscored by the argument that the available number of lawyers is 
higher than the demand for their services (Anassi, 2004; Regan, 2004), thus turning the 
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legal services market into a clients’ market. Metaphorically, the current legal services 
climate may be likened to a buffet for clients, as they are described as being able to engage 
and drop legal practitioners on a whim (Kirkland, 2011; Spaulding, 2003). This 
perception may not be unfounded, considering that between August 2014 and April 2015 
over 7000 students of the Nigerian Law School passed the bar exams and were qualified 
to be legal practitioners (The Nigerian Law School, 2015). This creates a situation 
whereby retaining the briefs of well-paying clients becomes the paramount consideration 
of the professional. Based on the perceived benefits of bribing, e.g. speeds up 
transactions, the professional who is not so inclined may consider the positive benefits of 
participating in these sorts of transactions in order to prevent the future loss of his or her 
clients to other lawyers who actively engage in such activities.  
This brings to the fore accusations commonly levied against lawyers that legal practice 
should be regarded more as a business and less as a profession (Barnhizer, 2004), since 
like businesses, lawyers are perceived as being driven by profit rather than the will to do 
service for the public good (Bowie, 1988; Heinz et al., 2005). This perception may not 
be far from what is actually obtainable, as some descriptions by participants were 
especially focused on the need to keep the high paying client and increase their reputation. 
One participant went as far as describing the type of deals some practitioners get into in 
order to further this agenda: 
Some lawyers go there to strike a deal saying ‘please I want to impress 
my clients, I want to make sure that these papers are out as fast as possible 
[…] Perhaps the clients want to use the title documents to now obtain a 
facility from the bank and because it’s not registered they want to register 
it sharp sharp (quickly) in order to do that […] They say I will pay you 
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X,Y,Z amount for you to make sure that this thing comes out as fast as 
possible’ (LP 7). 
As such, a common adoption of the ‘law as a business’ model may have contributed to 
the gradual fading of ethical awareness amongst practitioners (Kirkland, 2005), leading 
to the different levels of ethical fading expressed in participants’ descriptions.    
The form of competition discussed in this section raises a question of how it may impact 
on the attitude and behaviour of other group members. The next sub-section will discuss 
the nature of these intra-group relations and its effect on other group members.  
c .  N a t u r e  o f  I n t r a - G r o u p  R e l a t i o n s  
Unlike the study of intergroup relations and its dynamics, this is an area that has so far 
evaded the scrutiny of social identity and social psychology theorists (Yuki, 2003). To 
understand this nature of intra-group relations the theory of group dynamics, particularly, 
the concept of interdependence would be drawn upon. The development of this concept 
from Gestalt psychology can be traced to Kurt Lewin (1948, 1951; Johnson & Johnson, 
2009) in his study of the influences on social behaviour and group formation and 
functioning. Interdependence in this sense is described as a condition whereby the actions 
and experiences of a member of the group impacts on the behaviour and actions of others 
within the group (Brown, 1988). Amongst other things, Lewin argues that the key role of 
interdependence in group functioning and the behaviour of members of a group is vital 
to understanding the motivations of its members. Of relevance to this research is his goal-
based interdependence concept which means that members of the group share a task or 
goal related bond. This form of interdependence can either be positive or negative 
(Johnson & Johnson, 2009). It is positive where the bond fosters a cooperative behaviour 
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amongst group members and negative where it fosters a form of competition, which 
means ‘one person’s success is another’s failure’ (Brown, 1988).         
The accounts described by this group of legal practitioners suggests the symptoms of a 
group that is negatively interdependent. In other words, the positive experiences of some 
legal practitioners use of the tools of ‘facilitating’ and ‘mobilising’ bureaucratic officers 
may be negatively influencing the actions of other practitioners to tow the same line in 
order to prevent the loss of their clients to other group members. This conduct fosters 
unhealthy competition, otherwise referred to as negative-interdependence. In which case, 
the professional is more inclined to fall into the habit of circumventing the bureaucratic 
system for self-interested reasons which is masked by self-deception in its different 
manifestations.                   
6 . 3 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
This chapter presented a twofold discussion of the findings – the first relates to the factors 
that enable and shape the creation of an interaction order between the legal practitioner 
and the official, while the second examined some personal considerations that influence 
the behaviour and actions of the practitioner within the formal and informal interactional 
settings. Although the interaction order provides a space for conducting these informal 
transactions, the intriguing part is how different elements of the interaction is discursively 
constructed by participants. 
Using some elements from Tenbrunsel & Messick’s ethical fading framework (2004), the 
second part of the chapter discussed the impact of self-deception on the service user. I 
was able to show that participants in corrupt transactions can talk about their involvement 
but through the use of a language tool like euphemism. This is contrary to the popular 
view, amongst corruption researchers, that these kinds of participants are unwilling to 
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talk about their involvement (Blundo et al., 2006). It shows the analytical importance of 
considering language usage in corruption studies, as not only does it enable a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon, it also provides the opportunity to view corruption 
from another perspective.        
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C H A P T E R  7   
C O N C L U S I O N   
The preceding chapter provided a detailed discussion of the findings from the data 
analysis that was earlier presented (See Chapter 5).  
This study has set out to investigate the role of service users in bureaucratic corruption 
through a focus on how they ‘talk’ about their interaction with the public bureaucracy. In 
so doing, it has identified the part that they play in the reproduction of corruption, the 
motivations for playing such a part and the impact that this has on the performance of the 
public bureaucracy and reform efforts geared towards its improvement. There is sparse 
theoretical literature on this subject especially in the African context, despite the fact that 
most of her countries are consistently ranked as highly corrupt by international surveys. 
As such, the study sought to examine the subject of corruption through a different lens 
by seeking answers to the question, ‘are service users’ merely the ‘unfortunate’ 
victims of bureaucratic corruption or co-producers of corruption?’  
The remainder of this concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the research by first 
providing an answer to the research question followed by a discussion of the conceptual 
impact and policy implication of the study in the second section. The third section outlines 
the limitations of the study, while the concluding section provides recommendations for 
future research.   
7 . 1 .  S e r v i c e  U s e r s :  V i c t i m s  o r  C o – p r o d u c e r s ?  
Language use amongst this group of professional service users suggests that offering 
bribes to bureaucrats was more the norm than the exception and this is reflected in their 
extensive use of euphemisms to describe the action. In this sense, they can be said to 
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inhabit the role of active co-producers of bureaucratic corruption. However, this finding 
by no means undermine the general literary construction of service users as victims of 
bureaucratic corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Rather most of the participants 
construct themselves as inhabiting these experiential identities simultaneously. That is, 
on one hand they are the prey of the bureaucratic system while on the other they 
themselves are the predators seeking to exploit the situation for their own benefit. This 
illustrates the protean nature of corrupt transactions which participants, public officials 
and service users alike, enter into with the aim of obtaining some form of reward.   
The application of a discursive constructionist lens was particularly helpful in this study 
due to its ability to explain variations in constructed accounts (Potter, 1996; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987) and their underlying functions.  Applying the ethical fading framework 
(Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) to the constructed accounts revealed that participation in 
bureaucratic corruption has more to do with personal and business considerations of 
reputation and competing for clients. The fact that the bribe sum is already built into the 
professional fees paid to the practitioner, puts the professional under pressure to deliver 
to the paying client. The nature of the pressure is what determines whether or not the 
practitioner would get involved in corrupt transactions. Thus, these findings suggests that 
the role of the service user in bureaucratic corruption is more than that of an ordinary 
victim or even a passive co–producer.  
7 . 2 .  R e s e a r c h  I m p a c t  a n d  I m p l i c a t i o n s  
This section discusses the contributions of the study to corruption research area. It 
examines the conceptual impact of findings to the better understanding of corruption, 
future study of the phenomenon and the implications for policy developers, public sector 
reforms and professional bodies.    
  
211 
 
7 . 2 . 1 .  R e s e a r c h  F i n d i n g s  
A four–part contribution of this small but growing body of research on service user 
corruption is presented in this section. The first two parts involves a theoretical 
understanding while the remaining two address the analytical impact.  
a.) The study highlights the fact that in societies with systemic corruption, the line 
between victim and active co-producer is significantly blurred based on the 
ideology of ‘this is how we do things here’. Thus the perspective that corruption 
is solely an ‘office holder’ related problem becomes untenable. Many studies of 
corruption base their understanding of the concept on the World Bank (1997) and 
Asian Development Bank (1998) definitions of corruption. Findings from this 
study reveal that such conceptualisation of corruption is too restrictive to 
encompass the roles of all the participants to a corrupt transaction. Which has so 
far resulted in a lopsided understanding of the phenomenon. The wider lens 
adopted in this study enabled a better understanding of legal practitioners’ role in 
corrupt transactions and evidence from chapter five and chapter six highlight the 
active role of these non-office holders in bureaucratic corruption. Thus, this 
research echoes the argument of other authors (Gupta, 2005; Sikka & Lehman, 
2015; Sikka, 2008; Jancsics, 2013; Miller, Grødeland & Koshechkina, 2001; 
Balabanova & Mackee, 2002) that the simplistic and narrow understanding of 
public sector corruption is becoming redundant in addressing the related 
problems. Thus, making a case for the application of a wider lens and more 
unorthodox perspectives in future consideration of the subject. 
b.) A review of the literature revealed that there is no clear cut difference between 
the principles of ‘ethical fading’ and ‘moral disengagement’, probably because 
both are considered by-products of self-deception. As shown in Figure 13 (p. 194), 
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these concepts occupy two ends of a continuum, the beginning of which is ethical 
fading and the end is moral disengagement. Thus, these two concepts cannot be 
used interchangeably or as synonyms as there is a huge difference between the 
ethical grounding of persons in the two categories.   
c.) Very little research has employed a discursive approach to the study of corruption 
(Gupta, 2005). This study provides empirical evidence that a discursive 
perspective can successfully be employed in the study of corruption as it enables 
a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. The ability of the approach to 
highlight inherent contradictions in talk was particularly useful because it 
revealed the differences between how participants construct themselves as victims 
while describing their interaction with the bureaucracy which says otherwise.  
This made it a very useful tool in revealing the contradictions and the underlying 
motivations of legal practitioners who participate in corrupt transactions.  
d.) Contrary to the belief that participants in corrupt transactions shy away from 
talking about their involvement due to its illegal nature (Blundo et al., 2006), this 
research provides evidence that participants can talk freely about their 
participation by employing euphemistic tools. The extensive use of euphemisms 
by participants revealed that their participation ran deeper than those of a passive 
participant. 
e.) Despite arguments amongst corruption researchers that bribes are always 
demanded by officials, my findings show otherwise. In most of the cases, the legal 
practitioner actively seeks out who to bribe for a plethora of reasons chief amongst 
which is the client demands a quick job as they have paid a considerable sum to 
get it. 
In general, this study has examined the concept of corruption through a lens that could 
make a difference in the way the subject is understood. By focusing on legal practitioners 
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in Nigeria the study highlights some issues which might merit further examination in 
legal practice. 
7 . 2 . 2 .  R e s e a r c h  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  &  I m p l i c a t i o n s  
Since the time of Nigeria’s independence till date (1960–2016), the country has 
implemented about ten civil service reforms (See Table 1, p. 38) with the objective of 
improving the performance of public bureaucracies and reducing corruption. However, 
the institution is still plagued by inefficiency and corruption. Past reform policies have 
focused solely on the internal workings of the bureaucracy with the drive to reduce its 
size, increase officials’ salary and introduce regular training but these efforts seem to be 
yielding little to no results (Omar, 2012; Maikudi, 2012). As such, the following are the 
contributions and implications of the findings of this research endeavour: 
e. Public sector corruption has been constructed as always proceeding from an 
‘official’ and this is reflected in the definition of the phenomenon (Nye, 1967; 
Anand et al., 2004). However, findings from this research shows that 
transactions are oftentimes instituted by the legal practitioners. Thus, this 
research shows that the current narrow definition of corruption which focuses 
on officials as the sole culprits in corrupt transactions has given a license to non-
official participants to participate in corruption without the attendant 
responsibilities for their actions. Therefore, future policies geared at reducing 
corruption in the Lands Bureau need to consider the practices of legal 
practitioners who are the key users of the services of the institution. 
f. As by-products of self-deception, ‘ethical fading’ and ‘moral disengagement’ 
have been used interchangeably due to similar features (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004). However, this study shows that there is a progression from one to the 
other and this is reflected in the spectrum of ethical reasoning described by legal 
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practitioners. As such researchers using mainly quantitative methods, such as 
CPIs’, would be unable to determine from what ethical grounding a respondent 
is coming from and this has an impact on the corruption outlook of the 
individual.  
g. Most research on corruption adopt a quantitative methods approach on the 
ground that corruption being a covert and illegal affair is difficult to study 
directly (Bader et al., 2013), and participants would be unwilling to talk about 
their involvement.  Contrary to this view, participants were willing to talk about 
their participation in bureaucratic corruption, but mainly through the use of 
language tools like ‘euphemism’. Therefore, by focusing on language in use 
researchers can study corruption, and other sensitive topics, directly instead of 
relying on secondary tools such as CPIs. 
h. In research on bribery there is an inordinate focus on the economic perspective 
to the exclusion of others. Researchers of this phenomenon generally argue that 
public officials almost always request for bribes for financial gains (Rose-
Ackerman, 2010, Neild, 2002). Unfortunately, the general lack of research on 
service user corruption is also reflected in the lack of information on the 
underlying reasons why service users pay bribes. My research shows that 
service users initiate a bribery transaction for different reasons from the ‘that’s 
the way we do things’ factor, to the amount of professional fees paid by the 
client which is capable of inducing the practitioner to seek out who to bribe. By 
taking a closer look at motivations for the payment of bribes, other than its 
economic advantage to the official, research in corruption will be gaining more 
depth and a better understanding of the phenomenon.        
Importantly, this research shows that a reform can be derailed from a lack of 
understanding of the stakeholders and their role in the phenomenon. As such, findings 
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from this study suggests the need for a reform policy that takes into consideration the 
multifaceted role of service users and their impact on bureaucratic corruption.              
In line with academic traditions, it is important to state the limits of this research and this 
will be discussed in the next section. 
7 . 3 .  R e f l e c t i n g  o n  R e s e a r c h  L i m i t a t i o n s  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
A key limitation of this research is based on the methodological framework it has adopted. 
Due to the variability in sample sizes of qualitative studies, it is argued to lack the ability 
to produce generalizable findings (Bryman, 2016). The intention of this research was not 
to produce a mathematical generalisation reflecting all service user behaviour but rather 
to provide an analytical view (Yin, 2009) in understanding the role of professional service 
users in corruption. This form of generalisation will necessarily be context specific 
(Halkier, 2011) unlike its quantitative counterpart. But on a larger scale, it provides 
insight into the social processes under consideration (Yin, 2016) and a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
Based on the findings and limitations discussed, similar studies in the area of service user 
corruption may need to consider a larger and more varied sample group. More inclusive 
criteria would consider the recruitment of individual and professional users of the services 
of the public bureaucracy as opposed to the restricted focus of this study. This expansion 
will yield a wealth of discursive resources while providing further insight into the general 
nature of service user participation in corruption. It will also strengthen the analytical 
applicability of the findings.  
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This study found the use of corruption euphemisms to be quite extensive amongst 
participants in shielding them from the reality of what they actually do. Further research 
into the effect and role of euphemisms on participation in corrupt practices would be 
interesting and impactful. Also, euphemisms could be intentionally introduced by a 
researcher as a language tool in the data gathering process on sensitive topics.  
Finally, the ethical fading framework by Tenbrunsel & Messick (2004) has mostly been 
applied in organisational and professional contexts, it might be enlightening if similar 
studies on corruption extend its application beyond this scope.    
7 . 4 .  C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y  
In spite of the rapid growth in corruption research, which has seen it taking centre stage 
in policy development by international institutions and governments in developing 
countries, there seems to be no respite from corrupt practices. Developing countries that 
were deemed corrupt a decade ago are still deemed corrupt today, with a topping of 
corrupt practices emanating from the developed world.  
The ontological basis of policies and general research in this area is on the understanding 
that public sector corruption is as a result of the greed of public officials, while other 
participants are victims. Contrary to this position, findings from this study reveal that 
aside from officials, service users are also active participants in bureaucratic corruption 
as their participation is based on the benefits they get in return. As such they have the 
ability to derail reform efforts in the absence of a proper understanding of their role.  
This study provides empirical evidence as to the possible role of service users in 
bureaucratic corruption in the hope for a gradual shift from the single lens focus to a 
multi-lens view in research and policies on corruption.     
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A p p e n d i x  A :  P a r t i c i p a n t  I n f o r m a t i o n  S h e e t  
Public Administration in Developing Countries: An Examination of Service User 
Construction of Bureaucratic Corruption in the Lands Bureau of Lagos State, 
Nigeria. 
You are invited to take part in a study which is being conducted as part of a Doctoral 
Research degree at The University of York by Ms Salome U. Osia and supervised by Dr 
Lynne Baxter and Professor Stephen Linstead. Your participation will be appreciated as 
it will greatly enhance the findings of this study.  
Accordingly, before you decide whether or not to take part in this study it is important 
you have a fair idea of what the research is all about. Kindly take the time to read the 
following information carefully and please do ask if there is anything that is not clear or 
if you would like more information.  
Purpose of this Research  
Previous reforms in the civil service which have focused on improving service delivery 
and eradicating bureaucratic corruption have always looked at the problem from the 
perspective of the bureaucrat. In other words, most reform efforts (which have been 
largely unsuccessful) have based reforms on this singular bureaucratic perspective.     
Consequently, the aim of this research is to proffer another perspective – that of the 
service user – which should also be considered in formulating a more effective reform 
program.   
Your Involvement  
In your professional capacity as a legal practitioner you have been identified as a potential 
participant in this study due to your extensive interaction with the different departments 
in the Lands Bureau. This puts you in the position to have an in-depth understanding of 
the nature of service delivery in this institution.    
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed in a place that is 
convenient for you. The interview will take approximately one hour, and with your 
permission, will be audio-taped. Before we start the interview, you will be given an 
opportunity to ask questions and I will ask you to sign a written consent form confirming 
that you are happy to take part in the study.   
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the research 
at any time prior to the completion of the Doctoral program without giving a reason and 
without any detriment to yourself or your organisation.  
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The Information You Provide  
Interview tapes will be transcribed. All tapes and transcriptions will be locked in a safe 
place. All information collected during the course of the study will only be viewed by the 
researcher and her supervisors and will remain strictly confidential. The confidential 
handling, processing, storage and disposal of data will be in accordance with Data 
Protection Guidelines.  
At the end of the study, this information will be used to write up a Doctoral thesis and 
conference presentations. The names of the people, who have taken part in the research 
or any other information that could identify them, will not appear in the thesis or in any 
other written forms when the study is completed.  
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the final report, if they indicate 
so. When the study is completed, all information will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in 
a storeroom of the York Management School, University of York and will be destroyed 
at the successful conclusion of the Doctoral project.  
What is the Next Step?  
If you are willing to participate in the study, a suitable date, time and place for the 
conduction of the interview will be arranged after all your questions have been 
sufficiently answered by the researcher. On the day of the interview and before its 
commencement, a consent form will be signed. The consent form will not be used to 
identify you. It will be filed separately from all the other information. However, you may 
keep this sheet for reference.  
Further Information  
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please feel free to contact the main 
researcher Ms Salome U. Osia on +44 (0) 074 153 164 34 or +234 (0) 708 025 0665 or 
email suo500@york.ac.uk.       
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A p p e n d i x  B :  P a r t i c i p a n t  C o n s e n t  F o r m  
THE YORK MANAGEMENT 
SCHOOL  
FREBOYS LANE, HESLINGTON   
  Y010 5GD  
  Tel: +44 (0) 1904325062  
                Fax: +44 (0) 1904325021   
  
Public Administration in Developing Countries: An Examination of Service User 
Construction of Bureaucratic Corruption in the Lands Bureau of Lagos State, 
Nigeria  
Researcher: Salome Ufoma Osia   
  Please tick the appropriate box  YES  NO  
1.   I agree to participate in this study      
2.   
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and I am free to 
withdraw from the research at any time prior to the conclusion of this Doctoral 
program without giving any reason and without any detriment to myself and my 
organisation  
  
  
3.   
I confirm that I have read and understand clearly the information sheet for this 
research and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study. These 
questions have been answered satisfactorily by the researcher  
  
  
4.   
I understand that the interview will be audio-taped and that I may still take part in 
the study even if I do not want the interview to be audio taped  
  
  
5.   
I understand that only the researcher and her named supervisors have access to the 
information collected during the study  
  
  
6.   
I am aware that the information collected during the interview will be used to write 
up a Doctoral thesis  
  
  
7.   
I understand that information collected during the course of the research project will 
be treated as confidential. This means that my name, or any other information that 
could identify me, will not be included in anything written as a result of the research  
  
  
8.   
I understand that at the successful completion of this Doctoral thesis information 
obtained towards its completion will be destroyed thereafter  
  
  
9.   I would like to be informed of the outcome of the research via a report summary      
 Name of Participant  Date  Signature  
Name of Researcher  Date  Signature  
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A p p e n d i x  C :  D e t a i l e d  R e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  E L M P S  E t h i c s  
C o m m i t t e e  
24/10/2013  
Salome U. Osia 
ELMPS Lite Form, Page 5,  
(Recruitment of 
Participants)  
Mandatory Comment:   
The case is made that anonymity can be assured by taking a 
random sample of all lawyers active in Lagos State (p. 6, 10). Yet 
on p. 5 it states that the lawyers will have had a recent interaction 
with the Lands Bureau. Is this a significantly smaller group? If 
so, how will anonymity be assured? More needs to be said about 
how participants will be randomly selected.  
  Answer:   
Annually, practicing lawyers in Lagos State are required to 
update their business profile with the Nigerian Bar  
Association (NBA). Customarily this profile states the kind of 
commercial practice that a lawyer and his/her firm engages in. 
Based on this annually updated profile, lawyers and law firms 
that state that they engage in property law are my focus. In Lagos 
State, most relation to property law which generally includes, 
mortgages and the general registration and transfer of title to 
landed property involves a direct dealing with the Lands Bureau 
which is the institution under study. Also, it should be noted that 
this sample group is not a small group of lawyers, as most 
commercial law firms engage in property law. Thus, selection of 
participants will be based on the updated profile of law firms and 
lawyers.       
ELMPS Lite Form, Page 
10,  
Box (ii – Risk to the 
researcher)  
Mandatory Comment:   
Sentences such as the following do not fill the reader with 
confidence: ‘Lagos State like every other city in the world is a 
relatively safe city’ (p. 10). This is nonsense on various levels – 
basic personal security measures should be taken.    
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  Answer:   
As a safety precaution, the researcher will always carry a mobile 
phone to use in case of an emergency.  
   
Also, the researcher will check in daily with a designated point 
of contact in Nigeria throughout the time in the field and my 
research supervisors will be provided details of the contact 
person.     
Participant Information 
Sheet  
Mandatory Comment:   
This is too long, and should be edited to under 2 pages (I suggest 
cutting possible benefits, and risks or inconveniences);   
Para. 1 talks of three people conducting the PhD – distinguish 
between the student and supervisors;   
P. 2, the participants cannot withdraw from the research at any 
time, only prior to the completion of the PhD or related research 
outputs;  
 Explain ‘research panel committee’;   
The information ‘will’, not ‘may’, be used to write up a Doctoral 
thesis. 
 Answer:   
Thank you for the suggestions and they have been incorporated 
and highlighted below. (For ease of reading please find attached 
to this document a copy of the participant information sheet)  
  
Before:  
  
Public Administration in Developing Countries: An 
Examination of Service User Impact on Bureaucratic 
Corruption in the Lands Bureau of Lagos State, Nigeria. 
You are invited to take part in a research study which is being 
conducted as part of a Doctoral Research degree at The 
University of York by Ms Salome U. Osia, Dr Lynne Baxter and 
Professor Stephen Linstead. We appreciate your participation 
which we believe will greatly enhance the findings of this study.  
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Accordingly, before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being 
undertaken and what it will involve. Kindly take time to read the 
following information carefully and please do ask if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Purpose of this Research  
Based on the incessant civil service reforms and in particular, 
the recent SERVICOM initiative by the Government, it is 
apparent that improving public service delivery and reducing 
bureaucratic corruption is fundamental to the efficient and 
effective functioning of the bureaucracy and public institutions 
in general.  
However, in the pursuance of these reform efforts a fundamental 
element – the service user – whose contribution to the successful 
implementation of these reforms is constantly underrated is 
rarely involved in the reform process.   
Consequently, the aim of this research is to emphasise the 
importance of the service users in the reform process by 
highlighting the possible impact which they have on 
bureaucratic behaviour and the delivery of service.   
The Lands Bureau is chosen as a case study due to the important 
economic and social role of land in a society which makes this 
institution highly susceptible to corruption.    
  
Your Involvement  
In your professional capacity as a legal practitioner you have 
been identified as a potential participant in this study due to your 
extensive interaction with the different departments in the Lands 
Bureau. This puts you in the unique position of haven been 
affected by various forms of bureaucratic corruption.   
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed 
in a place that is convenient for you. The interview will take 
approximately one hour, and with your permission, will be 
audio-taped. Before we start the interview, you will be given an 
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opportunity to ask questions and I will ask you to sign a written 
consent form confirming that you are happy to take part in the 
study.   
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason 
and without any detriment to yourself or your organisation.  
Possible Benefits  
This is an opportunity for you to share your experience about 
interacting with the Lands Bureau of Lagos State as such 
information could inform research for future service delivery 
and institutional reform efforts. Also, the findings of this study 
may create a better understanding of why past reform efforts 
have been ineffective and what perspective to explore to 
possibly get better results.  
Risks or Inconvenience  
There are no risks attached to this study. Your interview scripts 
will be kept strictly confidential and are available only to the 
researchers.  
The Information You Provide  
Interview tapes will be transcribed. All tapes and transcriptions 
will be locked in a safe place. All information collected during 
the course of the study will only be viewed by the research panel 
committee and remain strictly confidential. The confidential 
handling, processing, storage and disposal of data will be in 
accordance with Data Protection Guidelines.  
At the end of the study, this information may be used to write up 
a Doctoral thesis and conference presentations. The names of the 
people, who have taken part in the research or any other 
information that could identify them, will not appear in the thesis 
or in any other written forms when the study is completed.  
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the 
final report, if they indicate so. When the study is completed, all 
information will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a storeroom 
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of the York Management School, University of York and will be 
destroyed at the successful conclusion of the Doctoral project.  
What is the Next Step?  
If you are willing to participate in the study, a suitable date, time 
and place for the conduction of the interview will be arranged 
after all your questions have been sufficiently answered by the 
researcher. On the day of the interview and before its 
commencement, a consent form will be signed. The consent 
form will not be used to identify you. It will be filed separately 
from all the other information. However, you may keep this 
sheet for reference.  
Further Information  
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please 
feel free to contact the main researcher Ms Salome U. Osia on 
+44 (0) 074 153 164 34 or +234 (0) 708 025 0665 or email 
suo500@york.ac.uk.   
   
After:  
Public Administration in Developing Countries: An 
Examination of Service User Construction of Bureaucratic 
Corruption in the Lands Bureau of Lagos State, Nigeria.  
You are invited to take part in a study which is being conducted 
as part of a Doctoral Research degree at The University of 
York by Ms Salome U. Osia and supervised by Dr Lynne 
Baxter and Professor Stephen Linstead. Your participation will 
be appreciated as it will greatly enhance the findings of this 
study.  
Accordingly, before you decide whether or not to take part in 
this study it is important you have a fair idea of what the research 
is all about. Kindly take time to read the following information 
carefully and please do ask if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information.  
Purpose of this Research  
Previous reforms in the civil service which have focused on 
improving service delivery and eradicating bureaucratic 
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corruption have always looked at the problem from the 
perspective of the bureaucrat. In other words, most reform efforts 
(which have been largely unsuccessful) have based reforms on 
this singular bureaucratic perspective.  
Consequently, the aim of this research is to proffer another 
perspective – that of the service user – which should also be 
considered in formulating a more effective reform program.   
Your Involvement  
In your professional capacity as a legal practitioner you have 
been identified as a potential participant in this study due to your 
extensive interaction with the different departments in the Lands 
Bureau. This puts you in the position to have an in-depth 
understanding of the nature of service delivery in this institution.    
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed 
in a place that is convenient for you. The interview will take 
approximately one hour, and with your permission, will be 
audio-taped. Before we start the interview, you will be given an 
opportunity to ask questions and I will ask you to sign a written 
consent form confirming that you are happy to take part in the 
study.   
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to  
withdraw from the research at any time prior to the completion 
of the Doctoral program without giving a reason and without 
any detriment to yourself or your organisation.  
The Information You Provide  
Interview tapes will be transcribed. All tapes and transcriptions 
will be locked in a safe place. All  
information collected during the course of the study will only 
be viewed by the researcher and her supervisors and will 
remain strictly confidential. The confidential handling, 
processing, storage and disposal of data will be in accordance 
with Data Protection Guidelines.  
At the end of the study, this information will be used to write 
up a Doctoral thesis and conference presentations. The names 
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of the people, who have taken part in the research or any other 
information that could identify them, will not appear in the thesis 
or in any other written forms when the study is completed.  
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the 
final report, if they indicate so. When the study is completed, all 
information will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a storeroom 
of the York Management School, University of York and will be 
destroyed at the successful conclusion of the Doctoral project.  
What is the Next Step?  
If you are willing to participate in the study, a suitable date, time 
and place for the conduction of the interview will be arranged 
after all your questions have been sufficiently answered by the 
researcher. On the day of the interview and before its 
commencement, a consent form will be signed. The consent 
form will not be used to identify you. It will be filed separately 
from all the other information. However, you may keep this 
sheet for reference.  
Further Information  
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please 
feel free to contact the main researcher Ms Salome U. Osia on 
+44 (0) 074 153 164 34 or +234 (0) 708 025 0665 or email 
suo500@york.ac.uk. 
Informed Consent Form Mandatory Comment:   
It needs to be clearer how participants will indicate ‘no’ in 
response to any of the statements. Make similar change to the one 
outlined above with regard withdrawal from the research ‘at any 
time’. Point 5 about the research team is unclear (if there is such 
a team, explain earlier). Add a point whether participants wish to 
receive a summary of the final report (as noted in the Information 
Sheet). 
 Answer:   
All the above changes have been effected in the reviewed  
Informed Consent Form which is attached to this document. 
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Anonymity Mandatory Comment:   
The researcher repeatedly emphasises that all risks to the 
participants can be dealt with by guaranteeing anonymity. 
However, given that the topic of the project is a presumably 
illegal activity (corruption) and the study aim is to  
investigate legal practitioners’ involvement in this activity 
(whether as passive supporters/active engagers), surely there are 
implications here for the researcher and the participants if 
participants disclose involvement in illegal activities? It would 
be useful if the researcher could provide further information 
about how such disclosures would be handled. Researchers can 
end up in very difficult positions when they have guaranteed 
somebody anonymity and their research findings shed light on 
illegal practices. It is important that such issues are considered in 
advance of fieldwork. 
 Answer:   
Thank you for the suggestion.  
To clarify some issues I will like to highlight the methodology to 
be employed in this research and the advantage of this for the 
current study.  
The methodology to be employed in this study is ‘discourse 
analysis’ which looks at how social actors construct reality 
through their discourse. Thus, the focus of this analytical 
paradigm is not on the individual per se but their ‘discourse’ 
which reflects their construction of reality and why it is so 
constructed.  
  
In relation to this work, the researcher considers this sample 
group as a ‘pool of discourse’ which when analysed may provide 
another perspective to bureaucratic corruption. Thus the focus of 
the study is not on whether people actually participate in corrupt 
activities but why and what is necessitating such participation.     
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Access to Data Mandatory Comment:   
The information sheet mentions the ‘research panel committee’ 
as having access to the data and it is not clear at all who these 
people are. Likewise, the consent form mentions ‘members of the 
research team’. In contrast, the application form states that the 
researcher will be the only person who has access to the data. The 
researcher should clarify who precisely will have access to the 
data and ensure that this is stated clearly on both the information 
sheet and consent form. 
 Answer:   
I am sorry for the initial confusion. The necessary corrections 
have been made and it is reflected below.  
  
Before:  
  
Participant Information Sheet  
All information collected during the course of the study will 
 only be viewed by the research panel committee and remain 
strictly confidential.  
  
Informed Consent Form  
I understand that only the members of the research team have 
access to the information collected during the study.  
  
After:  
Participant Information Sheet  
All information collected during the course of the study will only 
be viewed by the researcher and her supervisors and will remain 
strictly confidential. (And the supervisors were named prior to 
this paragraph. Please find attached the full Information sheet).  
  
Informed Consent Form  
I understand that only the researcher and her named supervisors 
have access to the information collected during the study. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
  
229 
 
A p p e n d i x  D :  T r a n s c r i p t  S a m p l e  
 
Interview on the Mainland with LP 8:  9th January, 2014 
SO: How long have you been interacting with the lands bureau of Lagos state? 
LP 8: Ehm…I have been interacting with them since 1993. 
SO: And over this period what kind of transaction do you conduct on a frequent basis? 
LP 8: Ehm…most of the things we do there is like you want to conduct a search in relation 
to a title to land, to perfect a deed of mortgage or a deed of assignment or maybe to put 
up a caveat or a caution…these are the things we frequently do at the lands ministry. 
SO: Okay…if we pick a particular transaction for example C of O what are the steps you 
take in order to conclude this transaction? 
LP 8: The steps we take in perfecting a C of O is first of all you have to apply to the 
surveyor general’s office, for a land information certificate, to know whether the land is 
under government acquisition or free of acquisition, that will help you to know 
whether…that is if it’s a government land you have to pay some money to get it done but 
if it’s a private land then you have to deal with the land owners. So that land information 
will now tell you the location where the land is and with it you can now purchase a form 
and file the application in Alausa, so with that application they will now assess the 
land…the fees payable and they will give you an assessment fees to enable you to know 
how much you’re going to pay in order to conclude the transaction. 
SO: So based on this transaction you can say you interact with different departments… 
LP 8: Yes… 
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SO: Now considering you also involve in searches, mortgages meaning your interaction 
with them is quite extensive… 
LP 8: Yes… 
SO: So how easy is it to interact with these different departments in concluding a 
particular transaction? 
LP 8: Over the years it has been very cumbersome due to the fact that you’re not dealing 
with only a department; in as much as you’re dealing with a department you’re also 
dealing with the individual staff who either in one way or the other want you to 
compromise and the next process won’t be so difficult. Sometimes the files that are 
supposed to go under normal process when it comes to their table, because either because 
they don’t want to do their job or they are lacking proper supervision they want to leave 
it there until the owner of the job comes; when you come they want you to “facilitate” it, 
apparently they are looking for something may be to put in their pocket in order to do the 
job they are supposed to do legitimately. So these are the difficulties we encounter.  
Be that as it may it will go a long way to delay the job, something that is supposed to be 
concluded maybe in 3months time will span over a period of maybe 6months to 1year, so 
you end up following it up yourself instead of going through the normal process. 
SO: So how do you now circumvent these kinds of problems? 
LP 8: The way you circumvent it is that since you know that there is no how the job can 
get done on its own without you intervening you have to be following it up. When it gets 
to survey, you go to survey and locate where the job is and see the officer that is in charge 
and say “please this is my job o” and in the process you can “grease” his palm and once 
you grease his palm amongst all the files he will bring out your own and attend to it, every 
other one that has not received any attention will remain there until the owner comes. So 
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that is what you continue doing from office to office until you get the whole thing 
concluded. 
SO: Have there never been any time that you go in there you submit your work and you 
actually conclude it without…you monitor it fine but you don’t have to grease anybody’s 
palm? 
LP 8: It’s a risk…because if you try it the next time you’re going there you might not be 
able to locate your file any longer. It would have gotten lost in the midst of other files 
because your file is not the only work that is there so if you don’t follow up your file you 
might be surprised when you get there you won’t be able to locate even the particular 
place where it is. 
SO: So even if you can’t locate a file is there no department that you could complain to 
like a monitoring department that tries to help you locate your files or if you have bad 
service delivered to you can you also complain to that department? 
LP 8: Ehm if you complain they will also need some information from you…where was 
the last place you located your file? To enable them trace it…if you don’t have that 
information how can they trace it? 
SO: I thought now due to the IT they have there that you can just give them only the 
number of the file and they trace the location… 
LP 8: …yes they can trace it but ehm you have to also give them information where the 
file was last…like you can say it went to survey on so and so date so with that they can 
go into their system to track it, that is the only way. 
SO: Okay, based on your two decade plus experience how will you rate service delivery 
there…have there been times that it was very good then sometimes it was bad or all 
through it has been bad? 
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LP 8: Initially you know it used to be…it wasn’t all that difficult…at the initial 
stage…because it was of recent that they brought out so many…introduce so many things 
that you have to meet up that was when it was becoming difficult. 
SO: So in the 1990s it was quite easy for you to conclude a transaction? 
LP 8: Yes it was quite easy, but of recent because of so many things they introduced you 
know it is not easy anymore. 
SO: So under this particular administration will you say any improvement has occurred 
with regards to service delivery or will you say it has still been the same bad services you 
have been receiving so far? 
LP 8: Ehm…there is a little improvement in the area of the services but in the area of the 
period that it takes to conclude it, I don’t think there has been any improvement, it is even 
getting worse. 
SO: If you say improvements in the area of services can you give me an example of the 
service you are talking about? 
LP O: The service I am talking about is like getting the Governor’s consent…because all 
these C of O, legal mortgage, deed of assignment at the end of it all what you are just 
looking for is the Governor’s consent to the transaction. The processes to getting that 
Governor’s consent are a bit cumbersome that is what we are complaining about. I have 
some files that I am doing here for 3 to 4years now and I am still on it…sometimes you’ll 
pay tax by the time you know it they will say it is expired…so many other things. 
Sometimes they will start…once they look at the document…the location of the property 
these are one of the serious problems we are facing now. If the property is in Ikoyi the 
tax…they have a personal income tax…they have a tax department in that area [which 
determines the taxes to be paid by the parties to the transaction]. For property around that 
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area they could say that the assignee is eligible to pay N500,000 the basis of which they 
arrived at that figure, nobody knows. For when someone who is trying to perfect his 
property [title] to get Governor’s consent you are asking him to go and pay a million plus 
in taxes…sometimes the clients or the people who are trying to do the transaction gets 
frustrated at the end of the day they are looking for a million plus to pay for tax they will 
just abandon the process… 
SO: So now you’re saying that the assignee has to pay for the assignor’s tax and his 
own… 
LP 8: …yes! Because the assignor has pushed over the whole thing to you…he is not 
interested cause he has given the property to you and you are the one that is trying to 
perfect it to your own name so you’re left with paying for him. So the assignee will now 
pay for the assignor…the same thing in legal mortgage. 
SO: Basically what you are seeing as the failings of the system right now are the processes 
and some of the policies that are been implemented in recent times… 
LP 8: Yes. 
SO: So what do you think could be done to actually improve the system? 
LP 8: What could be done to improve the system like in this area of tax that I mentioned 
now is that they have to give a reasonable tax assessment, this is one of the major 
problems we are facing there…taxes are over-quoted, it is out of proportion, they don’t 
have any yardstick. Because you’re having property in Ikoyi they will give you an 
outrageous amount of money to pay, not only you, you will pay for the assignor and pay 
for the assignee, if it is a company they say two directors. 
SO: If you are given an outrageous quotation is it possible to approach the head of that 
department to complain about it? 
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LP 8: Yes… when you complain they will tell you it is not their business that the 
quotation that you have is the due assessment that they cannot do anything. They will 
also refer you to the highest man which is not easy to get to, that you should write an 
application complaining on that but meanwhile they are not attending to that appeal and 
then the job is stuck. These are the policies a lot of them like this tax issue…like they will 
ask you to go and get a picture and the street and you know all these signboards that is 
showing the place…you know these are the difficulties…so many things they will 
mention. Initially they were not requesting for all these things.               
SO: Looking at it from another angle is it possible that we as service users we also 
contribute to bad services? 
LP 8: Bad services…yes. The way we contribute to bad services is that sometimes most 
of these requirements the banks who are…because all these things are pertaining to loan 
transactions, sometimes some of the customers who come to bank to take up loan some 
of them get that loan maybe on friendly basis, sometimes some of the requirements are 
not met they will now disburse the loan. And once a customer has taken a loan from the 
bank they will be on the run because he doesn’t want the whole documentation to be 
done; because once the mortgage is perfected the bank can dispose of the property in the 
event of default. Because of that they don’t want to…if you ask them to bring their tax 
clearance they will not respond, if you ask them to give you one or two things that will 
help you to do the perfection, they are nowhere to be seen because they don’t want you 
to conclude the transaction. 
So the lawyer who is doing it in Alausa is faced with the problem of not having enough 
documentation to present to the lands registry. That is the area that I think we contribute. 
SO: You don’t think we contribute in any way to bureaucratic corruption? 
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LP 8: Yeah they do too because ehm…will I say that they contribute…because the people 
there are expecting it…because if you don’t do that you will not have any success in what 
you’re doing. So it’s like you’re doing it but you’re reluctantly doing it. Because if 
like…like the example I gave you initially you found out that your file is on somebody’s 
table and the thing has been there for one month, he has not treated it meanwhile he is 
treating files even those that came after your own, they have been treated and sent 
out…they will now say “are you the owner of this file? We have not been seeing you”. 
SO: If you have a department that you can report such problems to will you take that 
opportunity to report such officers? 
LP 8: Why not? But one thing is that…is like what they do in that lands bureau is like a 
“mafia” thing…even the smallest officer does not have any respect for the man on top, 
the man on top respects the smallest officer…so it’s like he is not even scared about the 
man on top because all of them are doing the same thing. There was a time I had problem 
there I wanted to take it up they said ‘oga the best thing is for you to go and settle with 
this woman o, because you know you’re always here in Alausa once she finds out you’re 
fighting her now or that you have reported her all your job once they see it…you cannot 
locate your file again and you start having problems’. And it’s possible, they can gang up 
against you and frustrate you…say okay you are the one who is writing petition, who is 
reporting…so we are being careful because that is where you’re working that is where 
you’re making your money, you don’t want to be messed up. Not that you don’t know 
what to do but this is a typical problem that we have in this country, it’s not only in that 
lands it’s everywhere all facets of government. That is the problem, these people and 
corruption. 
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L I S T  O F  A B B R E V I A T I O N S   
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index 
ELMPS Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee 
EDMS  Electronic Document Management System 
FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
IAAF  International Association of Athletics Federations 
IMF  International Monetary Funds 
IPPIS  Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programmes 
TI  Transparency International 
TSA  Treasury Single Account 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
WADA World Anti-Doping Agency 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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